


Democratic Elections and Nigeria's National Security

Isaac O. ALBERT

Nathaniel L. DANJIBO

Olusola O. ISOLA

Stephen A. FALETI



Peace and
Conflict Studies
Programme

Institute of African Studies
University of Ibadan
Ibadan



Published by:

GPO Box 339, Dugbe, Ibadan

e-mail: johnnarchers@yahoo.co.uk

for:

Peace and Conflict Studies Programme
Institute of African Studies

© Peace and Conflict Studies Programme,
Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 2011

First published 2011

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, who is the copyright owner.

ISBN 978-978-2188-48-4

Chapter 1: Elections and State Fragility in Nigeria's Fourth

Republic

Professor Isaac Olawale Albert

Chapter 2: Elections and Nigeria's National Security

Adeyoyin Adeayo

Chapter 3: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Party Nomination: The Case of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Delta State, Nigeria

Agbegbedia Oke Anthony

Chapter 4: Violent Crime in Party Politics and the Electoral Process in Nigeria's Democracy

71

Akintilebo Adekunle Akinwale

Chapter 5: Democracy and Resource Management: The Role of Credible Election

86

I. B. Allege, M. B. Kareem and I. A. Bolaji

Chapter 6: A Framework for Intervening in Election-Related Conflicts and Violence

100

Joseph T. Atang

Chapter 7: Governance, Electoral Violence and Nigeria's National Security

112

Abosede Babatundé

Chapter 8: Election Crimes in Nigeria and Legal Steps to Safeguard National Security

137

Titus Kehinde Adekunle

3

Chapter 9: Reframing Security Sector Reforms for Effective Engagement of Nigeria's Elections <i>Stephen A. Falei</i>	148	Chapter 18: Re-Contextualisation of the Concept of <i>Godfatherism</i> : Reflections on Nigeria <i>Ifeanyi Onwuzuruike</i>	292
Chapter 10: Electoral Violence and National Security in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Towards Alternative Framework for Security and Development <i>Akhakpe Ighodalo Bassey</i>	166	Chapter 19: Electoral Violence and National Security in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective <i>Kingdom E. Oji</i>	319
Chapter 11: Fear of Crime and Electoral Violence: Mainstreaming Gender in Nigeria Politics <i>Okunola, R.A. and Ikuomola, A.D.</i>	178	Chapter 20: Enhancing a Viable Electoral Process in Nigeria for National Security Sustainability: The Role of Community Broadcasting <i>Jude Tema Kur</i>	331
Chapter 12: Re-Examining the Management of Election Conflicts in Nigeria: Suggestions for an Integrated Approach and Development of an Early Warning Mechanism <i>Olusola O. Isola</i>	198	Chapter 21: Understanding and Practising Democracy in Nigeria <i>Rev. Fr. Dr. Mike Ukah Egbua</i>	350
Chapter 13: Youth and Electoral Violence: Implications for Human Security in Nigeria <i>A.A. Karim</i>	209	Chapter 22: Financing Elections, Party Funding and Political Violence in the Fourth Republic: Implications for Nigeria's National Security <i>Dhikru Adewale Yagboyaju</i>	367
Chapter 14: Electoral Violence and Its Implications for National Security in Nigeria's Fourth Republic <i>A.A. Karim and Oluremi Albert</i>	219	Chapter 23: New Security Paradigm and the Imperative for Philosopher-kings in Political Offices in Nigeria <i>Adebola B. Ekanola</i>	381
Chapter 15: Barons, Aspirants and the Struggle for Tickets: Democratic and National Security Concerns of Party Nomination in Nigeria <i>Chukwueneka Gahia and Chibuzor Chie Nwobueze</i>	231	Chapter 24: The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Zoning of the Office of the President in Nigeria: Threat to National Unity and Stability <i>Nathaniel D. Danjibo</i>	397
Chapter 16: Challenges of Internal Democracy in Nigeria's Political Parties: The Bane of Intra-Party Conflicts in the Peoples Democratic Party <i>Chris C. Ojukwu and Tope Olajifa</i>	250	Index	419
Chapter 17: Early Warning and Early Response: Recipe for Preventing Electoral Violence and Ensuring Sustainable Security <i>Olumide Olaniran</i>	271		

7

Governance, Electoral Violence and Nigeria's National Security

Abosede Babatundé

INTRODUCTION

Africa's social formation was characterised by fratricidal struggles for state power, group domination and counter domination. Some scholars have tried to explain various aspects of contemporary violence in the form of guerrilla wars, rebellion, political assassinations, warlords, fratricidal struggles for power, despotism, and so on in terms of this past (Mazrui, 1967, 1968; Bozeman, 1976; LeVine, 1965; Sundiata, 1988). The configuration of various African kingdoms and territories into nation-states laid the foundation for conflicts. This fundamental conflict has persisted till date, and foregrounds many of the apparent crises and or conflicts in the African states. After many of these African nations fought the war for freedom, the independence they got became enmeshed in

ethnic conflicts (Yakubu, 2005). Colonialism in Africa resulted in the breakdown of time-honoured practices, the disruption of civilisations, religious beliefs and social values, the creation of new ethnic identities and the imposition of new arbitrary and artificial political boundaries. The crisis of state building has been particularly serious in Africa because most of the states were constructed by colonial authorities with scant regard to historical, ethnic and cultural affinities and worse still, very little was done to fully integrate the new states as the growth of civil society which historically serves as the engine room for civil integration was and continues to be emasculated (Osaghae, 2005). The separation of kith and kin and the emergence of some ethnic groups as dominant groups and others as minority groups led to various wars. The effect of the above was secessionist attempts, coups and counter-coups. This was the situation that led to the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, in which the Igbo attempted to secede from Nigeria.

Nigeria is an amalgam of rival ethnic groups pitched against each other in a contest for power and resources that have reflected in the political processes, occasionally threatening the corporate existence of the state. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has struggled to establish a democratic government. Nigerian political life has been marked by conflict along both ethnic and geographic lines, characterised most notably by northern Hausa domination of the military and the civil war fought by the southern Igbo for the sovereign state of Biafra. Poor governance has undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state apparatus and raised doubt about whether Nigeria and its multitude of ethnic groups can be held together as one nation. Given the multi-ethnic nature and the high level of ethnic identification in Nigeria, political struggle takes place along highly divisive ethnic lines (Williams, 2004). It is, therefore, understandable that the major ethno-national movements are concentrated in the south and middle belt regions of the country because the military rulers were perceived as perpetuating northern (Hausa-Fulani) hegemonic interests (Awodiya, 2006).

