







Dutse Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

Vol. 1, September, 2014

Editor-in-Chief Salisu A. Abdullahi
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url:library.fud.edu.ng

Printed by
Ahmadu Bello University Press Limited,
Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria.
Tel.: 08065949711.
E-mail: abupresslimited2005@yahoo.co.uk;
abupress2013@gmail.com
Website: www.abupress.org

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The Transformation of the Nigerian Military (1998-2015): A Policy Analysis

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Abstract

This article examines the contemporary trend in the security challenges facing the military in the 21st century world with emphasis on the experiences of Nigeria and other third world countries. The paper argues that the new dimension of security threats is more challenging to the developing nations, but does not totally exempt the developed nations, which makes military transformation a globalized phenomenon. By 2020, all countries are expected to have objectively transformed and modernized their military to combat the new wave threats and maintain global peace. In view of this, the paper made an in-depth exploration of the activities of the Nigerian military hierarchy and the federal government in the transformation process toward combating the challenges of internal insurgency (especially that of 'Boko Haram') and external aggression. Consequently, it accomplishes the main objective of the 'on-the-process' evaluation by highlighting the key issues, positive effects and challenges facing the process. It calls for a paradigm shift in the behavioural tenacity of the stakeholders and argued that the success of the process hinges on the concept of attitudinal change in which the military personnel inculcate professional attitude by imbuing discipline and respect for civil laws. The paper recommends that the Nigerian government should sustain the tempo of its committed political will and encourage the military hierarchy to be holistic in the process by carrying all the stakeholders along and avoid politicization, among others.

Keywords: internal insurgency, external aggression, attitudinal change, global peace, security

Introduction

The transformation of military forces into modern and effective tools of providing security in a changing world is a key concern for states and international organizations. As a matter of fact, all states of the world see it as very crucial and are obliged to engage in the process. While some have successfully transformed and are in the process of evaluation (U.S.A., Australia, Norway, Nether-land, etc.), others are in the process of transformation. Nigeria and most 'middle powers' belong to the latter category. It is a global phenomenon with a time frame of the year 2020 when all the countries of the world are expected to have successfully and objectively transformed their military to meet up with contemporary security challenges. The 'super-powers' only encourage countries to develop economically, but no country will ever holistically encourage others to embark on the process of defense transformation, simply because it is an issue of comparative advantage. The need to transform a country's military is usually borne out of the security challenges facing such a country both internally and/or externally. The case for Nigeria is premised on her internal security challenges and her strategic position in international politics.

Nigeria is facing new and challenging threats both internally and externally, which makes it mandatory to re-adjust her military forces. The task of suppressing internal insurrection or what can be described as irredentist claims are the great challenges facing the military. The *Jama'at Ahlul Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, otherwise known as the *Boko-Haram* 're-emergence' of the Niger-Delta militant activities serve as major threats that test the might of the Nigerian state and the capability and capacity of Nigerian military forces in performing their constitutional roles. Externally, the willingness to play a role in contributing to world peace and the aspirations for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council also necessitated the need for military transformation in Nigeria.

Military transformation is a huge capital intensive task, which requires substantial upfront investments in technology and software. Cabrera (2006:4) is of the view that these short-term

expenses can be set at 30% of the defense budget. Despite the limited resources, the Nigerian military hierarchy sees its transformation as irreversible. Gen. Andrew Q. Azazi, the former Chief of Defense Staff argued that the whole essence of the transformation is to 'have a military which is well respected and well equipped to operate anywhere in the world; a military that supports the political objectives of the Nigerian nation' (Thursday Newspaper, 6th June, 2008).

In view of this, therefore, this paper provides an overview of the activities of the Federal Government and the military hierarchy towards the transformation process, which is targeted to be fully implemented by the year 2015 and subsequently move Nigeria from the realm of 'military-transforming' to that of 'military-transformed' nation. The objectives are to analyze the said activities with a view to analyze the transformation process, evaluate the process, identify the challenges and problems/hindrances facing it and make implementable recommendations in order to make the target year 2015 realizable. All these will identify whether or not national political will and decision making remain the key driving forces behind such a process.

