



THE NIGERIA ARMY IN A DEMOCRACY SINCE 1999:

A PROFESSIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY
SUBORDINATION TO CIVIL AUTHORITY

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
LT GEN TY BURATAI

EDITED BY:
AM ASHAFA
HUSSAINI JIBRIN

© A M Ashafa & H Jibrin

All rights reserved. This book is copyright and so no part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Directorate of Army Standard and Evaluation, Nigerian Army Headquarters, Abuja.

ISBN 978 - 978 - 55162 - 3 - 4 (Soft cover)
ISBN 978 - 978 - 55162 - 4 - 1 (Hard cover)

First published October 2017

Printed in Nigeria by
Pyla-Mak Services Ltd
Printers and Publishers
NM 5. Lokoja Road
Kaduna Nigeria.
e-mail: pylamak@gmail.com

- 21 The Role of Civilian Joint Task Force in the Restoration of Peace in Borno State, 2013-2016
Abdullahi Garba 353
- 22 Key Challenges and Strategic Lessons in the Counter Insurgency Operations in the North-East
Aliyu Muhammad Muri 369

Part 7: The Regionalisation of the Counter-Insurgency

- 23 International Reactions and Actions on Militancy and Insurgency in Nigeria since 1999
Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 385
- 24 Nigeria's Neighbours and the Fight against Militancy and Insurgency
Armstrong Matiu Adejo 401
- 25 The Role of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Counter-Terrorism War in Nigeria's North-East Zone
Osisioma BC Nwolise 413
- 26 The Challenges of Multinational Joint Task Force in the Fight against Boko Haram
Adedoyin J. Omede 427

Part 8: The Media War, Humanitarian Issues and the Economy of Insurgency

- 27 Strategic Communication and Counter-Insurgency Operations in Nigeria's North East Region
Umaru A. Pate and Wilson Joseph 453
- 28 In the War on Truth, Honest Reporting Matters: The Nigeria Army Public Relations and the Media Campaign on Militancy, Terrorism and Insurgency
Brig Gen SK Usman 469
- 29 The Management of Humanitarian Crisis Arising from the Boko Haram Insurgency: The Role of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
Alhasan Nuhu 485
- 30 Humanitarian Crises in the North-East in the Pre and Post-Lafiya Dole Era: A Civil Society Perspective
Chom Bagu 501
- 31 From Prosperity to Poverty: The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Economy of the Northeast
IK Abdulsalam 513

26

THE CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

ADEDOYIN J. OMEDE, PhD

Introduction

Since 2009 when the Boko Haram insurgency began several loss lives were counted much as more are is still being counted. This is apart from other casualties of injury as well as properties worth billions of naira destroyed. However, the region has witnessed a new pattern of female suicide attacks, as well as frequent abductions, the capturing of towns and villages and the expansion of Boko Haram's activities beyond Nigeria's borders to include a more aggressive presence in Cameroon in the second half of 2014 and the targeting of Niger and Chad in February 2015. Having established relations with al-Qaeda affiliates, Boko Haram is the most prominent group to have sworn allegiance to the Islamic state of Iraq and al-sham (ISIS) rebranding its Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Withnall, 2015). Muhammadu Buhari in his inaugural speech after been sworn in as President on 29th May 2015 regarded the Boko Haram as a typical example of small fire creating large fires. The analogy was appropriate from its inception in the early 2000s; the group has emerged from an isolated, broadly non-violent sect to a brutal, Islamist insurgency engaged in terrorism and criminality.

The complex nature along with the group's successful exploitation of socio-economic grievances and expansions of territorial control beyond Nigeria's borders meaning that Boko Haram requires a cooperative response from several neighboring countries on multiple levels: security, socio-economic and political. Boko Haram had taken advantage of various borders and exploited the cultural ethnic and religious affinities that Chad, Niger and Cameroon share with Northern Nigeria. The link fast tract smuggling of small and light weapons, recruitment of fighters and personal flows between Boko Haram in Nigeria and their Hausa, Kanuri and Muslim kin in Niger ,Chad and Cameroon. These countries find it difficult to cope with existing problems including the spillover

effect of war in Central Africa Republic on Cameroon and Chad and the presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its sympathizer in Nigeria.

The group exerts significant ideological influence among Nigeria's neighbors. In 2014 Abubakar Shekau Boko Haram's leader had tried in operational terms to avoid confrontation with the governments of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon-with the exception of abductions of foreign nationals in Cameroon in 2013. For their part, neighbouring governments were reluctant to launch a major crackdown against Boko haram both fear of retaliation and because their capabilities were limited (Comolli, 2015). The outbreak of violence in 2014 marked a turning point; Nigeria's neighbors can no longer remain passive. The Lake Chad basin Commission established a regional force with Nigeria, Niger Chad and Cameroon pledging at a June 2014 summit in London to jointly deploy 2,800 troops (Adepegba, 2014). In March 2014 the Directors General of the External Intelligence Services of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, alongside France signed a deal to increase border policing, coordination and intelligence sharing. Countries Later on the countries of the LCBC saw the need to containing the activities of this terrorist group when they formed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to deal with this security challenge.

This chapter therefore seeks to discuss the challenges of the Multinational Joint Taskforce under the mandate of the African Union in combating the Boko Haram insurgency; it explores the theoretically basis of collective security and examines the role and contributions of the MNJTF and the challenges encountered in the fight against Boko Haram. It also argues that the formation of the MNJTF was not only a bold step by the Lake Chad Basin Commission to solving what they considered as a regional problem, but was also, an attempt geared towards ensuring peace and security in the region being violated by the terrorists in the region. The chapter analysis the challenges of the multinational joint task force in the fight against Boko Haram such as finance and administrative constraints, training and equipment challenges, problems relation to command and control, political will, public opinion and others, of which affected the conduct of its operation in various ways. In conclusion, the chapter observes that the Lake Chad Basin Commission had demonstrated rare commitment to addressing the security challenges in the Lake Chad region, much as there are still more to be done to ensuring regional security and suggest ways of improving the performances and contributions of the Multinational Joint Task force. A documentation of the Multinational Joint Task Force is important to enable the appropriate authorities to take stock and improve upon its performance for the future, especially in this age of instability in the globe.

Theoretical Framework

The chapter adapts the collective security theory. The theory is appropriate because its major tenent is based on the assumption that war and international conflict are rooted in the insecurity and uncertainty of power politics. It suggests

that as long as states pledge themselves to defend one another, then, the onus is on all members to have the capacity either to deter aggression in the first place, or to punish the transgressor, if international order is or has been breached. Successful collective security depends on three conditions. First, the states must be roughly equal, or at least there must be no preponderant power. Second, all states must be willing to bear the cost and responsibility of defending one another. Third, there must be an international body that has the moral authority and military capacity to take effective action. (Eke, 2007)

Collective security is the security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force (Heywood, 2011). Sovereign nations eager to maintain the status quo willingly cooperate, accepting a degree of vulnerability and in some cases of minor nations also accede to the interests of the chief contributing nations organizing the collective security. Collective Security is achieved by setting up an international cooperative organization under the auspices of international law and this give rise to a form of international collective governance albeit limited in scope and effectiveness (Eke, 2007). The collective security organization becomes an arena for diplomacy, balance of power and exercise of 'soft' power. Soft power is the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force. The use of 'hard' power by states, unless legitimized by the collective security organization is considered illegitimate, reprehensible and needing remediation of some kind. Hard Power is the ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors' behavior.