It is hardly contentious that the Nigerian state is a product of coercion and remained so for many years under military rule, thereby not providing its citizens the opportunity to imbibe a democratic culture and way of life. Underpinning this characterisation are presence of weak state structures and incapacity, poor performance and illegitimacy, corruption, inability to establish control over the monopoly of violence, lack of security, and law and order (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999; Agbu, 2004). Development is impeded

by entrenched poverty, pervasive corruption, and challenges of governance. It is this weak state that produces politics that makes violence a prime means of political action in Nigeria (Allen, 1999). It enables excessive coercion, repression and abusive violence, constructs a vicious terrain of violent challenges (Ikelegbe, 2004). This antagonistic characterisation is associated with the framing of politics in the mould of ethnic conflicts where claims are seen as largely exclusive (Ake, 1996). In such a situation, the image of a biased state furthering sectoral interests would be the dominant perception of the major segment of the population. This results in the making of exclusive political claims and it engenders fierce competition for the control of the state, thus raising the quest for power into a zero-sum game as witnessed in Nigeria. In this game, the only avenue of mobilising support available to the elites struggling for power is ethnicity.

However, the intervention of the military in the political affairs of the country and their long duration in governance, succeeded in abating the full manifestation of ethno-nationalism. Indeed, Nigeria's political life has been dominated by military coups and long military-imposed transition programs to civilian rule. The military has ruled Nigeria for about three out of its five decades since independence. The return of the country to democracy in 1999 enabled the suppressed ethno-national grievances to explode, throwing up issues beyond the capacities of democratic institutions. Ethno-nationalist movement in the south and middle-belt questioned the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani military elites. The emergence of organisations such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Movement for the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) and Oodua People Congress (OPC) was seen as bringing into the open, complaints that were previously concealed, prior to the transition to democracy (Uban, 2006; Jason, 2006). The activities of these organisations, suggest an escalation of ethnic consciousness in the country (Duruji, 2008). This has permeated the Nigerian society to the extent that the activities of these ethnic militia organisations challenged the legitimacy of the state. The resort of the Nigerian democratic government to failed military administration's tactics of unleashing the might of the state to suppress these ethnonationalist manifestations brings into question rule of law and due process which are vital elements of any democracy (Philips, 2000). It has become a threat to the survival of the country's nascent democracy and national stability.

Nigeria democratisation experiments have midwived three republics. However, the crises which have rendered the Nigerian democracy palpable

persisted. Prior to embarking on the democratising experiment that supposedly marked the end of military rule in Nigeria on May 29, 1999, there have been two previous Presidential elections in Nigeria. These elections were not conducted perfectly and there were well-founded allegations of fraud and other irregularities. However, compared to Nigeria's recent elections, the conduct of those elections demonstrated a commitment to engage in legitimate, democratic processes. The conduct of the 2003 and 2007 elections, however, was extremely disconcerting. The overall credibility of the elections has been seriously questioned by the domestic and international observers. The report by Nigerian observers regarding the 2003 elections confirmed numerous reports of fraud in many states across the country (Transition Monitoring Group, 2003). The European Union observers' report also reported widespread election-related malpractice in a number of states in the Middle Belt, the South East, and the South South (European Commission, 2003). The conduct of the 2007 elections in particular, have both domestic and international observers allegations of vote rigging, fraud, and ballot stuffing raised serious concern about Nigeria democratic survival. The international observers group including the European Union, the Commonwealth, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Republican Institute, were critical of the conduct of the elections. All of these international observer groups concurred that the 2007 electoral process did not meet minimum international standards for democratic elections and that the polls also failed the Nigerian people. The conclusions reached by international observers echoed the findings of the domestic observer groups. Following the elections, the European Union (EU) observers issued a report considered the most disparaging it has ever released anywhere in the world. Consequently, the European Parliament delivered a resolution recommending that European Union aid be withheld from Nigeria until "new, credible elections have been held".

Indeed, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people in many places, and in a number of ways. The pre-election period was characterised by the inability or refusal of the election authorities to release basic information about electoral process to the contestants and the electorate. A major problem that marred this stage of the electoral process was that polling disenfranchised many prospective voters. International observers reported that in all of the elections observed in every region of the world, such a delay in the delivery of essential electoral material and in the opening of polling sites is unprecedented including previous elections in Nigeria. The serious flaws

witnessed during this electoral process threaten to further erode citizen confidence in the country's democratic institutions. The cumulative effect of the serious problems substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process. It can be argued that the Nigeria electoral process with regards to the conduct of the 2007 polls jeopardised the forward trajectory of democratic consolidation. It is pertinent as this point to question the fact that Nigeria, a decade after democratic transition still lacks the political will to conduct credible elections whereas its poorer neighbours, such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Sierra Leone have managed to conduct credible elections in a short period of time following their democratic transitions.

The 2007 elections marked the first time in Nigeria's history that the country moved from one democratically elected administration to another, rather than falling back to military rule as it has done consistently since 1960. Expectations that the 2007 elections will represent a significant improvement against previous elections proved a mirage. But far from improving on the 1999 and 2003 elections, the conduct of the 2007 election was worse. It has been argued that the 2007 polls represent a step backward in the conduct of elections in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2007). However, prior to the 2007 elections, certain positive trends were observed in the country's democratisation process. The major achievements of the political transition that has been in progress since 1999 included an independent judiciary that responded in a timely way to the deadlines imposed by the electoral calendar; a legislature that has exercised its oversight and representative functions more effectively; a civil society that has mobilised in large numbers to monitor the electoral process and to educate voters; and a more vibrant media that has created channels for the expression of diverse views and the dissemination of information.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the Nigerian elections took place against the backdrop of advances in democratic governance and competitive elections across Africa which has been termed the "third wave of democratisation". The African continent has moved from a situation in which only four countries including Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal and the Gambia practised some level of multipartism in 1990 to one in which 34 countries were rated 'free' or 'partly free' in the 2006 *Freedom in the World* Publication of the Freedom House, despite ongoing conflicts and stalled transitions in countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Increasingly, African countries such as Ghana, Benin, Botswana, Mali, South Africa, Zambia, Namibia, and recently Mauritania among others demonstrate to

the continent and to the rest of the world the universal nature of democratic principles and practices, including the desire of peoples to freely choose those who govern them through regular and credible elections. It is noteworthy that since 1990, the number of African heads of state and government who voluntarily retired or left office after losing an election has increased to nearly 40, compared to only three heads of state between 1960 and 1990. This reflects the changing political face of Africa.