For these to be done, this paper is organized into a number of sections. The first part is the introduction followed by the review of the relevant literature on the subject matter. The third part will identify and analyze the issues for military transformation anchoring on related theoretical framework. It will also thoroughly analyze the process taken by the government in adjusting the Nigerian military force to the new security environment (military transformation), and the implications and problems/hindrances of the process will also be examined. This paper ends with a conclusion and recommendations, taking the military effectiveness in combating the *Boko Haram* insurgency and other internal insurrections into consideration.

The Historical Evolution of the Military in Nigeria

The historical evolution of the military in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era where it served as part of the colonial

machinery used in quashing anti-colonial resistance by the people. It was, therefore, created to facilitate and sustain colonial rule and exploitation (Momoh and Adejumo, 1999:8). It should be noted that each tribal group hitherto had their own standing armies before the advent of colonial rule. However, this paper is interested in the evolution of the present day Nigeria Armed forces, which metamorphosed from the colonial machinery and not the tribal armies. The first armed unit formed by the British was in 1862. It was called "Glover's Hausa" or "Hausa Militia". Initially, it numbered 40 men before it rapidly rose to 100. This force was essentially made up of Hausa slaves who ran away from their masters to seek refuge with Lieutenant Glover (Welch, 1992:5; Adekanye, 1985: 64).

In 1886, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was formed with a view to protecting British trading interests. It formed the 1 and 2 Battalions of the Northern Nigeria regiment, but the latter was cleared in 1900. The nucleus of the three Battalion of the Southern Nigeria regiment was constituted by the force raised by Sir Ralph Moor between 1891 and 1892 called the 'Oil River Irregulars' and later renamed the 'Nigeria Coast Constabulary' with headquarters in Calabar. In 1897, Sir Fredrick Lugard (later Lord) created the West African Frontier Force (WAFF); and the three battalions mentioned above constituted some of its regiments, when Nigeria was amalgamated in 1914. On June 7th, 1956, the Nigeria regiment of WAFF was renamed 'Nigeria Military Force Royal Waff'.

At this juncture, it should be noted that prior to Nigeria's independence, there were only fifteen military officers who were Nigerians. The rest were Britons (Momoh and Adejumo, 1999:8). It is also pertinent to note that the colonial military was used against the people to quash internal insurgency and fight imperialist wars. It was never part of the anti-colonial movement. After independence, the name was changed to the 'Nigerian Armed Force'. However, the military as an institution witnessed many transformations stemming from educational qualification for entry into the officer corps, and the introduction of a 'quota system', especially for the junior officers in the ratio 50:25:25 for North, East and West, respectively. This

consequently led to the present nature of the Nigerian Army dominated by the Northerners. The Nigerian Army had tremendously improved from what it used to be under the colonial regime. It is now made up of purely Nigerians with higher educational status and possesses moral wisdom, in comparison with what was obtainable before 1960.

The Nigerian military of today was established under Section 217 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which comprises the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). This is made up of highly intelligent and educated personnel with those in active duty in the three Nigerian armed services totaling approximately 76,000. The Nigerian Army, which is the oldest, largest and most operationally experienced, and saddled with the responsibility of conducting ground battles in favour of Nigeria, has about 60,000 personnel deployed in two mechanized infantry divisions: the composite division (airborne and amphibious), the Lagos Garrison Command (a division-sized unit) and the Abuja-based Brigade of Guards. It has demonstrated its capability to mobilize, deploy and sustain battalions in support of peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan/Darfur and is currently leading the military intervention in the Northern Malian crisis. Nigeria currently has about 6,000 peacekeepers deployed in 12 UN missions worldwide. The Nigerian Navy (7,000) is equipped with frigates, fast attack, and coastal patrol boats. The Nigerian Air Force (9,000) flies transport, trainer, helicopter and fighter aircraft, but most are currently not operational. Nigeria also has pursued a policy of developing domestic military production capabilities. Before the lifting of sanctions by many Western nations, Nigeria had turned to China, Russia, North Korea and India for the purchase of military equipment and training (US Bureau of African Affairs, 2012).