Over the years there have been various calls for the formation of an African High Command, a Pan -African Defence (PADF) and ECOWAS defence pact that would provide for the collective defence and the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of African states (The Official Journal of the ECOWAS 1981). This demand for an African collective security is what has been summed up as African collective security. The collective 'regional' security is the military aspect of the pan-Africanist concept which implies, a voluntary association of states in which the countries involved pledge themselves to use their military power against any other member state that commits any acts of aggression within the region (Omede, 1995).

The African concept of collective security, just like that of the UN which makes provisions for regional security organizations is based on the need for states to, 'provide a conflict management method that can be utilized in a relatively peaceful environment and which can be achieved and which be achieved through systematically institutionalized procedures for dealing with unacceptable international behavior (Amistutz, 1982). Hence, in the Pan-African context, security is seen in the light of the defence of Africa's independence and solidarity with emphasis on the notion that:

Africa's security is national security of all African countries, since any threat to African security represents direct or indirect to African security represents direct or in direct threat to all Africans. (As such).

Pan-Africanism shapes the strategic and foreign policies of African states. As a security doctrine and movement, it provides African states with a common focus and a common forum in security development matters as well as foreign policy (Nkrumah 1961:9; Omede, 1995)

The concept of Collective Security was propounded by scholars such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson who applied interests in security in a broad manner to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out. Collective Security literature and definitions of Collective Security is copious and is still growing (Baylis et al 2005, Chaturvedi, 2006, Eke, 2007, Heywood, 2011). From the forgoing conceptual clarifications, collective security can then be seen as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign States whose members pledge them to defend each other against attack (Chaturvedi, 2006).

According to Palmer and Perkins (2007), "a collective security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs." The principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith.

Certain historical occurrences made the need for collective security important. First is the appearance of practical morality which noticed that poverty, war and conflict are not foreordained. Second is the rejuvenation of the ancient philosophic idea of the brotherhood of mankind in which both men and states were enjoined to be their brothers' keeper. It therefore implies that mankind should pursue a common course to maintain and enforce international peace and security (Baylis et al 2005). A collective security system entails the centralization of a society's coercive mechanisms. As a corollary the members of that society, in this case states, give up a great deal of their individual freedom to indulge in self-help, and are generally restricted to a limited right of self-defence, usually until the central authority takes over their protection.

The objective of collective security is to inhibit war through the threat of collective action. The theory of collective security is based on certain basic conditions, which are required for its effective applications. Kissinger (1992) observed that collective security requires each state to share responsibility for every other state's security. He argued that it 'assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it' (Kissinger 1992:239). In the Lake Chad Basin, the Boko Haram insurgency has huge exacerbated pre-existing violence and underdevelopment. The jihadist group remains a momentous regional threat, recruiting members and attacking civilians and security forces in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This has created a humanitarian

catastrophe. Failure to bring security, other basic public goods and visible socio-economic dividends to affected areas.

These would have severe consequences for the security and long term stability of the four countries bordering the lake. Beyond making regular incursions into Cameroun, Boko Haram Kidnapped the wife of the Country's deputy prime minster and issued a death threat against the president. Apparently taking into cognizance the need for a collective action against Boko Haram, some African countries like Chad have already joined Nigeria in the campaign against Boko Haram. MNJTF was formed as a result of the need by the LCBC member countries to pool their efforts in a bid to provide a common and coordinated solution to the security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin region especially the security challenges posed by terrorists in the region.

Understanding Regional Security Threat of Boko Haram

The early development of the insurgent activities of *Boko Haram*, often translated as "Western education is forbidden" or, using its Arabic name *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad)— in Nigeria date back to the early 2000s. It started as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect in the 1990s that worshipped at the al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State. The group advocated a strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was an enigmatic and admired Qur'anic scholar who not only proselytized widely throughout northern Nigeria but also assisted in the implementation of Sharia law in several northern states in the early 2000s. The failure to achieve the expected full implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria helps explain some of the deep-rooted resentment and anger of a considerable number of Muslim youths at what they perceived as the government's "deception" and "insincerity." This resentment fuelled their call for an authentic Islamist revolution (ICG, 2014). While the sect's leadership did not initially engage in violence, its followers were involved in periodic skirmishes with police during its formative years (Blanchard, 2014).

The year 2009 marked a turning point in Boko Haram's transformation. In July 2009 at least 700 people were killed during an attempt by Nigerian security forces to suppress the group. In the aftermath of the attempt, their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in police custody. The group subsequently appeared to dissipate, but re-emerged a year later under new leadership. It orchestrated a large prison break in September 2010 that freed hundreds, including many of its members. Some Boko Haram militants may have fled to insurgent training camps in the Sahel in 2009-2010. The group has built ties with transnational extremist groups in the region, which have reportedly provided Boko Haram with insurgency training and increasingly sophisticated weaponry. Since 2011 Boko Haram attacks have featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and, periodically, suicide attacks, but fighters also continue to

inflict a heavy toll using small arms and arson. Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization (Perouse de Montclos, 2014).

It has several splinter groups, some of which have formed alliances with foreign Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in Somalia, which have helped in bringing about the radicalization of its leadership. The number of Boko Haram fighters is estimated in the hundreds to low thousands and its organizational structure is often described as diffuse, and increasingly so since the death of Yusuf. Boko Haram's attacks have increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality since 2010, occurring almost daily in parts of northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond. Their attacks were directed initially and primarily against state and federal targets, such as police stations, but they have also targeted civilians in schools, churches, mosques, markets, bars, and villages. Cell phone towers and media outlets have also been attacked, for both tactical and ideological reasons. The group has assassinated local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Its deadliest attacks include a coordinated series of bombings in Kano, northern Nigeria's largest city that killed more than 180 people in January 2012; an attack on the village of Ben sheikh in September 2013 that killed more than 160 civilians; and an assault on another northeastern village, Gamboru, that may have killed more than 300 people in early May 2014. Since July 2014 the Boko Haram insurgency has entered a dangerous new phase in which the insurgents are beginning to operate like a conventional army.