Considering Nigeria's strategic role in the West African sub-region, African continent as well as in the international community, the failure of Nigeria's democratisation process has far reaching implications. Therefore, this paper examines the linkages between governance, electoral violence and Nigeria's national security and reviews extant studies on Nigeria's electoral process and outcomes. The importance of this paper cannot be over-emphasised given the extent to which ineffective governance and electoral process have undermined Nigeria's development and stability. It argues that flawed elections in Nigeria could disrupt the ongoing fragile democratic transition, with grave consequences, including increased potential for violence and instability in the Nigerian state, West Africa sub-region and the African continent. The non-performance of government and governance result in electoral violence with dire consequence for national security. This paper indicates that governance, electoral violence and security are organically linked. The Nigerian government lacked the political will to ensure credible elections because they are the beneficiary of the flawed elections. What are the chances of credible electoral process in Nigeria? Indeed, there is an urgent need for concerted efforts to rescue the credibility of the election process, so that Nigeria's serious internal instability would not be fatally aggravated. Subsequent sections examine governance and the Nigerian electoral context, its implications for Nigeria's national security and stability and proffer recommendations to achieve a positive trajectory of democratic consolidation, domestic and regional stability.

GOVERNANCE AND THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL CONTEXT

One of the major impediments to an enduring democracy in African states is ineffective electoral process cumulating into legitimacy crisis. It is highly imperative to examine governance and the Nigeria electoral process in order to proffer ways of achieving democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Because of Nigeria's history of electoral fraud, elections often have been associated

with political tension, crisis, and even violence. In particular, political tension has significantly increased in the oil-rich Niger Delta region (Adekanye, 1990). While the southern politicians are exerting pressure to retain power, the northern politicians insist that power should revert to their region in fulfilment of a long-standing agreement. Insurgency has spread with the emergence of various ethnic and youth militias who engaged in hostage taking and destruction of oil platform. This situation portrays a deep crisis in governance and consequently the Nigerian state has been clearly embroiled in social struggle in which it has been ineffective in mediating. It could be argued that governance characterised by personal, instead of national interests will have an adverse effect on the electoral system. The overriding of self interest against national interest by Nigerian political leaders has no doubt negatively impacted on the Nigerian electoral system. A transparent electoral system is a tool for good governance that will serve as a better security for political leadership rather than the loss of integrity and credibility arising from a manipulated process.

The democratisation processes in Africa since the 1990s has been geared towards the western liberal democracy which placed empathy on entrenched fundamental human rights through which the citizens could exercise political participation in the political system; existence and adherence to the principle of rule of law that guide functional conflicts concerning the processes for power acquisition; independent electoral body that should be free from the maneuvering and influence of governmental officials and must be viewed as credible by competing parties; principle of political equality which respects the notion of one man, one vote and where the votes of the electorate count; notion of free and fair election, where electorate are not intimidated nor insecure in participating in elections among others. However, what is being practised in Nigeria is far from liberal in any sense.

In a democratic context, elections lead to the choice of decision makers by the majority of citizens. Elections and democracy are therefore inextricably linked. However, as Kurfi (2005) observes, rigging is almost synonymous with Nigerian elections. The objective of electoral rigging or fraud is to frustrate the democratic aspirations of citizens who have voted or would have voted into office someone other than the victor. Are Nigerian elections doomed by the machinations of fraudsters who frustrate the people's democratic aspirations? The outcomes of many elections have been so fiercely contested that the survival of the democratic process has been compromised. This sad history of electoral fraud or rigging has serious

implications for Nigeria's democratic consolidation because the phenomenon is growing rather than declining. The principal forms of rigging and fraud were perfected in the elections of 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003 and 2007. The result is that the outcome of elections has been the subversion of the democratic process rather than its consolidation. Not surprisingly, major political conflicts have emerged around rigged elections (Kurfi, 2005). Nigerian elections in the present democratic dispensation were almost as contentious as the infamous 1983 elections that precipitated the collapse of the Second Republic. The varied forms of electoral malpractice and the high number of incidents of electoral violence rekindled old fears that the basic institutional weaknesses associated with the electoral system could lead to the failure of the democratic experiment. This fear is even more palpable as Nigeria moves toward the 2011 elections.

After series of military coups and failed attempts to establish civilian rule, Nigeria made another transition in 1999, with elections that are best seen in the context of the broader impetus to end military rule. Nigerian and international observers viewed those elections as the beginning of a process of democratisation and the rebuilding of a political infrastructure that would sustain and broaden the efficacy of civilian rule. Consequently, the flaws of a rushed electoral process were largely overlooked. However, there were high expectations that the electoral process would significantly improved for the 2003 polls which were perceived as an opportunity to further advance democratic gains. The elections may be deemed successful in certain respect even though there were also serious problems that compromised the integrity of the process. The viability of many of Nigeria's weak public institutions, most notably the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) was tested. INEC was criticised for its institutional and professional shortcomings and perceived lack of independence. Moreover, a lack of preparation early in the electoral process raised concerns about INEC's ability and commitment to conduct credible elections. Widespread electoral malpractice and the staggering scale of falsified results were possible because of serious shortcomings within the regulatory agencies. Vigorously manipulated by the presidency, INEC virtually abdicated its responsibility as impartial umpire. Inefficient and non-transparent in its operations, it became an accessory to active rigging. Similarly, the massively deployed police and other security services helped curb violence but largely turned blind eyes to, and in some cases helped in the brazen falsification of results.

Domestic and International observers reported that there was extended

delays and lack of transparency in the voter registration process that disenfranchised eligible voters; high levels of political violence; widespread lack of secrecy in balloting, vandalised stolen and stuffed ballot boxes and altered results during the multi-tiered tabulation process particularly in Rivers, Kogi and Enugu states, all of which took place against a background of last-minute transfer of State Resident Electoral Commissioners. The inability or refusal of election authorities to release basic information about the electoral process to the public in the pre-election period undermined transparency and hampered participation. In addition, the accreditation of tens of thousands of domestic election monitors was delayed unnecessarily by INEC. Is it not ironical that these monitoring groups, which had fought for the restoration of civilian democratic government in Nigeria during the difficult period of military rule and were accredited in 1998/99 when the military was in power, were now being impeded by an elected government?

At the party level, party primaries were often contentious and it was observed that the lack of transparency in the selection of candidates impacted negatively on prospects for an inclusive and violence-free electoral process (Ibrahim, 1991). The political parties have a persistent tendency to factionalise as recent study showed that the country's four leading political parties were enmeshed in internal crisis with a high level of violence (Ibrahim, 2006). Prior to the 2007 elections, assassinations of party leaders were rampant. The situation was the same as preceding the 2003 elections. Between June and August 2006, three gubernatorial candidates were assassinated. To understand this mafia-style activity in Nigerian politics, it is important to note that many political parties are operated by political "godfathers," who use money and violence to control the political process. They decide party nominations and campaign outcomes, and when candidates attempt to steer an independent course, they use their preferred instruments to deal with them. As a result, they raise the level of electoral violence and make free and fair elections difficult. Although parties have formal procedures for the election of their leaders, these procedures are often disregarded. Even when they are adhered to, the godfathers have means of determining the outcomes.