The army has metamorphosed from foot-soldiering at inception in the Nineteenth Century to the present-day mechanized and motorized formations. The military might displayed on October 1, 2010 at the 50th Independence Day celebration epitomises this fact. It renewed the fact that the

Nigerian military is a force to reckon with, owing to its skilled personnel, world class tactics and highly sophisticated and technological equipment. This necessitated a country like Sierra Leone to seek for military assistance in showcasing its own military might during her independence celebration, towing the path of the Nigerian experience.

The fact that the Nigerian military is able to actualize its enormous might to the advantage of the Nigerian state in terms of surmounting internal insurgencies and external aggressions cannot be rebuffed. However, this has not gone without a negative side of the coin. The history of Nigeria cannot be written without giving undiluted attention to the unconstitutional military intervention in Nigerian government and politics. Out of the fifty four years of self-rule (1960-2014), the military was in charge of governance for twenty nine years compared to the twenty five years of civilian rule. The military intervened on the allegation of corruption and abuse of office by the civilian administrations, only to end up perpetrating the same offences at the gravest level. The effect of the prolonged misuse of the military is perhaps the major root of the problem, which the country is grappling with (Ojo, 2000). Thus, the fear of another military intervention in the wake of the administrative recklessness of the current political executives is another major reason for the military transformation exercise in order to bring professionalism into it and discourage the military chiefs from nursing a political agenda.

The Concept of Military Transformation: A Review

It is common in social science that a phenomenon is not bound by one generally accepted definition. This is also the case with what transformation really means in the military context. There is confusion about the meaning of "military transformation" because the term has been subjected to various interpretations. One thing that is common is that transformation is a current buzzword in discussions about the future of the armed forces. Simply put, it is generally agreed that the concept refers to the changes needed to adapt the military to the new security environment. The bone of contention is the means and

ways of transforming the military, which brought about confusion in its conceptualization.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) has taken the lead to work out an all-encompassing definition. In view of this course, Military Transformation is seen to have gone beyond mere force modernization. It is also a strategy for discovering new sources of power and greater capability in the way forces are organized, trained, equipped and employed. In conclusion, the CTNSP posits that transformation is about people: transforming the way civilian and military personnel think about warfare (CTNSP, nd: 1).

In their own view, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) and Office of Force Transformation (OFT) assert that transformation addresses three major areas: how we do business inside the department, how we work with interagency and multinational partners and how we fight (Department of Defense, 2005:6). The main concern or methodologies of transformation, according to the OFT and DOD, is how the military does war fighting. According to Harvey (2005), military transformation is:

an approach that is best described as evolutionary change leading to revolutionary outcomes. This priority...means we must make a smooth transition from the current army to a future army- one that will be better able to meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment. It means we must prepare our forces, in mindset, training and equipment, to operate in future ambiguous and austere environments. But to be truly successful, this transformation must build on our enduring army values and rich tradition- preserving the best of the past, while changing and improving for the future.

However, in a sharp contrast to Harvey's position, Cabrera (2006:2) argued that the process of military transformation involves more than just acquiring technologically advanced weaponry and equipment and has a significant impact on the decision making, organizational and operational levels by

referring to ideals and concepts, such as co-operation and integration among national military units and bodies and international organizations. In a general term, Kem (2006) argued that effective transformation requires that organizations address four specific considerations: the *geostategic setting* (the context for transformation), the *ends* (the purpose of the organization), the *ways* (the method that the organization uses to achieve those ends) and the *means* (the resources used to accomplish the ways). He concluded that this approach of 'geostategic setting, ends, ways and means' provides a holistic and coherent approach to transforming an organization and without it, an organization does not truly transform. Regardless of how transformation may be defined, the Chief of the Defense Department's Office of Transformation, Arthur Cebrowski (a retired US Vice Admiral) had identified some criteria by which military programs may be judged for their transformational qualities.

i.