Awojobi (2014:144-150) has opined that the frequent bombings and clashes between the insurgents and the security agents have weighed heavily on the commercial and business activities in the region, while many people have fled the area. In some locations business activities were paralyzed. The spate of insecurity trailing the activities of Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria has greatly stressed and imperiled a growing commercial chain that was instrumental in the cooperation and integration process, which was the vision of the founders of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in a fast globalizing economic and political order. The economic impact of terrorism on security is multifaceted. Investors naturally evade areas perceived to be a potential source of terrorist attacks. In Borno and Yobe states in the North-East, Nigeria, the people who go to the fish and beans market have reduced due to the fear of attack by terrorists. Apenda and Tough (2015) noted that farmers who produce onions, rice, maize, livestock, pepper and fish have all fled the Lake Chad region. Baga market known for fishing trading, has been forced to close for security reasons. The effect of the closure of these markets on food safety is unprecedented as neighboring states also felt the scarcity of the items which resulted in the increases of price of these food items.

The strategy of violence of the Boko Haram has also caused the massive displacement of people of large scale agricultural and fishing communities from their original habitat to other settlements. These displaced people were responsible for the production of essential materials needed for exchange in the

international trade relations among the adjacent neighbors in the region (Awodola and Ayuba, 2015). The north east of Nigeria also houses the famous Yankari game reserve and the Mambila Plateau, which used to attract tourists and investors from different parts of the globe before Boko Haram insurgency. These tourist centers have lost a great deal in the wake of Boko Haram, leading to unemployment as employees abandoned their various duty posts for fear of been attacked. In Cameroon for instance it has caused a steady decline in visitors to Waza National Park, which is Cameroon largest game reserve. According to Tourism Ministry spokesman Serge Eric Epoune, people used to come in their thousands, but the number has reduced. It has therefore threatened the financial infrastructure of Cameroon (Ngala, 2015). The situation in the Lake region has become worrisome and calls for desperate measures to address these security challenges. It is even more disturbing in area that is in dire need of development in all facets of human endeavors.

Background to the Formation of Multinational Joint Task Force

The Boko Haram Saga was recognized as continental question and the Members of the African Union saw the need to united with Nigeria against Boko Haram this was put up as a proposal by the Republic of Niger at the 23-27 January 2014 Executive Council 26th Ordinary Session. The Continent wide solidarity against Boko Haram was suggested by the Republic of Niger in its capacity as Chair of the Lake Chad Basin. As noted by Niger Republic "given the gravity of the threat posed by terrorism in the continent, the Peace and Security Council in its 455th meeting which took place on 2nd September 2014 in Nairobi at heads of State and Government level adopted a Decision on the prevention and combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa". In paragraph 19 of the thereof, the council urges the countries concerned to take necessary steps towards making operational, the mechanism agreed upon to address more effectively the threat posed by *Boko Haram* through support to existing regional structures".

This led the Heads of State and Government of member countries of Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Republic of Benin held an extra ordinary summit in Niamey on 7th October 2014 and decided to finalize the deployment of national contingents and the establishment of a Multi-national Joint Task Force Headquarters on 20th November 2014. It is of interest to note that Foreign and Defence Ministers of Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Republic of Benin also met on 1st October 2014 in Abuja, the particular involvement of Benin Republic which does not have any territorial contiguity with the Lake Chad.

The MNJTF is an initiative of the LCBC only four of the six member states-Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad joined by non-member Benin are part of the force. It is a coalition of states that saw the need to confront a common threat. Since majority of the countries concerned belong to the LCBC and Boko Haram's reach has gotten to the shores of the Lake Chad Basin, the organization appeared as the 'natural' institutional framework to take on this effort.

The mandate of the MNJTF is to:

Create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups...facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC member states and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and facilitate within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations (AU Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation of Communiqué PSC/AHG/Comm.2,2015).

Its mandate includes among others conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of the group activities; conducting patrols; preventing all transfers of weapons or logistics to the group; actively searching for and freeing all abductees, including the girls kidnapped from Chibok in April 2014; and carrying out psychological actions to encourage defections within Boko Haram ranks (AU Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation of Communiqué PSC/AHG/Comm.2, 2015). The MNJTF has also been tasked to undertake specific actions in the area of intelligence, human rights, information and the media (Strategic Concept of Operations of the MNJTF, 2015).

Haven identified the complexity of its mission, three components were subsequently established, namely: military, police and civilian. The ambitious scope of MNJTF's mandate and scale of operations as well as of its key tasks is likely to raise some skepticism about its ability to take concrete and efficient action. Concerning MNJTF's area of operations, each of the country contingents is deployed within its own country's national boundaries and operates as a matter of priority within this space (Strategic Concept of Operations of the MNJTF, 2015). Four sectors were defined:

Sector 1 the command located in Mora (Cameroon)

Sector 2 the command located in Baga –Sola (Chad)

Sector 3 the command located in Baga (Nigeria)

Sector 4 the command located in Diffa (South east Niger)

The task force operates under the direct authority of the LCBC and the heads of State and government to whom it reports on the execution of its mandate. Its institutional architecture is structured around the LCBC, which is responsible for political oversight, while the AU is a strategic and technical partner in close collaboration with the LCBC Executive Secretariat, contributes to its effective operations and the headquarter officials are responsible for directing operations and commanding various national contingents . The operational headquarters of the MNJTF are based in N'Djamena (Chad) consist of personnel from various force contributing countries. They exercise command and control of the force and coordinate the military actions of the troop contributing countries. It is expected that the multinational force of 8,700 troops will come from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin.

The Challenges of MNJTF

It is indeed a truism that the collective effort by the LCBC and Benin Republic to establish a sub-regional organisation such as the MNJTF was based on the need to attain sustainable peace and stability, using African resources as the primary means of achievement. It is also a matter of fact, that the MNJTF has been bedeviled with series of challenges that seem to hamper its operational effectiveness. Some of the challenges are the lack of political will and improper coordination, inadequate finance, insufficient troops, manpower and logistical problems, rivalries and language differences, public opinion and the contending issue of, human rights, among others. The challenges in our view are multi-dimensional ranging on one end of the spectrum from purely military to a mixed bag socio-political-economy on the other.

Political Will

A critical impediment to the successful operationalization of the aims and mandate of the MNJTF is the lukewarm attitudes, individualistic tendencies and, lack of harmonised actions in operations against the BOKO HARAM. Members tend to focus more on their own "particular" interests rather than adopt a more "general" regional approach to tackle the insurgent activities of the Boko Haram. Recognising these challenges, the Nigerian Defence Chief – General Abayomi Olonishakin, in a meeting with the various Chief of Defence Staff of the member of the LCBC in February 2017, called on leaders in the region and other members of the international community, to render more support to the MNJTF so as to effectively stamp out terrorism and other acts of criminality in the region. Driving home his point, Olonishakin (2017) explained that the range of threats confronting the region is so multifaceted that the solution to them requires a multi-dimensional approach by various member states. Hence, the need by, members to combine in a holistic manner, to able to, defeat terrorism, and restore peace and order in the Lake Chad region.