Many political parties, especially parties of incumbents, rely on electoral fraud rather than popularity to stay in power. Therefore, the political significance of parties is no longer determined by popular support, as is the case in all democratic countries in the world, but by administrative fiat. That is why so many of Nigeria's political parties devote considerable resources and energy to suspending and expelling members for so-called

anti-party activities. Party barons are mainly interested in controlling the party machine rather than ensuring that they nominate the most popular candidates for competitive electoral posts. As the Babalakin Commission of Inquiry into the 1983 elections rightly argued, the nature of politics and political parties in the country is such that many men and women of ability and character simply keep out of national politics. For the most part, political parties are dominated by men of influence who see funding of political parties as an investment that must yield rich dividends (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1986: 348).

The election observer group revealed that during the election, there was a relatively smooth electoral process in some parts of the Federal Capital Territory, Niger, Plateau and Lagos states. In these places, according to them, polling stations opened on time, with sufficient materials and adequate numbers to give voice to Nigerian voters, and to address issues which adversely affected voters on election day. However, in the preponderances of places the delegates visited, such as Abia, Adamawa, Anambra, Bauchi, Benue, Cross River, Enugu, Kaduna, Ogun and Oyo states, a different picture emerged. Serious irregularities as highlighted by the domestic and international monitoring groups included delay in the distribution of balloting materials, which prevented polls from opening late in the afternoon or not at all; inadequate supply of voting materials, particularly ballots for both the presidential and legislative elections, and the "opening" and "results" sheets. In the case of legislative elections, ballot papers did not include all of the candidates. Because of these omissions, a significant number of races were suspended on election day and had to be re-scheduled. Also, there were issues of inadequate locations and facilities for voting and collation; lack of secrecy of voting; a non-transparent and multi-tiered collation process which made it vulnerable to manipulation; disenfranchisement due to errors in the voters register; inconsistent application of verification procedures for identifying voters; failure to display the voter register; allocations of voters per polling station that were greatly in excess of the standard 500 voters per polling station announced by the commission and underage voting. Another dangerous trend is the recruitment of unemployed youths for electoral violence. While pre-election violence decreased before to the polls, the use of youth for "protection" by political parties before and on election day was prevalent. There were also incidents of improper conduct by security agents, stuffing and scratching of ballot boxes, intimidation by party agents and vote buying. In all places, ballot security was severely compromised as a result of the presidential ballot lacking

serial numbers. This makes the system susceptible to abuse and made it impossible to verify the accuracy of the results.

The cumulative effect of the electoral fraud contributed to a serious lack of public confidence in elections. A public opinion poll conducted by Afrobarometer in 2003 revealed that only 9 percent of Nigerians believed that the polls were free and fair in 2003. The 2007 election was even worse than the 2003. In 2007, Nigeria conducted the third general election since the return to civilian politics in May 1999. The 2007 elections were critical to the future of Nigerian democracy for a number of reasons. The elections marked the first time a third consecutive presidential election took place and the first time one elected leader succeeded another. The military overthrew both the First and Second Republics after heavily rigged and acrimonious second-consecutive elections took place in 1965 and 1983, respectively. The Third Republic under General Ibrahim Babangida was stillborn, as he annulled the 1993 first-round elections. Nigeria, therefore, has a history of problematic elections. Given these electoral experiences, Nigeria needed successful elections in 2011, not only to ensure the legitimacy of the new government and build public confidence in the country's nascent political institutions, but also to demonstrate the country's continued leadership on the continent.

The 2007 elections are a sharp reminder of the many deep and persistent challenges to effective governance in Nigeria. The most critical question is whether the Nigerian government can take the extraordinary steps needed to redress its flawed electoral process in order to serve the public interest and recover the important, yet fragile, gains made by the country's fledgling democratic institutions in the legislative and judiciary arms of government. The positive trends in Nigeria's democratisation process give reason to hope that the concerns resulting from the recent elections can be overcome. As indicated earlier, the Nigerian judiciary performed admirably in rulings that enhanced its credibility and independence in the eyes of many Nigerians. The outgoing National Assembly exercised considerable oversight over an attempted expansion of executive powers, and an energised civil society mobilised in large numbers to monitor the elections and to educate voters. The media also created channels for the expression of diverse views and the dissemination of information. Most importantly, millions of Nigerian voters waited patiently to exercise their fundamental political and civic rights, showing a strong desire to participate in the democratic process.

In the post-election environment, the election tribunals were delayed

with petitions following the outcome of the elections. Even with tribunals based in each of Nigeria's 36 states and new rules to speed the processing of claims, the sheer number of petitions considered more than double the number filed in 2003 overwhelmed the legal system. More than 1,250 election petitions were filed with the election tribunals, including eight that disputed the results of the presidential race, 106 challenging the gubernatorial outcomes, 130 cases against Senate races, 292 related to the House of Representatives results, and 724 cases regarding state legislatures (International Crisis Group, 2007). The delay in resolving election-related conflicts is a major cause for concern. In one notable case after the 2003 elections, it took three years for the election tribunals to finally rule that the true winner of the gubernatorial elections in Anambra State was not the candidate sworn into office. The rightful winner of the 2003 election was finally inaugurated in 2006. The tribunals also took almost three years to rule on the case brought after the 2003 election by the opposition presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. Similar experiences abound in the 2007 elections. In addition, guidelines for filing election petitions, although designed to speed up the process of adjudication, have drawn criticism. Critics cited difficulties in meeting filing requirements, the potential for intimidating witnesses (whose details and sworn statement must be disclosed upon filing) and a lack of cooperation from INEC in providing required documentation, as serious obstacles. The adjudication of electoral disputes is an integral part of the electoral process, but to ensure stability and the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria, the election tribunals must process complaints expeditiously and in a transparent manner. The failure of the adjudication process could result in an escalation of frustration across the country, leading to increased tension. The intimidation of civil society protest against the flawed election by Nigerian security services is also a major challenge to the electoral process. The government needs to recognise civil society's role in advocating for constructive and meaningful reforms, and its right to do so. Such silencing of protest, however, cannot conceal the far-reaching implications of the failed elections for Nigeria and, indeed, Africa. The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) noted rightly that general elections which were expected to help deepen democracy and promote development in the Nigeria nation have, through manipulation and massive electoral fraud, become a source of major national crisis. It is a crisis that threatens the very foundations of the country and threatens to take the nation to a state of anarchy.

In the aftermath of these failed elections, Nigerians are left wondering

whether to keep faith in the country's electoral process and to believe that their votes count, or to succumb to apathy and disaffection with democracy. If Nigerians lose faith in the democratic process as a means for resolving disputes, the potential for tensions and instability will inevitably grow. Almost immediately after the 2007 polls, violence increased in the Niger Delta, and efforts made to disarm militias that perpetrated violence against political opponents and threatened stability and general security across the country through the Amnesty programme has not been deemed successful. Indeed, Nigeria's democracy is in crisis. The 2007 elections were supposed to move the country to a higher rung on the democratisation ladder, create a more conducive environment to resolve its many internal conflicts and strengthen its credentials as a leading peacemaker, but instead generated serious new problems that may be pushing it further towards the status of a failed state. The emerged Nigerian President assumed the mantle of leadership with less legitimacy than any previously elected president and, therefore, with less capacity to moderate and resolve its violent domestic conflicts. Expectations that the Government would redress electoral injustice and punish the most grievous voting frauds, including those by officials of the agencies directly involved in administering the elections remained largely unfulfilled.