Interoperable: This is the top criterion which states that the weapon system or operating procedure be interoperable. Interoperability means that the system can function easily with a variety of other systems, including those from other services.

ii.

Change in war fighting methods: This is the second criterion which judged whether the system helps the user to change its methods of war fighting, as opposed to merely improving existing methods.

iii.

The third criterion is whether the system can deal with a wide range of threats (Gail and Svitak, 2002:4)

In relation to Nigeria, Agbaje (2008) posited six dimensions of comparative experience in military transformation. These are: the fascination of the democracy argument, the tenacity of identity problematique, the 'for richer for poorer' question, the 'better life for the military' outcome, the 'when the nation-state sneezes and globalization squeezes'

syndrome and the 'foreign assistance' dilemma. By the *fascination of democracy*, he argued that since Nigerians preferred a democratic future to an undemocratic one, military transformation is likely to be more thorough going and successful under democratic settings than transformation under a dictatorship. On the *tenacity of identity*, he opined that the transformation of the Nigerian armed forces from a segregated (along ethno-religious cleavages) to an integrated institution can be an impressive achievement on account of the identity question facing Nigeria. Conclusively, he argued that military transformation should include new technologies but must move beyond that to embrace also other components, such as adaptation and defense reform, incorporating cultural, human, political and organizational transformation.

From the various conceptualizations of military transformation, one can see that transformation is not a one-dimensional concept or a predetermined recipe for change. Instead, it is commitment to the innovative approaches to war fighting and the support of war fighters (Aach and Hosek, 2004:2). This paper argues that military transformation hinges on the concept of attitudinal change. For any military to be seen as transformed, such military must not only be sophisticated in skills and equipment but also as a matter of priority inculcate the need to adopt a professional attitude to duty by inhibiting discipline and respect for civil laws and not see themselves as above the law in the civil-military relations. Contemporary happenings are fast bridging the gap between the military and the civil society. Military personnel are drafted in joint security operations with the police in dealing with civil disturbances, which are fast outgrowing external invasion. The new security challenges facing the military, which warranted transformation, are more often than not issues of civil disturbances. It is observed in civil-military relations that most military officers are have imbibed the attitudinal notion of tagging the people as 'bloody civilian' who are seen to be inferior in all ramifications. This negative notion has eaten deep in the military orientation to the extent that the military hierarchy finds it difficult to take order from a minister of defense who does not have a military

background. This trajectory specificity makes transformation of the military inevitable in the efforts to attain the highest state of professionalism.

Issues for Military Transformation in Nigeria: Theoretical consideration

The vision of the Nigerian armed forces depicts the kind of military force the country aims to possess. It states "to build a flexible and responsive force with intellectual, doctrinal and technical characteristics and capabilities to support the objectives of the National Defense policy in ways that complement other instruments of national power" (*Thursday Newspaper*, June 6, 2008). For this vision to be achieved, it became a matter of obligation for the Nigerian Armed Forces to re-organize and re-structure in order to face the new challenges in the current international security environment. In the course of identifying the issues in consideration toward the transformation process, the paper relies heavily on the theoretical framework posited by Roger Cabrera (2006). In his contribution to the annals of the literature on the subject matter, Cabrera (2006:3) postulated a uniparite framework for military transformation, especially in middle power countries. To him, a country transforming her military should first and foremost 'define or, at least, prioritize what constitutes a threat to her security'. Secondly, such country must 'set the guiding principles for countering those threats and for the nation's role in providing security at the international or global sphere' and finally, 'transform the Armed Forces to the extent possible based on the resources available and the compromises required within the International Organizations they belong to'. He argued that any effort at transforming the military of the middle power countries without strict adherence to these three issues may end up to be a worthless exercise or what we can best described as a boondoggle.