The lack of political will among the political leaders of member states of the MNJTF is manifested in several ways. From the reluctance to redeem financial pledges, inability to contribute needed manpower, to the lukewarm attitude exhibited in apprehending Boko Haram suspects in their territories. All these issues can be attributed to member countries pursuit of their individual States' national interests which is exemplified in the way individual members handled Boko Haram insurgent activities across the region. To illustrate this point few cases will suffice;

There were cases of Cameroonian troops entering Nigeria in pursuit of militants. In January 2015, for the first time, Chadian troops moved into Cameroon (Musa et. al. 2015). Nigerian has on several occasions made clear its reluctance to allow foreign military action on its soil. In March 2015, Chad forces claimed there was no actual cooperation with the Nigerians and that they had been denied entry while pursuing Boko Haram. Despite Buhari's efforts to smooth over regional disputes, tension remains. In June, Nigerian defence

headquarters refuted claims by its Chadian counterpart that Chad had conducted airstrikes on Boko Haram camps within Nigeria. Abuja claimed they had taken place in Niger instead (Premium Times, 2015). Niger, in particular has suffered from the lack of a unified efforts; as Nigeria and the other countries have stepped up their military offensives, the country has not been able to muster the necessary military force to counter the insurgents domestically.

Another notable example is the Boko Haram attack on Bosso, Niger, in 2016. The President of Niger was forced to request military assistance from the Chadian military. Even when President Idriss Deby of Chad agreed to help, Chadian troops arrived only about a month later; the MNJTF never sent military support. The failure to coordinate a regional effort has resulted in military efforts that enabled the Boko Haram to move around, rather than eradicate the insurgency (Matfess, 2016). What is more, the BOKO HARAM has cashed in on the situation and thus, has been operating unhindered across the Lake Chad region. They have intensified the killings of soldiers, civilians, and held on to certain towns most especially in Mobbar and Abadan local government – a border town between Nigeria and Niger Republic (www.voanews.com : 2016).

To make matters worse, member countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic have most times displayed the lack of political will and open disinterest to the nefarious activities of the BOKO HARAM. Accordingly, in most instances the BOKO HARAM strayed into these countries they are accorded protective shield instead of being persecuted. Coupled with this, “most of the fleeing Boko Haram, have also relocated to border communities of neighbouring countries without any form of molestation by security agents”(Naijanews.com: 2016). To buttress this point, Yan St Pierre (Chris Stein, www.voanews.com: July, 2016) explained that regional rivalries, internal political turmoil and language differences keep the five countries involved from effectively collaborating. Accordingly, St Pierre argued that the MNJTF is a regional coalition (where) everybody is on his own and collaborating when there is a need to and basically when they are forced to.

Nigeria and Chad have also had territorial disputes over islands in Lake Chad. The cooperation between Nigerian and Niger has not helped with a recent spat after Nigeria defense officials accused Nigerian soldiers of running away from Boko Haram. This has aggravated a general tendency to blame other countries for problems that are in fact internally. Nigeria often complains that Chad, Niger and Cameroon are not doing enough to prevent militants from using their territory as safe havens. The same neighbors accuse Nigeria of been unable to contain insurgency spillover of militants and refugees across their borders, which have done real damage to their economies. Checkpoints, curfews and temporary border closures, together with the threat of violence, have significantly reduced cross-border trade and led to food shortages in the border regions (Merrick, 2014).

Command and Control Issues

The absence of proper coordination within the command and control unit of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a major impediment to the successful nipping in the bud of the activities of the Boko Haram terrorists (BOKO HARAM). Apparently, this problem stems directly, from the mandate of the MNJTF which specifies that "member countries were free to pursue insurgents into the territories of others in order to effectively battle terrorists within the communities and that members are to carry out joint operations on counter-terrorism from time to time" (Strategic Concept of MNJTF, 2015). Although, all the members of the MNJTF were in tandem with the agreement, still, the issue of territorial sovereignty remains a thorny one. Furthermore, there are still doubts whether the MNJTF command has the capacity to fully play its role considering the risk of interference from national commanders. Another issue is, whether the force commander will have the leeway needed and the space required to operate freely in relation to sector commanders, as outlined in the force's mandate? Although, the proviso in the agreement recognizing zones of deployment was highly noted, yet, the point can still be made that to what extent will the troops be allowed to operate in a foreign territory? To the Nigerian commanders, this has become a vexed issue. (Peace and Security Council of the African Union Communiqué, 2015).

Leaders of the contributing countries and even, the Boko Haram group have cashed in on this particular proviso of the mandate. Each member-state within the MNJTF has adopted and, pursued (and still engage in), its own strategies and tactics based on the level of perceived and actual threats of the Boko Haram to its national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Apart from few instances of joint operations (like Operations: *Arrow*, *Gama Aiki* – Finish the Job of June 2016); the needed consistent and sustainable military offensive from the command of the MNJTF is, highly inadequate and insufficient. This lacuna has been a motivating factor that gingered individual member states like, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, to adopt specific operations to contain and deter the Boko Haram. The Nigerian military on its own launched both Operations Lafiya Dole (Peace by all Means) in 2015 and the widely acclaimed "Operation Crackdown" initiated by the present Chief of Army Staff (COAS) – Lt Gen Yusuf Tukur Buratai in 2016.

Both Chad and Niger Republic have also been involved in a joint operation especially on the heels of the Boko Haram attacks on Bosso town in Niger. Chad deployed two thousand (2,000) troops in June 2016 to help Niger combat the insurgents and reclaimed the seized town (www.al-jazeera.com; 2016). Cameroon on her part, has been working in tandem with the United States of America (USA). The USA military at the behest of the Cameroonian Government deployed three hundred (300) troops alongside military vehicles and other equipment to Cameroon. The aim was to provide intelligence support to local forces, conduct reconnaissance flights and drone operations as well as train the country's infantry force on the use and management of IED.

(www.wikipedia.org). The divergent *modus operandi* of the member countries of the MNJTF was highlighted in an analysis of the West African Report. The write-up contended that:

Whereas, Nigeria had carried out a military offensive to halt, the Boko Haram Terrorists gains, and retake, the localities under the group's control from February 2015 onwards. Cameroon, Niger and Chad, had sought, instead to contain its (*Boko Haram*) expansionists tendencies. Faced with an identical phenomenon, the countries had adopted different offensive or defensive positions (The West African Report; 2016).

It is, apt to say, that the different postures of the member states of the MNJTF has indeed, hampered the much sought after regional cooperation, solidarity and the coordination needed to deter and curtail the Boko haram phenomenon. The lack of harmonious relations and coordination has created a situation whereby "each troop of the MNJTF mostly stayed, within their own boundaries (borders), but conduct joint operations and occasionally crossed into other member countries territories to pursue the Boko Haram insurgents (www.voanews.com: 2016). Examples of such uncoordinated operations among the MNJTF are abound.

In the same vein, other analysts have bemoaned the absence of integration and coordination among the force. In one of its report, Reuters (2016) noted that each force is based in its country of origin and so, the MNJTF, has no integrated force with battalions moving in perfect coordination. Still, the absence of harmonisation of the operations of the MNJTF has been attributed to Nigeria's reluctance and protective posture to safeguard its territorial integrity and sovereignty from external forces. Fessy (BBC News: 2015), re-echoed this point when he noted that "Nigeria preferred to lead or at least, be part of the force, rather than host foreign armies to solve threats to its national security.