Nigerians are confronted with three major challenges in the preparation for elections. First, is that the political class has at its disposal a vast repertoire of electoral fraud techniques, already used to frustrate Nigerians' right to elect their leadership. Second, is whether the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and security forces have the will and capacity to prepare adequately for free and fair elections. Lastly, is the growing tension within the political class, ethnoregional zones, and political parties that threatens the country's political stability. However, these challenges are not insurmountable. Indeed, Nigerians are showing increasing capacity to organise to protect the exercise of democracy.

A central factor in ensuring democratic survival in Nigeria and other African states is free and fair elections. The failure of the electoral process has grave implications for the democratic process as a result of the legitimacy crisis. Nigeria has witnessed persistent crisis of legitimacy in governance as a result of ineffective electoral process (Omodia, 2008). Although elections could not be said to be tantamount to the democratic process in that democracy encompasses other attributes as stated earlier. However, elections are so central to the operation and survival of democracy in that it defines the level of freedom exercised by the people in decoding who represent them in

government. It also serves as an index of noticing whether the electoral body and the judicial organ of government are independent of the legislative and executive organ. However, in Nigeria present democratic dispensation, events have shown that the electoral body is not independent of the party in power. This has been defined in relation to the manner in which the electoral body had conducted elections such as poor planning, device of excluding electorates from voting in places considered to be the strongholds of opposition, and inadequate supply of voting materials, or late arrival of electoral officers to polling stations, all of which are beneficiary to the party in power (Abdullahi, 2008).

Moreover, there have been cases in which candidate that won electoral primaries were replaced by candidates that either never contested or by candidates that were defeated during the exercise. As case in point is the 2007 gubernatorial election in Rivers State in which the name of Rotimi Amaechi, the PDP aspirant who won the primaries was substituted by Celestine Omechia, among many others. Moreover, the scenario in which flag bearers of political parties either in the Presidential or Governorship elections were disqualified from contesting elections few days to the conduct of elections for no genuine reason by the electoral body as observed in the 2007 general elections indicated that the electoral body was not truly independent of government as those decisions served the interest of the party in power. For instance, INEC's decision to disqualify a number of candidates including the vice president, on the grounds of indictment by a federal government administrative panel was overturned by the courts. This was one of many factors that cast doubt on the Commission's impartiality in the pre-election period. When the Supreme Court ruled that the vice president should appear on the ballot five days before the 2007 election, INEC had to rush to print new presidential ballots, which lacked serial numbers as required by law and arrived in the country so late that voting was officially postponed by two hours. In many polling sites, the delay was much longer, and in some places ballots never arrived (International Crisis Group, 2007).

In contrast to what was obtainable in the aborted Third Republic where the judiciary served as a tool for creating political instability that undermined the democratic process, the judiciary under the present democratic dispensation showed a positive development for Nigeria's democratic survival. Indeed, the judiciary has served as a tool for upholding democratic decisions with such cases as the judicial pronouncement of Peter Obi of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) as the duly elected Governor of

Anambra State rather than Chris Ngige of PDP, and the further judgment that the tenure of the administration would end in 2010 rather than 2007. This is coupled with several judicial judgments that led to either the re-run of elections or outright victory for the opposition parties in some states of the Federation including Kogi, Adamawa, Edo, Ondo, Sokoto, Ekiti, among others. Conversely, it must however be stated that in the cases of re-run elections, such elections became cosmetic as the party in power utilised government machinery to the advantage of its candidate. In addition, there were cases in which adjudication were said to be based on political considerations. For instance, political consideration played a major part in the case between Alhaji Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP and Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP as a result of the fall out of the 2003 Presidential elections in which the case was decided in favour of the PDP Presidential candidate by the Nigerian Supreme Court (Isa and Zakari, 2008).

Nigerians as well as many international observers perceived the 2007 elections, as the most poorly organised and massively rigged in the country's history. In a bitterly contentious environment, Nigerian government and the ruling party, People's Democratic Party (PDP) acted with unbridled desperation to ensure winners-take-all victories, not only in the presidency and federal legislature but also in state governorships and assemblies. Characterised as a "do or die" battle by the government, the campaigns and elections also witnessed extensive violence, including over 200 people killed (International Crisis Group, 2007).

Therefore, it is hardly contentious to conclude that the flawed elections have pushed the country further towards a one-party state and diminished citizen confidence in electoral institutions and processes. Most ominously, it has undermined Nigeria's capacity to manage its internal conflicts, deepening already violent tensions in the Niger Delta and refuelling Biafran separatism in the ethnically Igbo south-east. It has also badly damaged the country's international image and the government's legacy as a statesman, thus diminishing their credibility to serve as leading forces for peace and democracy throughout West Africa.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY

The outcome of Nigeria's elections has deepened, rather than mended, the divisions in Nigerian society. The scope and scale of problems associated

with the electoral process have exposed serious weaknesses in the electoral system and pose risks not only to the country's fragile democracy, but to Nigeria's national security and development. As a result, addressing these problems speedily must be an immediate priority for the Nigerian government. It will also mean moving precipitously to fix the broken electoral system, including making the electoral commission fully independent.

The flawed elections have aggravated the political crisis in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta region which accounts for over 75 percent of the country's oil production since the 1970s, is, however, plagued by a volatile political situation wrought with environmental degradation and human rights abuses. Over the past fifteen years, in the Niger Delta insurgency has spread and the conflict has reached unprecedented levels (Ikelegbe, 2001). The emergence of various ethnic and youth militias in the Niger Delta have serious security implications for Nigeria. The government strong-arm tactics in the management of the conflict as witnessed in the Odi and Choba massacres in 1999 and the militarisation of the region aggravated the conflict and proved ineffective. While joint military task forces continue to patrol the area, the state has lost the capacity to exercise authority effectively in the Niger Delta. Militia groups regularly attack and kill military personnel. They abduct foreign petroleum workers and release them after their companies pay a ransom. They regularly sabotage petroleum facilities, and bunkering (theft of petroleum) has become a serious problem. The core problems of poverty and environmental degradation remain, and they fuel the anger expressed in demands for resource control or ownership of petroleum resources (Fayemi *et al.*, 2005).