In relation to the type of military transformation in Nigeria, the theoretical postulation can be considered thus:

- i. Define or, at least, prioritize what constitutes a threat to security: Nigeria is facing a lot of internal

- insurrections, ranging from antisocial vices to civil disturbances that are posing a security threat to her national security. These include the *Boko Haram* insurgency, kidnapping, pipeline vandalizations, corruption, armed robbery, the re-emergence of Niger-Delta militant activities, ethno-religious crises, ethnic rivalry, inter-governmental feud and political rivalry, among others. Each of these disturbances is in itself a great threat to the country's national security and needs to be addressed with utmost urgency with the limited resources available. Hence, Nigeria is faced with the dilemma of the challenges of prioritizing them according to how serious they constitute a threat to security in the face of the ongoing military transformation.
- ii. Set the guiding principles for countering those threats and for the nation's role in providing security at the international or global sphere: Nigeria is being faced with the issue of formulating and implementing the best policies that will curb the series of internal insurrection and irredentist claims. Despite this, the global community is looking up to Nigeria in providing security and enforcing peace in war torn countries, especially in Africa. Yet, Nigeria cannot show anything as the positive reward of its big brother roles in Africa in particular and the world at large. The issue facing the nation is the determination of the most pressing threat among the internal crises and the external ones in the wake of its transformation process.

- iii. Transform the Armed Forces to the extent possible based on the resources available and the compromises required within the International Organizations they belong to: it is unfortunate that the Nigeria's military transformation process is taking place at the period of a global credit crunch and drop in crude oil prices, which constitute the major revenue for the country. These have been affecting the budgetary allocation of

the military, which require a huge capital in implementing the transformation agenda, as earlier noted. This notwithstanding must not deter the process to the extent possible. Nigeria needs to shape its armed forces as effective tools to provide security to its population, protect and advance its national interests and foreign policies in order to remain useful and a reliable ally and coalition partner in multilaterally undertaken peace missions.

Nigerian Military Transformation Policy

The ongoing military transformation was perceived under the military regime of General Abdulsalam Abubakar but became more intensified in 1999 shortly after the inauguration of the fourth republic. The need for the intensification of the process is borne out of the cognate experience of the new civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who had ruled the country as a onetime military head of state. His garnered experiences in coup plotting (through an active role in successfully deposing Gen. Gowon) and foiling (when his principal, Gen. Murtala, was assassinated in an attempted coup) techniques during his military regime (1975-1979) made him see the transformation of the military as a necessity to avoid the termination of the Nigerian nascent democracy. The primary objective thus is to professionalize the military in the art of security and discourage or inhibit it from intervening in politics, amongst other reasons. The vision of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. O.A. Ihejirika (2011), best depicts the core cause and targeted result of the transformation and modernization process. It states "to transform the Nigerian Army into a force better able to meet contemporary challenges".

The process practically started in earnest on June 5, 2008 when the Ministry of Defense accepted and adopted the report of the Transformation Committee on the Armed forces of Nigeria. The 20-man Transformation committee was earlier inaugurated by Gen. Owoye Azazi on January 30, 2008 and was headed by Air Officer Operations, Nigerian Air Force headquarters, Air vice Marshal Olufemi Faloyin. The then

secretary to the government, Alhaji Yayale, instructed that two bodies: the Defense Management Board (DMB) comprising the ministers and the service chiefs, and the Service Committee comprising the meeting of the CDS and the service chiefs to start work immediately on the implementation of the report (i.e. the military transformation process).

Under the transformation policy, new policies on the National Military Strategy detail the deployment of forces for external defense, ISO (internal security operations), peacekeeping, containment of natural disasters and accidents. It would specify on the scope and holiday of a Quick Reaction Force, a follow-up force and a Defensive force. It also includes specifying a general force structure for all the services and relevant doctrine for their training and deployment (Lawo, 2008). Subsequent to this, a retreat of the civilian officials of the MOD and the military personnel serving in DHQ and the three services (the Army, the Navy and the Air Force) is scheduled where all ranks are expected to be briefed on their various contributions to the new transformation.