Apparently, one can argue, that the undercurrent of mutual distrust is simply a reflection of the envisaged problems which formed the basis of zones of deployment of forces that were specifically assigned in the mandate of the MNJTF in the first instance (EPRS, 2015:2). From the foregoing, it is obvious that the persistence of uncoordinated actions coupled with constant claims and counter-claims of victory by individual states during joint operations against the Boko Haram has resulted in a, strained, frosty and "tense relations between the four principal contributing countries" (Sawadogo/ ISS: 2017). The tense relations, has also created moral problems and conflict of interests and have affected some setbacks. The problem that has overwhelmed Nigerian's relationship with her neighbors over a number of years is unlikely to disappear. Taking note of the 70s of Nigeria and Cameroon been troubled by territorial dispute of Bakassi peninsula disputes as well in the Lake Chad area (Familugba. et.al. 2013).

Institutional and Structural Challenge

The MNJTF was a creation of the LCBC, yet, it has been observed, that the LCBC secretariat, in its capacity as an organ in charge of implementing the institution's activities plays no specific role in the operations of the MNJTF. The political input required from the LCBC is "strangely" lacking. This has resulted in an institutional vacuum, because of the absence of an organization on which the MNJTF could rely on (ISS: 2017). A closely related issue is the role of, and relocation of, the MNJTF headquarter (HQ) to N'Djamena in Chad. The HQ consists of personnel from contributing member states. In addition, the commander of the force has always being a Nigerian and the MNJTF mandate specified clearly that "a Nigerian officer would be the force commander for the duration of the mission against the *Boko Haram* with a Cameroonian as deputy commander". Evidently, this proviso just goes on to show the overwhelming role of Nigeria. This action has also contributed to the undercurrent of mutual mistrust among members. Certain issues, fuelling the mistrust within the force revolves, around the mandate proviso of command and control. Would one not be right to then contend as a realist that: Is it because Nigeria bears the bulk of the finance of the force that the country has to be compensated with the mantle of command and control? Is it that he who pays the piper dictates the tune? Is it that the Nigerian troops are more professional, experienced, and superior than those of other members and thus cannot take command from others within the force? Or, is it that the *Boko Haram* impact negatively more on Nigeria national security and territorial integrity and so, its officers are in the best position to deal decisively with the menace? These questions in our mind are part of the contributory factors limiting the performance and harmonious policy coordination within the MNJTF.

Inadequate Troops and Manpower

Another notable challenge is the issue of inadequate troops and manpower. Apart from insufficient equipment and logistical issues, the inability of member states such as Chad, Benin and Niger Republics to deploy adequate troops based on the pledges made at the onset of the operation is a case in point. The reason is not far-fetched. Each country has its own internal security problems and most of their troops are assigned to cover hot spots within their countries. Two classical examples are relevant to buttress this point. Nigeria is grappling with internal insecurity in many fronts. From the *Boko Haram* attacks in the North Eastern part, to dealing with the menace of militants and the vandalization of oil pipelines in the Niger Delta. It is also battling with the menace of armed robberies, kidnapping, etc., in the South East and South West. Some of the troops are also on peacekeeping mission in several parts of the world. The Chadians had their own internal security priorities too. Troops are deployed to several flanks around the country's border to deter threats from the Nigerien, Libyan, Sudanese and indigenous rebel groups. Some of the country's troops are also participating in peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic

(www.warisboring.com). Cameroon and Niger Republic are also dealing with the threats of the Boko Haram insurgency as well as other domestic crises.

The inadequacy of manpower is quite worrisome, particularly, when one compares to the capacity, with which the *Boko Haram* not only recruited its "foot soldiers" but also, to the tenacity with which it employs in mobilizing and deploying its troops to carry out dastardly acts across the region. It is also, an open question whether a 10,000 strong MJTF will be adequate in the fight against Boko Haram whose troops, according to the US authorities is estimated in February 2015 to be around 6,000 men (Hosenball, 2015). Even if MNJTF should increase the number of its troops, it will be extremely difficult to outsmart the Boko Haram whose men are mostly ragtag, and who relies on the use of rudimentary and unconventional guerrilla tactics to engage a conventional standing force in a war of attrition.

Training and Equipment

The various contingents of the MNJTF demonstrate uneven levels of training, professionalism and capability. The Chadians are generally seen as effective fighters, while Nigerian forces appear to be underequipped. Though the Nigerian forces are highly professional, yet, they lacked the necessary equipment that are, mobile and flexible. This is the more reason the Nigerian leaders embarked on a hurried acquisition of long-range strike capabilities. Recent purchases including strike aircraft and multiple-launch rocket systems and the modification of some puma helicopters to accommodate rocket pods. However one of the successes of the operations conducted by the Nigerian forces in the early month of 2015 was due to the increased availability of weaponry hurriedly procured from sources such as US defense contractors, and a Czech Republic company that provided used Hungarian tanks. An attempt in acquiring of cobra helicopters from Israel was blocked by the US (Cohen, 2015).

It is important to state that, most of these deals were not officially confirmed. Photographic evidence and satellite imagery suggested that a number of orders and deliveries took place in a hurry, including through uncommon and very expensive practices. The delivery by plane and deployment to the front line of at least four T72 tanks from the Czech Republic for example was observed to have taken less than six weeks (Defence Web, 2015).

In spite of these acquisitions, questions have been asked whether the Nigerian troops have been fully trained and equipped with the necessary skills to operate the new hardware. Furthermore the challenges of operating newly acquired weapons system may be the reason for the widespread speculation that South Africa private military contractors have been involved in the anti-Boko Haram effort. The president made it clear his displeasure about hiring of private military contractors. President Buhari had declared severally that, it is the dexterity and capability of the Nigerian forces that had made possible the gains registered in early 2015 (Alabelewe, 2015).

Finance and Administrative Constraints

The unavailability of substantial funding needed to expend on the operations, stipends and salaries of personnel of both the LCBC's secretariat and the MNJTF is a main factor hindering the successful military counter insurgency campaign of the MNJTF against the Boko Haram group. Financial constraints have delayed the operational capability of the MNJTF. Before it was able to occupy its current premises, the LCBC secretariat in N'Djamena hosted its command. Similar difficulties were encountered in setting up the various MNJTF sectors of operation in the field. This weighed even more heavily on the troop contributing countries because they were already burdened by the considerable financial cost of the human and material resources pitted against Boko Haram (Nako, 2015). These difficulties continue to act as a constrain, and this is what motivated the MNJTF commander Major General Lamidi Adeosun to bemoan the lack of tangible effect given to the pledges of financial support required to meet the requirements of the MNJTF. Without mincing words, member countries have been unable to redeem their pledge due to lack of political will and commitment, pressing domestic problems and global economic meltdown especially, the fallen prices of oil resulting in a decline of foreign reserve earnings. This shortcoming raises the questions of the capability of member countries in sustaining the momentum of the MNJTF in combating a war of attrition engendered by the Boko Haram.