During the 2003 elections, the level of violence in the Niger Delta region was the highest in the country (Human Rights Watch, 2004). The recruitment of militants for electoral violence by politicians during the election was rampant. HRW (2005) observed that prior to the 1999 and 2003 federal, state, and local elections, all parties, but most notably the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), recruited and armed members of youth militant groups to intimidate opposition politicians and their supporters. (Human Rights Watch, 2005). After the elections, many of these armed youth became well-utilised in their activities of oil bunkering, sabotage of oil facilities, hostage taking and abduction of oil workers to generate huge monetary compensations (Ikelegbe, 2005). The failure of the 2007 elections exacerbates the prospects of intensified conflict in the Niger Delta. It has provoked diverse reactions

in the region. The flawed elections led to the renewal of hostilities by the Niger Delta militants who engaged in series of attacks on oil facilities, kidnapping of foreign workers, and disruption of oil production. In particular, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and various other militants groups stepped up the kidnappings and disruption of oil service at platforms and pumping stations in reaction to the election results. The heightening of hostilities in the region took a higher toll on the oil companies who were forced to halt production by as much as 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) (International Crisis Group, 2007). Oil companies had to shut down some of their offshore operations out of security considerations. The long term implications of the disruption on oil production can best be imagined given the fact that Nigeria has the second largest economy in Africa and is the continent's largest producer of oil. Nigeria generates over \$47 billion a year in oil and gas revenues. It is the third-largest oil supplier to the United States (Phillips, 1991; Soremekun and Obi, 1993; Ikporukpo, 1996; Olomola, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Onimode, 2001; Onosode, 2003; Imobigile, 2004; Iwayemi, 2006).

Indeed, it underscored the fact that continued militancy in the Niger Delta could have more serious consequences in the near future, for Nigeria and the international oil market. Intensified conflict, particularly in the Niger Delta, could also have implications for security in West Africa. It could disrupt gas flows to neighbours who are partners and potential beneficiaries of the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP). Thus, in spite of the elections, or indeed because of them, violence in the Delta has escalated. Apart from the attacks on oil workers and other foreigners, the post-election weeks also witnessed attacks specifically aimed at persons recently elected to higher political office from the region.

Another fallout of the flawed elections is the intensification of the separatist agitation championed by the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) since 1999. It was reported that the elections was poorly conducted and massively rigged in the south east more than in any other zone of the country (International Crisis Group, 2007). Consequently, in reaction, to the flawed elections, Ohanazee Ndigbo, the pan-Igbo ethnic pressure organisation, called on all Ibos to "totally condemn and disassociate themselves from the elections" and "to deny legitimacy to the president and some governors, including state and federal legislators who have been declared winners by INEC". This stand has already rekindled the separatist sentiments of MASSOB activists, whose leaders

see the elections as vindication of their long-standing position that the Igbo can never realise their political aspirations within the Nigerian federation. The shortcomings of the elections are likely to deepen separatist sentiments and boost MASSOB's following in the Igbo-speaking south-east.

The failure of the elections has major implications for Nigeria's governance, internal security and stability. Agitations by Nigerians, local election monitors and international observers as well as defeated candidates and parties in denouncing the conduct of the elections posed a constant moral burden and made it more difficult for the government to muster the cooperation needed to confront fundamental challenges to Nigeria's stability and development, ranging from constitutional reforms to improved economic governance and control of natural resources. The legitimacy deficit will thus produce a Nigeria that is much less coherent and united and considerably more vulnerable to disintegration. This weakness will affect government's moral authority in negotiations which are urgently needed to resolve its many domestic conflicts. Indeed, the flawed elections have implications for Nigeria's domestic conflict management. A decade after the end of military rule, the country has witnessed recurrent incidents of ethno-religious, community and resource-related conflicts. Many of these arose from flaws in the 1999 constitution, distorted use of wealth resulting from oil revenue and the operation of a deeply flawed federal system. The imperative of reforms in order to evolve more effective institutions for managing and resolving crises cannot be over-emphasised.

The serious flaws witnessed especially on the part of INEC during the electoral cycle threaten to further erode the confidence of many Nigerians in their country's nascent democratic institutions. This could offer a more conducive environment, if not an invitation, to coup plotters and others who may wish to effect unconstitutional change of government. As the experience following the country's first coup d'état in 1966 showed, such actions could trigger a chain of events, eventually leading the country into more deadly forms of conflict.

The failure of the elections is also a major blow to Nigeria's international image and credibility. Nigeria has always claimed a major role in African affairs in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, economic integration, and, increasingly, good governance and promotion of democracy. Nigeria has played a critical role in the region and subregion as well as been a important partner to the international community, particularly the United States. Nigeria played a leadership role within the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), provided

peacekeeping troops for missions that western governments are unwilling to do and acted as troubleshooter mediator in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan (Darfur), Guinea and other trouble spots across the continent. After the electoral debacle, Nigeria has abdicated its strategic role by not setting good example for other African countries. The result could be diminished prospects for democracy and peaceful resolution of disputes in West Africa.

Clearly, Nigeria is a nation that can simply not be ignored, especially at this critical era of globalisation. Nigeria is an important country, not only in Africa but for a world experiencing rapid political and economic globalisation. It has all the potential in the world to be an even stronger nation and a model for African development, with even stronger ties to the International community, particularly the United States. However, this will not happen if it backslides into despotism, dictatorship and rigged elections. The fatally flawed elections have, indeed, set back Nigeria's claims to leadership in Africa. The failed elections, widely regarded as a reversal of its democratic progress, have also weakened the country's aspirations to play a greater international role. For example, Nigeria has been seen by many as a leading candidate for a permanent African seat in the event that the United Nations Security Council is expanded. Its case for that honour has now been seriously damaged. Many diplomats believe that if a permanent African Security Council seat had to be decided today, Nigeria would trail South Africa, Egypt and possibly Algeria.

The Government of Nigeria must commit to a deep and immediate reform agenda, both to rebuild legitimacy in the wake of the fundamentally flawed elections and to assure Nigerians that their voices will be respected well in advance of the next national election. Corruption undermines democracy and prosperity. Good governance and accountability build trust in a democratic system and elected officials. If the elections fail and Nigeria, with its large population, descends into violent conflict, the stability of the whole region will be seriously threatened. It is therefore imperative that Nigeria's neighbours and the international community closely monitor the road map to the next elections and encourage the government to practice the principles it has been preaching to others.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nigeria has suffered from military intervention for most of its history in

comparison with many of its neighbours, such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, that have managed to conduct credible elections in a short period of time following their political transitions. A decade after the transition to democratic rule, Nigeria still lacks the political will to fully embrace the tenets of democratic governance. Successive Nigeria democratic government pledges to improve and reform the country's electoral system after the flawed 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections, however, were not kept. Rather, there was a serious, widespread crisis of confidence over INEC's competence and readiness, as well as over the political will of major actors, including the government to conduct free and fair elections. The elections have been marred by the undemocratic practices of the parties, particularly electoral violence, INEC incompetence and the partiality of state security agencies. The flawed elections posed major risks which in turn threatens the Nigerian nation itself. The major risks are threefold and include the rejection of election results by wide sections of the populace, leading to a crisis of legitimacy and ultimate collapse of authority; loss of faith in elections as an avenue for peaceful resolution of conflicts and encouragement of violent, unconstitutional actions by groups; and paralysis of governance, leading to national collapse and destabilisation in West Africa.