Realistically, the 3-day retreat with the theme: "Transformation and Modernization of the Nigerian Armed Forces" was held in December 2008 with the following main objectives:

- i. To examine the various aspects and needs of the armed Forces for sustenance of the nation's nascent democracy
- ii. To focus and discuss extensively the report of the Armed Forces Transformation Committee
- iii. To refocus the Nigerian Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 7-point agenda and vision 20-2020 of the federal government (Yakubu and Izang, 2008).

The retreat was declared open by the president and C-in-C of the Armed forces, represented by the National Security Adviser, Major Gen. Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar (rtd). A total of 352 dignitaries and participants from diverse backgrounds were in attendance. The retreat has 5 Syndicates (which serve as the

Objectives and Strategies of the transformation process) as follows:

- Syndicate 1: Evolving an enduring national military strategy towards the realization of vision 2020
- Syndicate 2: Restructuring the Ministry of Defense, to promote best practices in higher management of defense
- Syndicate 3: Evolving virile military capabilities for the armed forces of Nigeria
- Syndicate 4: Developing the technological capacity of the armed forces of Nigeria-the way forward
- Syndicate 5: Funding strategy for the transformation of the armed forces of Nigeria.

Recommendations of the Retreat with Regards to the Five Syndicates

On the issue of *Evolving an enduring national military strategy towards realization of vision 2020*, the retreat recommends that:

- i. The MOD should review the National Military Strategy (NMS) every two years in line with the dynamic nature of the global security environment. The MOD/DHQ should ensure that the nation's strategic defense planning should include the establishment, training and equipping of a special force with all the competences and capabilities of quick response to crises. The FGN should ensure that the grand strategy of the nation details and lay emphasis on the employment of national infrastructure to facilitate and support the ability of the military to operate during crises and disasters within the country.
- ii. DHQ should articulate detailed requirements for the nation's participation in peace support operations (PSO). This should include equipment for PSO force and training.
- iii. MOD should gradually implement the restructuring of consideration of the heavy financial involvement.

With regards to the *Restructuring the Ministry of Defense to promote best practices in higher management of defense*, the following recommendations were made:

- i. MOD should integrate its civil and military personnel in line with the proposed structure as amended.
- The Amendments are:
 - ii. The plans and inspections directorate should be headed by a military officer due to the nature of responsibilities and functions
 - iii. The transformation office should be headed by a military officer of 3-star rank to ensure effective coordination and implementation.
 - iv. The MOD should place DICON under the office of the permanent secretary in accordance with the existing Act.
 - v. MOD should merge the Budget and Finance departments into the department of Accounts having deputy directors, each in charge of budget and finance.
 - vi. MOD should ensure the acquisition/ construction of an appropriate building to accommodate the new structure for proper integration.
 - vii. DHQ should review the IHTACOS particularly as it concerns the length of the service of personnel.

Regarding *Evolving virile military capabilities for the armed forces of Nigeria*, the retreat recommends that:

- i. MOD should adopt an appropriate forces structure for the AFN
- ii. MOD/ DHQ should ensure the upward review of remuneration and continuous training and appropriate deployment for the AFN
- iii. DHQ should establish a department of defense logistics and promulgate a joint logistics policy
- iv. DHQ should ensure the establishment of PSO policy formulation committee.

On the issue of *developing the technological capacity of the armed forces of Nigeria: the way forward*, the retreat recommends as follows:

- i. MOD/ DHQ should identify areas of comparative advantage on human capacity development with a view of fashioning out guideline to drive the military technology initiative.
 - ii. MOD should articulate a defense ICT policy that covers a broad spectrum of ICT applications.
 - iii. MOD/ DHQ should adopt the proposed structure of the Defense Space Agency.
 - iv. TRADOC should be made a tri-service institution and the centre point for military R and D.
 - v. FGN should set aside a minimum of 10% of the AFN's annual capital budget for core R and D.
- Finally, with respect to *funding strategy for the transformation of the armed forces of Nigeria*, the retreat recommends that:
- i. The FGN should fund the AFN on the first charge basis
 - ii. The FGN should allocate 80% of fund accruing from Peace Support Operations (PSO) for equipping the AFN.
 - iii. The FGN should exclude the non-core defense expenditure (e.g. education, Medicare, barracks maintenance, etc.) from the defense budget.
 - iv. The FGN should adopt the use of the advanced capital market mechanism through the use of debt to finance specific defense needs.
 - v. The FGN should tax the direct beneficiaries of defense towards equipping the AFN (Yakubu and Izang, 2008).