Most of the available finance is sourced from mainly Nigeria and other external sources like the European Union (EU), France, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). In fulfilling her leadership role and also, being a major actor in the counter insurgency force, Nigeria had made "huge" contributions since 2015, following the intensification of attacks by the *Boko Haram's*. The Buhari administration consented to galvanise the force with \$100 million funding (Vanguard, 2015) to expend on the forces' key activities as well as take responsibility for the MNJTF HQ in N'Djamena, Chad. The EU through its Africa Peace Facility provided about 50 million Euros (www.africa-eu-partnership.org, 2016), while the USA pledged \$5million on top of existing programmes. The United Kingdom provided five million pounds, bulk of which was expended on the various aspects of support to the MNJTF. By 2016, the international partners of the MNJTF contributed 31.67 Euros out of the 50million Euros pledged (BBC News, 2015; Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release, 2015). (ISS, 2016) (www.wikipedia.org). In as much as the contributed funding seems "huge in figure terms"; it however, falls short of the projects and operations to be carried out (Reuters, 2016b).

The funding the MNJTF expenses can in no small measure be, attributed to the inability to, reign in various cash and pledges of members and donors. To ameliorate this problem, the then Deputy Chairman of the AU Commission Erastus Mwencha hoped for mobilization of funds from across the continents and through UN channels. The effort was relatively successful. The UN pledged to provide technical support, while the Africa Union Peace and Security Council

was able to realize about \$250 million out of the \$700 million, it budgeted for the yearly operations of the MNJTF (ISS: 2017). The financial support to the MNJTF is directed at the procurement of weaponry, meet its logistical and material needs, as well as, cover a part of its human resource costs. This is expected to cover land and air transport requirements; secure communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; the equipment for the command headquarters and the camps in the sectors of operations and bonuses for the troops. Analysts have wondered how the African Union (AU) already stretched in Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia will be able to sustain a further engagement. These contributions are not enough. Thus, one is inclined to logically deduct from the analysis that "the contributions of Nigeria, the United Kingdom, the Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-SAD) and the European Union, are not enough to cover the initial budget of about \$700 million yearly estimate of the MNJTF" (Sawadogo in ISS; 2017), not to talk of sustaining the forces momentum, its offensive spirit and above all, maintaining the morale and discipline of its officers and men.

The Challenge of Mishandling Human Rights

The fight against the *Boko Haram* Terrorist group was indeed a counter insurgency operation. The *Boko Haram* in most cases mingle with the civilian population after carrying out various horrendous acts of killings, burning and looting, raping and kidnapping, suicide bombings and the like. In apprehending the culprits the MNJTF often carry out reprisal attacks to flush the terrorists out of their hideouts. Some of these cases we understand involve some form of "collateral damage" where some of the *Boko Haram* terrorists were manhandled or maltreated and made to suffer some form of indignities.

The proportion of, such indignities and collateral damage have not only been described as a "disproportionate use of force", but, has also be a subject of controversy by the members of the public via the social media. International organisations such as the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also provided various evidences in form of eye witness accounts, live streaming of events, video recording and posting of still photos on social media and online broadcast channels of several news organisations (Human Rights Watch: World Report, 2016:19); (Amnesty International, 2016/17 Report).

The Nigerian and Cameroonian troops have been majorly accused of several human rights violations. Reports of Amnesty International indicated that most of the MNJTF violations involve mass arrests and killings of dozens of civilians, torture and detention of thousands of civilians (in government prisons and designated centres), and exposing them to horrific conditions resulting in malnutrition and diseases. The problem is compounded by the activities of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) whose supportive role has in many ways exposed *Boko Haram* that hid among the civilian populace. Amnesty International also claimed it has documented abuses by the group, which included the beatings and killings of *Boko Haram* suspects.

Other implications of public opinion on the operations of the MNJTF abound. For instance, the participation of Cameroonian, Chadian, and Nigerian contingent in the fight against Boko Haram has already provoked retaliation in a familiar pattern of escalation, if such attacks increase in number and deadlines. For example multiple suicide attacks in the Chadian capital in Ndjamena on 15th June which prompt Nigeria's neighbors in having a rethink on their level of engagement (France 24, 2015). Kenya is an example on the side of the continent, of how her military intervention in Somalia prompt large scale attacks at home (Tompo et al 2015). These attacks have had serious political consequences for President Uhuru Kenyatta, a fact which should not escape the leaders of Nigerian Neighbors.

There is also the perception on the group trying to take advantage of members' domestic challenges. Nigeria's ability to capitalize on Boko Haram's current weakness and curb it is another uncertainty, particularly with oil prices low and the naira falling. The neighbors strengths are also unknown. Each in its way is fragile. Cameroon is faced with delicate presidential succession come 2018, a security apparatus with internal tensions and a north with a large Muslim Population that feels marginalized. Niger Republic is faced with budget problems, a partial criminalization of the state due to illicit trafficking and a military used to meddling in politics (Crisis Group, 2013). Chad is also fragile with a long history of armed rebellions, essentially controlled by a tribal army awash with aspiring men at arms, reeling from the oil prices collapse and with a conclusive election in which President Idris Deby won a fifth term (Crisis Group, 2016). Such frailties could in various ways, offer ground for an extension or more indigenous mutation of Boko Haram, as well as the emergence of other violent actors, Jihadist or not.

Consequently, the chapter wishes to stress that the success of their operations as in past counter insurgency operations worldwide, depends to a large extent on an important dictum: as the government troops become demoralised and defensively oriented, as they increasingly appear unable to provide the population with elementary security in their daily lives, the government loses whatever allegiance it had. The message inherent in the forgoing is that "popular confidence is the indispensable condition for successful anti-guerrilla warfare" (Spanier, 1972:180).

The Challenge of Fighting Guerrilla Fighters

The horrendous activities and unconventional operations of the *Boko Haram* "nomadic fighting force" has in no small measure undermine the effectiveness of the MNJTF in curtailing its operations. The *Boko Haram* is operating as guerrilla fighting group with a modern twist. The "conventional armies" of the MNJTF seemed to have lost sight of certain fundamentals that the *Boko Haram* has adopted from the practice of classical guerrilla tactics. To assist our understanding of the issue at hand, the following points will suffice:

Boko Haram (Western education is bad) regard itself as fighting a "war of liberation" from Western influences. The group does not have a specific territory or political space it can call its own. It does not have the weapons capability comparable to the countries it is operating from like Nigeria and Cameroon. This is a weakness for the *Boko Haram*. But then, their strength lies in weakness. The question is how is this so?