As such, the current crisis of legitimacy can only be overcome by an urgent commitment and extraordinary steps to strengthen the country's democratic institutions. The Nigerian Government should begin by initiating an inclusive national dialogue followed by comprehensive electoral reform. A seriously flawed election process, after all, can infect other institutions, as well as important efforts to fight corruption. If votes can be stolen with impunity, why should anyone take seriously efforts to stop the theft of money? These festering problems can only lead, dangerously, to further disaffection, apathy, and cynicism. The democratic process, in general, and elections, in particular, are major means for resolving conflicts between political constituencies. Elections marred by widespread irregularities including violence would seriously undermine Nigerians' confidence in their democratic system as a credible mechanism for peacefully resolving the country's numerous political disputes, leaving many convinced that democracy cannot guarantee equity and justice and, therefore, cannot protect their interests. The resulting sense of insecurity would encourage groups to use violence as an alternative, thus proliferating civil unrest and deadly conflict. Nigeria's unity, stability and security are still challenged by several conflicts, some

violently active, others dormant but with potential to erupt at the slightest provocation. The conflict in the Niger Delta has intensified since the outcome of the elections and the initially non-violent agitation for Biafra has increasingly assumed violent dimensions. Also, the bloody assault on civilians and security agents by radical Islamic elements in the North suggests a deepening disenchantment with the state, including its security agencies. Similarly, the indigene-settler issues and other symptoms of faltering federalism all need to be addressed forthrightly. This requires a government that enjoys legitimacy and respect in the eyes of its people and can enlist their cooperation.

An election that produces widely disputed results could itself lead to post-election violence, which could degenerate into wider and more intense forms of conflict, threatening the nation's stability. Electoral malpractice and violence were the military's justification for seizing power in 1966 and 1983. Violence associated with elections, therefore, poses a serious threat not only to the next elections but also to Nigeria's continued path towards stable, democratic development. This in turn could have far-reaching consequences for Africa. The elections urgently need to be salvaged. Real progress in that direction will come only when the incumbent government and ruling party, out of respect for democratic principles, conduct a truly free and fair election and accept the people's choice, even if it proves unfavourable to them. Government should also confront endemic poverty and unemployment. As long as people remain poor and lack access to basic means of livelihood, they will remain susceptible to all kinds of manipulation, including fomenting violence during elections.

Nigerian government, in particular, as well as the international community must take extraordinary steps urgently, to address the electoral crisis, build government legitimacy, restore trust in institutions and sustain Nigeria's leadership in Africa. Government must decisively engage on the very broad agenda that needs to be faced if the Nigerian state is to be pulled back from the brink of failure. At this critical juncture in history, Nigeria's government must demonstrate the political will necessary to implement reforms that would once more place Nigeria on a positive trajectory towards democratic consolidation. The Nigerian people also must come together to ensure that these issues are not allowed to go unaddressed. Civic and political leaders in society must work together, with a common purpose and sense of urgency, to move the country forward. The international community must remain engaged diplomatically and provide the needed support for dialogue and a

genuine and immediate electoral reform process. Disengagement would send a signal that the international community has lost interest in the conduct and integrity of electoral processes in Nigeria. It would further undercut the confidence of millions of Nigerians who expect such support and serve to negate the efforts of the international and domestic election observation missions to the elections. Disengagement also would be interpreted by other countries as a sign that international support for the development of democracy is hollow or short-lived.

Africa, needs a democratic and stable Nigeria that can serve as a positive force on the continent. To allow a crisis of legitimacy in Nigeria to persist or worsen will only exacerbate existing problems, and create serious obstacles for the Nigerian state in serving its people. The citizens of Nigeria and the people of Africa deserve better. Nigeria's neighbors, including the DRC and Liberia, have demonstrated that it is possible to conduct elections that meet international standards, even in the most challenging of circumstances.

REFERENCES

- Adekunle, J.B. (1990). "Elections in Nigeria: Problems, Strategies and Options," *Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
- Abdullahi, Y.S. (2008). "Planning Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria." In: S.M. Onodi (Ed.) *Managing Elections in Nigeria*. Keffi: Onaiyi Printing and Publishing Company, pp. 184-186.
- Agbu, O. (2004). *Ethnic Militia and the Threat to Democracy in Post Transition Nigeria*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Research Report No 127, Uppsala.
- Ake, C. (1994). "Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa", Centre for Advanced Social Sciences Monograph no 1, Maitlhouse Press Ltd, Lagos.
- _____. (1996a). "The Political Question", in Oyeleye, Oyediran (ed.) *Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Billy J Dudley*. (Ibadan: Oyediran Consult International).
- _____. (1996b). *Democracy and Development*. CODESRIA, Dakar.
- Allen, C. (1999). "Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa". *Review of Political Economy*.
- Awoyemi, M. (2006). "The Challenge of Ethnic Nationalism" *Vanguard newspaper online* January 25. www.vanguardngr.com
- Babawale, T. and Olatupo, B. (eds) (2000). *Devolution of Powers in a Federal State*. Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
- Bello, K. (2008). *Ideological Bankruptcy in the Political Practice of Nigeria: Genesis, Magnitude and Consequences*. Keffi: AMD Designs and Communication.