An Assessment of the Transformation Process

Out of the scheduled 17 years (1998-2015) of the transformation exercise, 16 years is gone with only a year left. In view of this, it is not out of point to evaluate the extent of the achievement recorded so far on the implementation of the transformation policy. This will not only enable us to appreciate the difference made to the military, but also identify the gap that needs to be filled before the time frame elapsed.

First and foremost, it is observed that the media publicity given to the transformation process when it started reduced drastically to the extent that military observers and scholars thought that the process is abandoned, as it is usually the case with most Nigerian government policies. It took the unrelenting effort of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Azubuike Ihemirika, to sensitize the public that the process is still on course before most people realized it (News Agency of Nigeria [NAN], 2013). The number of activities and ground breaking achievements of the military corroborated the position of the military chief. These range from staging a series of workshops, conferences and training for the military personnel to the invention of locally made sophisticated equipment. The achievements of the process manifested mainly between 2012 till date.

The most prominent positive outcome of the transformation process is seen when the military unveiled locally made equipment: the Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) called 'IGIRIGI APC' built by the Nigerian Army Electrical and mechanical Engineers; and the 160ft Seaward Defense Boat (war ship) called 'NN ANDONI P100' built by the Nigerian Navy currently working on the second war ship (*Leadership*, December 30, 2012), bulletproof vest and other military clothing. These indigenous armaments were made in the ballistic arms factory, the DICON-Marom factory located in Kaduna. It is a public-private partnership between DICON and Israel's Marom Dolphin Nigeria Ltd (United Press International [UPI], 2012). This proved the fact that the military have gone far in implementing the recommendations of the Syndicate 4. Other landmark achievements of the process include the establishment

of the Army Transformation and Innovation Centre (ATIC) by the Nigerian Army on September 28, 2012 (Oladéji, 2012; Leadership, September 29, 2012) to monitor, improve and maintain the success of the transformation process. In line with Syndicate 3 (as stated above), the army through its engineering section has completed and commissioned lists of projects, which include the Army Headquarters Dog Centre at Ijaja, Lagos and the Phase one of the 176 Special Forces Battalion Kuje Barracks, Abuja, amongst others, to create a conducive environment for evolving virile military capabilities.

In response to the current wave of internal security threats of oil theft and bunkering, sea pirates, the *Boko Haram* insurgency and other related ethno-religious conflicts, the military have commissioned a Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency Centre at the Nigerian Army Training Center (NATRAC) in Kontagora to enhance the training and professionalization of military personnel to confront the security challenges facing the country. As part of its corporate social responsibility and fostering civil-military relations, the military distributed vehicle stoppers and anti-terrorist devices to churches and mosques in Abuja to curb the activities of the *Boko Haram* group in the FCT (Oladéji, 2012). In addition, Civil-Military Affairs is established under the headship of Major Gen. Bitrus Kwaji to maintain the cordial relationship between the towns and barracks. On ending the menace of oil theft, illegal bunkering, pirates and other criminal activities in the creek, the military joint task forces successfully conduct 'EXERCISE FARUTA' in which no fewer than 17 ships (including MT Garroch, MT Energy, MV Gulf Sisan, MT Androussa and MT Aegean Horizon, amongst others) laden with stolen millions of barrels of crude oil were arrested. A total of 8 warships, including NNS Thunder, 6 gunboats and one maritime patrol aircraft and over 400 personnel, participated in the exceptional exercise in the Gulf of Guinea between November 11 and 17, 2012 (Leadership, December 30, 2012).