The answer in our view is simple. *Boko Haram's* weakness compels it to whittle away at their enemy's strength (member countries of the MNJTF) bit by bit. Here comes the process of attrition which can go on for a considerable length of time. Strategically, the *Boko Haram* seems to be on the defensive, but, tactically, they are always on the offensive. They adopt hit and run tactics. They are highly mobile and carry out surprise attacks. They inflict physical damage and psychologically demoralise the people, military and the government. Above all, the *Boko Haram* has adopted Mao's well known formula: Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue (Heilbrunn, 1962:78-79) (Spanier, 1972; 173).

From a contemporary view point, the group has been utilising the social media (YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, etc.) not only to recruit new members, raise awareness about its activities, convert new members to their goal, mobilise them to carry out specific instructions, but also, to psychologise the people (through videos and footage of killings by both sides posted on social media) by questioning the competence and capability of the government and MNJTF to end the terrors and insecurity associated with the insurgent activities.

A cursory overview of the *Boko Haram* activities over the years showed that the group has adopted a "poor man solution" to make its impact pronounced. They have laid land mines all their major hideout especially, the Sambisa forest. This is a major hindrance to the tracking and apprehending members of the group by the MNJTF. They have also engaged in a series of suicide bombings carried out by the vulnerable that is, female (mostly younger girls) and boys. The group has kidnapped a lot of people from different villages and several schools in the area. They have taken civilians as hostages and in certain cases used them as human shields. They have integrated and still are mingling with the civilian population and are also part of the internally displaced persons (IDP's). A more astonishing ability of the *Boko Haram* is the adeptness to disperse, simply move into the jungle and regroup; set up bases even without proper shelter and camps to protect them from the elements and "simply live like animals" (www.voanews.com; 2016).

The foregoing description of the *Boko Haram* group clearly showed that its members are just ordinary folks like the rest of the people. They have no identifiable or distinguishing marks yet. Essentially, they have no Boko Haram uniform, no tattoos, no guns etc. To us, the issue once again then is, how can the MNJTF defeat such a group (that "moves with the fluidity of water and ease of the blowing wind") and achieve its aim within the framework of its mandate? The answer from our perspective cannot be found in adopting a purely military

solution. Member countries of the LCRC, MNJTF, African Union (AU) and other stakeholders should understand that the Boko Haram phenomenon is a symptom rather than a cause. Simply put, *Boko Haram* is a barometer of discontent. This discontent must be ameliorated, for it is the decisive element that determines victory or failure of counter-insurgency or anti-guerrilla warfare (Spanier, 1972: 180) like the MNJTF.

It is our submission therefore, that political leaders of member countries of the MNJTF have not fathomed two major elements into their military equation. First, going by counter insurgency tactics, all the member nations of the MNJTF must agree to set up a special sub unit that is highly mobile and thoroughly professional that is, a "suicidal unit" whose aim is to seek out at whatever cost, the command and control structure/cell of the Boko Haram. The ultimate aim is to live in the jungle for months, gather their own intelligence, isolate and ambush the leaders and other members, cut their supply routes and if possible, to totally destroy their sanctuary. Secondly, the MNJTF ought to know through historical experiences, that defeating the *Boko Haram* group through a purely military solution is an illusion. To be successful in their mission therefore, the MNJTF needs over a period of time to build into their institutional structure as well as adopt the proper political framework that will ensure the effectiveness of their military action (Spanier, 1972:177).

Conclusion

The Multinational Joint Task force is just two years old and its policy objectives on combating Boko Haram and other groups labeled as terrorist operating around the Lake Chad Basin, will take time to develop. However it has scored some gains in the fight against Boko Haram. Despite the challenges it faced in the area of resources and manpower. One can see the effort made by LCRC in addressing the threat of insurgency posed to the stability of the region. However with regard to the Multinational Joint Task force, the LCRC has acquired some experiences, but has committed errors in its ability to monitor and implement decisions.

The challenges of Multinational Joint Task Force are grave and should be addressed by all in order to provide solutions for its effectiveness and efficiency. However just as knowledge of the possible cause of a disease will assist a General Practitioner to give the adequate prescription for the prevention and curing of such disease, similarly it will be possible to recommend the following curative measures that will assist the Multinational Joint Task force: Member states of the Multinational Joint Task Force need the collaborative efforts of the African union as the actor responsible for conflict resolution in Africa. They must put aside any form of selfish interest and offer purposeful leadership to members of their population. There is the need to control membership state politics which will go a long way to strengthen the operations of the multinational joint task force. Member states continue to have an immense influence on the effectiveness of the AU to promote peace. The success of the AU is a determinant factor of political will it receives from member states. The

development of pragmatic leadership both within the AU and the continent is important to gain political support from the international community to effectively win the war against Boko Haram. A lesson learnt unit should be created with the experience of the multinational joint task force; this unit will be able to evaluate the missions' performance and lessons which will serve as an institutional memory for the future of its operations.

Command and Control of Multinational joint task force is a vital aspect that must be understood by all member states and government, there should be no compromise on this. There is only one option as far as command and control is concerned. All forces deployed in a mission are answerable to the Head of Mission and force commander. Lack of financial and logistical support has a dampening effect on the political will. Financial and administrative constraints will continue to be a major hindrance to the Multinational joint task force. In our opinion multinational joint task force executed by the African Union this has proof that no organization has the absolute leverage to keep peace in Africa. The MNJTF partners should give concrete effect to their pledges of materials, financial and technical assistance in order to strengthen operational capacities that would enable it to operate effectively.

The task force should step up its efforts in the field of external communication and civil military relations to better inform public opinion about its actions which will benefit the support of local population located in its areas of operation. The regional fight against Boko Haram has not been an easy one. It should be noted that the group is not monolith. Verification of existence of ideological factions and elements of opportunistic support, gives room that there are divisions that can be exploited. After several months of conflict, many of the militants have shown signs of fatigue. The force alone is not the solution.

A lot needs to be done to secure and stabilize those regions affected by the insurgency. These will assist the return of millions of displaced persons and refugees who are living in extreme conditions. Total victory over Boko Haram will not happen soon, instead advances will be measured against progress in terms of security and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and socio economic developed of the affected ravaged regions. The psychological reintegration of certain population groups, former fighters, relatives, supporters and victims of Boko Haram is an area that should not be overlooked.