- Bozeman, A. B. (1976). *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dinneen, G. (2006). *Political Economy of Democratization in Nigeria*. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited.
- Dunji, M. M. (2008). "The Changing Context of Ethno-nationalism in Nigeria" *UNILAG Journal of Politics*. Volume 4, pp. 77-103.
- (2009). "Social Inequity, Democratic Transition and the Igbo Nationalism Resurgence in Nigeria" *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3(1) February. <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR>
- European Commission, Nigeria (2003). *European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report*.
- Fayemi, K., S. Amadi, and O. Baniadele (eds) (2005). *Towards an Integrated Development in the Niger Delta*. Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development.
- Fearon, J. D. and David, D. L. (2006). *Nigeria: Random Narrative on Civil War Onset*. Stanford University.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1986). *Report of the Judicial Commission Inquiry into the Affairs of Federal Electoral Commission: 1979-1983*.
- Human Rights Watch (1999). *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities*. London: HRW.
- (2004). *Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence*. New York.
- (2005). *Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria's Rivers State*. New York.
- Ibaba, I. S. (2007). Elections and Crisis of Democratic Practice in Nigeria. *Journal of Social and Policy Issues* 4 (1): 12-15.
- Ibrahim, J. (1991). "L'Accès à l'État. Classes Sociales, Élités, Factions: Une Étude du National Party of Nigeria." Ph.D. thesis, University of Bordeaux.
- (2004). "Introduction," in Jibrin Ibrahim, and Amina Salihu, eds. *Women, Marginalisation and Politics in Nigeria*. Abuja: Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Global Rights and Centre for Democracy and Development.
- (2006a). "Legislation and the Political Process: The Third-Term Agenda and the Future of Nigerian Democracy," seminar paper, Centre for Democracy and Development, London, April.
- (2006b). *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties: The Nigeria Report*. Stockholm: International IDEA and Centre for Democracy and Development.
- and Egwu, S. (eds). (2005). *Nigeria Elections 2007: Defending the People's Mandate*. Abuja: Global Rights.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2001). "Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 3.
- (2004). "Crisis of Resistance, Youth Militias, Crime and Violence in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria" paper presented at African Studies Centre Seminar, Netherlands.
- (2005). "The Economy of Conflict in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria," *Nordic Journal of African Studies* Vol. 14, No. 2.
- Imobighe, T. A. (2004). "Conflict in the Niger Delta. A Unique Case or a Model for

- Future Conflicts in other Oil Producing Countries?" In Rudolf Traub-Metz. Ed. *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- International Crisis Group (2007). *Failed Elections, Failing State? Crisis Group Africa Report No. 126*. 30 May 2007.
- Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDEA (2001). *Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue for Nation Building*. Capacity Building Series No. 10 International IDEA: Stockholm, Sweden.
- Ikpoukpo, C. O. (1996). "Federalism, Political Power and the Economic Power Game: Conflict over Access to Petroleum Resources." In *Nigeria Journal of Environmental and Planning* Vol. 14: 56-177.
- Isa, Y. I. and Zakari, M. Y. (2008). The Courts and the Management of Elections in Nigeria. In: S. M. Omodia (ed.), *Managing Elections in Nigeria*. Keffi: Onaivi Printing and Publishing Company.
- Isumonah, V. A. (2004). "The Making of the Ogoni Ethnic Group". In *Africa* Vol. 74 No. 3, pp. 434-453.
- Iwayemi, A. (2006). "Nigeria's Oil Wealth: The Challenges of Sustainable Development in a Non-renewable Natural Resources Dependent Economy." The Postgraduate School University of Ibadan, 31st Interdisciplinary research discourse.
- Jason, P. (2006). "Niger Delta: From Militancy to Insurgency". In *Vanguard*, March, 2006. www.vanguardngr.com
- Jinadu, A. L. (2004). "Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards A Cultural Theory of Democracy". Uppsala University Forum for International and Area Studies Lecture.
- Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (1975). *The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War and the Theory of Fear*. Uppsala, Sweden: NAI.
- Kurfi, A. (2005). *Nigerian General Elections 1951-2003: My Roles and Reminiscences*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- LeVine, V. T. (1965). "The Causes of Political Violence". In W. H. Lewis ed., *French Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: The Free Press).
- Mazrui, A. A. (1967). *Towards a Pan-Africanism: A Study of Ideology and Ambition: Essays on Independent Africa* (Chicago).
- (1968). "Thoughts on Assassination in Africa". *Political Science Quarterly*, vol 83, no 1.
- Mbakur J., Pita Agbese and Kinmenyi Mwangi (2001). *Ethnicity and Governance in the Third World*. Aldershot: Ashgate Pub. Company.
- Nnoli, Okwudibia (2008). *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*. Revised Second Edition. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1999). "Ethnicity and State Politics in Africa". In *African Journal of International Affairs*.
- Ojella, I. A. (2004). "The Nigerian State and the Niger Delta Question". A paper for the 22nd Annual Conference of the Association of Third World Studies, Americas, Georgia, USA.
- Okator, F. U. (ed) (1997). *New Strategies for Curbing Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*

- in Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu.
- Oiomola, A. (1999). "Restructuring Nigeria's Fiscal System: Rational Strategies and Policies." In NES. Ed. *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development. The Nigerian Economic Society*, pp. 477-499.
- Omodia, S.M. (2007). "Governance and Democratization in Africa: The Nigerian Experience." *The Social Science* 2 (2): 134-138.
- _____. (2008). "Background Perspective to Understanding the Management of Elections in Nigeria." In: S.M. Omodia (Ed.) *Managing Elections in Nigeria*. Keffi: Onaivi Printing and Publishing Company, pp. 1-2.
- Osinmode, B. (2001). "Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Options for the 21st Century." Vol. 1 Research Report, Ibadan.
- Onosode, G. (2003). *Environmental Issues and the Challenges of the Niger Delta: Perspectives from the Niger Delta*. Environmental Survey Process, Yaba: The CIBN Press Limited.
- Osaghae, E. (1995). "The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics Minority Agitation and the Future of Nigerian State." *African Affairs* Vol. 94, pp. 325-344.
- _____. (2005). "Violence in Africa: State, Ethnic and Regional Dimensions." In Albert, I.O. ed. *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa*. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd.
- Phillips, A. (1991). "Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues." *Publius* 21: 103-111.
- Philip, B. (2006). "Biafra Violence Fear". In BBC News 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/765944.stm>.
- Soremekun, K. and Obi, C. (1993). "Oil and the National Question." In NES. (eds.) *The National Question and Economic Development in Nigeria*. Nigerian Economic Society Annual Conference: 209-231.
- Sundiata, I.K. (1988). "The Roots of African Despotism: The Question of Culture", *African Studies Review*, vol. 31, no 1.
- Transition Monitoring Group. (2003). *Do the Votes Count: Final Report of the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria*. Abuja.
- Uban, E. (2006). "Insecurity: Once a Nightmare, Now a Reality" *The Guardian*, April 26, 2006 www.ngguardian.com.
- William I. (2004). "Ethnicity, Ethnicism and Citizenship: A Philosophical Reflection on the African Experience". In *Journal of Social Science* Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 45-58. available at <http://www.krepublishers.com/02>
- Yakubu, J. A. (2005). "Containing Conflicts in Africa: Legal Obstacles, New Impetuses and Challenges for the Future." In Albert, I.O. (ed.) *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa*. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd.

8

Election Crimes in Nigeria and Legal Steps to Safeguard National Security

Titus Kehinde Adekunle
Institute of African Studies,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Governments the world over are, by virtue of the social contract theory, expected to provide law, order, social infrastructure, justice and security for their citizenry. A country's national security is one of the major yardsticks for measuring the success or failure of the administration operating within its confines. National security connotes all measures and apparatuses which a state puts in place to secure its citizens, resources and territory from the danger of subversion, infiltration or external aggression. This is manifest only in the ability of an individual to walk along the streets without the fear of harm and go about one's daily activities free