Reference

- Adepegba, A. (2015). Nigerian Appointed MNJTF Commander. Retrieved from <http://vanguardngr.com/2015/06>. (Accessed 13th March 2017)
- Alabelewe, A. (2015). Buhari Laments Mercenary Soldiers Use. 19th May. Retrieved from <http://thenationonlineng.net/new/buhari-laments-mercenary-soldiers-use/> (Retrieved 12/3/17).
- Amistutz, R. (1982). *An Introduction to political Science: The Management of Conflict*. USA: Pressman and Co. Glenview.
- Amnesty International Report (2016). State of the World's Human Rights. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/480> (Accessed 23/3/17) (Retrieved 23/3/17)
- Apenda, I and Tough, B. (2015). Terrorism and Boko Haram: Reconsideration of Impacts on World Peace. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 37, Pp. 97-103.
- Assanvo W., Jeannine Ella, Abatan A. & Wendyam A. Sawadogo.(2016) Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram. West African Report. <http://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com> (Retrieved 20/3/17).
- AU Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation of Communiqué PSC/AHG/Comm.2 (DLXXXIV) on the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and on other Related International Efforts 3rd March 2015.
- Awodola, B and Ayuba, C. (2015), "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram" *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 6(4), 247-257.
- Awojobi, O. (2014), The Socioeconomic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria. *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research*, 11(1) Pp. 144-150.
- Baylis, J. Etal. (2005), *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- BBC (2015), "Boko Haram Crisis: US to fund Nigeria-led Force" BBC News 16th June. <Http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33146561>. (Retrieved 20/2/17).
- Blanchard, L.P (2014), Nigeria's Boko Haram Frequently asked questions. Congressional Research Service, June 2014.
- Chaturvedi, A. K. (2006.) *Dictionary of Political Science*. New Delhi: Academic Publishers.
- Comolli, V. (2015), *Boko Haram: Nigerian's Islamist Insurgency*. London: C. Hurst and Co.
- Cohen, G (2015) US Prevented Sale of Israel Helicopters to Nigeria. Retrived from <http://www.haaretz.com> (Acessed 23rd March 2017).
- Defenceweb (2015), Nigeria receiving T-72s and other weapons from Czech Republic. Defence Web 2 February 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.defence-web.co.za/index.php?Option=com-content&view=article&id+37790:Nigeria-receiving-t-72s-and->

- otherweapons-from-czech-republic&catid+50:
land&Itemid+105(Accessed 12th March 2017).
- Eke, O. (2007). *Strategic Studies: Logical Focus in the 21st Century*. Abakaliki: Willy-Rose.
- Familugba, J etal (2013). "Nigeria and Cameroon Border Relations: An Analysis of the Conflict and Cooperation (1970-2004)". *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol.3 (11). June. Pp. 183-4.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press (2015). UK to provide £5 million support to tackle Boko Haram. 27 March. Retrieved from <http://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-provide-5-million-support-to-tackle-boko-haram>. (Accessed 12th March 2017).
- France 24(2015). Chad Blames Boko Haram for Deadly Suicide Attacks in capital. 16th June. <http://www.france24.com/en/20150615-suicide-blasts-target-police-chad-capital-ndjamena> (Retrieved 20/2/17).
- Heilbruun Otto (1962). *Partisan War* New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Heywood, A. (2011). *Global Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hosenball, M. (2015). Nigeria's Boko Haram has up to 6,000 Hardcore Militants: US officials Reuters 6 February. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/us-nigeria-violence-bokoharam-idUSKBN0LA2j120150206> (Retrieved 20/2/17).
- Human Rights Report (2016). West Africa Report Issue. Retrieved from www.worldreport/2016/countrychapters/nigeria
- ICG (2013). Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? African Report N 208.19th September. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- ICG (2014). Curbing Violence in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Insurgency. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- ICG (2016). Chad: Between Ambition and Fragility. African Report N233. 30th March Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- Jalloh Abu-Bakarr J (2015). Analyst: 7,500 AU troops to battle Boko Haram not enough. Deutsche Welle. 2 February. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/analyst-7500-au-troops-to-battle-boko-haram-not-enough/a-18229819>.
- Matfess, H (2016) In the fight against Boko Haram, What's the role of the Multinational Joint Task Force. *IDA Africa Watch*, Volume 12. 18th August.
- Merrick, M (2014). The Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Business and Trade. *Africa Border Monitor*, 4th June 2014.
- Musa, T and Bavier, J (2015). Chadian Soldiers Arrive in Cameroon to Battle Boko Haram. Reuters 18th January. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/18/us-nigeria-violence-cameroon-chad-idUSKBN0KR0IB20150118> (Accessed 12th March 2017).
- Naijanews (2017). Feature on Boko Haram. www.naijanews.com (Retrieved 18/3/17).

- Nako, M. (2015), "How much does the War against Boko Haram Cost Chad", *Jeune Afrique*, 10 March.
- Omede, A.J. (1995), "Nigeria Military Role in Liberia" *African Journal of International Affairs and Development*, Vol (1) 45-55.
- Palmer, N. et al. (2004) *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*. Delhi: CBS Publishers.
- Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CDLXXXIV), 484th Meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29th January 2015.
- Perouse de Montclos, A. (2014). Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis. Chatham House, 02 September 2014.
- Premium Times (2015) Chad Airstrikes against Boko Haram Not on our Territory – Nigerian Military 18th June.
<http://premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/185323-chad-airstrikes-against-boko-haram-not-on-our-territory-nigerian-military.html>
(Retrieved 12th March 2017).
- Reuters (2016a), "Challenges Regional Armies face against Boko Haram" [citizens.co.ke/news/challenges that regional armies face against Boko Haram](http://citizens.co.ke/news/challenges-that-regional-armies-face-against-boko-haram) (Retrieved 20/3/17).
- Reuters (2016b) Funding fall short for task force to fight Nigeria's Boko Haram.
<http://www.mobile.reuters.com/article/iduskcnov> (Accessed (Retrieved 23/3/17).
- Sawadogo, W.A. (2017) The Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Stay the Course? 13th January. Retrieved from www.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria. (Retrieved 20/3/ 17).
- Spanier, J. (1972), *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics*. U.K: Praeger Publishers, Inc.
- Stein, C. (2016) Multinational Task Force Fighting Boko Haram Get Mixed Results. [www.voanews.com /multinational force.../3420173.html](http://www.voanews.com/multinational-force.../3420173.html). Accessed 20/3/17.
- Strategic Concept of Operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in the Fight against Boko Haram. 24th February 2015.
- The Official Journal of the ECOWAS (1981)
- Thomas, F (2015). Boko Haram: Can Regional Force Beat Nigeria's Militant Islamists? www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-3169550 . Retrieved 20/3/17.
- Tompo, J and Akwiri, J. (2015), Kenya's Tourism Industry Braces for more misery after Islamist Attack. 6th April. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/articles/2015/04/06/uk-kenya-security-tourism-idUKKBN-oMX01820150406> (Retrieved 20/2/17).

- Vanguard (2015), Buhari orders Release of \$21m to MNJTF on Boko Haram.
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/buhari-orders-release-of-21m-to-mnjtf-on-bokoharam/>. (Retrieved 12/3/17).
- Withnall, A. (2015), Boko Haram renames itself Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) as Militants Launch New Offensive against Government Forces. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/Africa/boko-haram-renames> (Retrieved 13/3/17).
- www.africa-eu.partnership.org/ has fought against bokoharam.
- www.wariboring.com - A.U Readies an Army to Fight Boko Haram: Don't Count on Success. Accessed 22nd March, 2017.
- www.wikipedia.org - Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Accessed 18th march, 2017.
- Zamfir, L (2015) Africa Led Counter-Terrorism Measures against Boko Haram. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). www.eprs.com (Retrieved 20/3/17).