However, there are some negative sides of the transformation process. For instance, the NAF Foundation, which was established to provide welfare services to NAF

personnel failed to satisfy its core mandate, though it was unbundled and NAF Holdings Ltd established in its place (Oladéji, 2012). Another point of negative outcome of the process lies in the failure of the Nigerian Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to meet the contemporary security challenges, as confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika (Leadership, September 29, 2012). There is also indication that the target date of 2015 may not be feasible. This can be inferred from the comment of the Nigerian President (C-in-C of the armed forces) during the commissioning of the NNS ANDONI warship when he said that "this is the beginning of transformation and I believe that in another 10-15 years, we will be thinking of starting a project of taking Nigeria to the air. We have just started and we will continue" (Jonathan, 2012). This is a strong indication that the process can be extended beyond the 2015 target year.

In response to the shortcomings noted in the transformation process, the military hierarchy swiftly took some laudable steps at addressing the defects. First, machinery was put in place to ensure budgetary increment in defense spending. The ICD Research/Strategic Defense Intelligence embarked on feasibility research which forecasts Nigerian defense expenditure to grow annually at 22% from US\$2.19billion in 2012 budget to US\$4.76billion by 2016 amounting to a total increase of 126.6% within four years (UPI, 2012). On April 2, 2013 the army headquarters unveiled the Nigerian Army Information and Processing System (NAIPS) designed by the ATIC. The system will accept emergency alert messages in form of short message service (SMS) and emails from the public and process it for immediate action under a very strict confidentiality of its sources of information. The response time from reporting and decision making is estimated at 15 minutes. Three email addresses: nigerianarmytips@yahoo.com, nigerianarmytips@gmail.com, and nigerianarmytips@hotmail.com and GSM numbers: 08160030300, 0705333123 and 08181555888 were released to the public to enable distressed persons to forward information to (Daniel, 2013). In addition, the army fulfilled its promise (as hinted by Lt-Gen. Ihejirika in May 2013 at a seminar on

Nigerian Army Transformation in Abuja) by establishing a Special Operation Unit known as the Nigerian Army Special Operation Command (NASOC) with the assistance of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). The command is designed as a low level strategy to combat the threat of the *Boko Haram* insurgency (Stratrisk, 2014). The CDS, Admiral Ota Ibhahim (2014), confirmed the establishment of the NASOC and said it is an effort to boost the transformation of the NASOC and said it is force capable of meeting contemporary security challenges.

The Challenges Facing Military Transformation in Nigeria

Nigeria is ranked high in possible terrorist attack long ago by the UN opinion survey. This prediction subsequently became a reality and manifested in the *Boko Haram* insurgency, which is currently seen as the most serious threat to national security, though there are other threats as well. The fight against this group transcends the capability of the Nigerian Police, which consequently rest it on the shoulder of the military. However, this type of warfare requires special techniques both human and material that AFN should acquire and sustain accordingly. This is chiefly because members of the group adopt guerrilla tactics – a system of war where an enemy launches a sudden offensive attack and disappears into the civil crowd with no traces. That makes it difficult to identify them as the state enemy. For example, a series of reportage in the News and Newspapers have it that the Military have killed hundreds of *Boko Haram* members. However, the group in its condition of dialogue with the federal government requested that government should pay compensation, otherwise known as 'Dhyya' - 'blood money' to the family of the 24 killed members at A2 million each (Kupoluyi, 2012). Logically speaking, this means the group lost only 24 members in contrast to the hundreds killed by the military. The question is: does this not signify that the military have been killing innocent citizens? A claim the sect have made on several occasions when the military strike and kill a 'supposed sect-member'. This poses a serious challenge facing the process. Also, the decisions about the procurement of expensive new equipment and the acquiring of fairly used ones

from the 'super powers' are attracting criticism, which, more often than not, put the military hierarchy in a dilemma of what decision to take that will satisfy the people, most especially the critics of the army and the social commentators.

Another challenge is the realization that, in an increasing interconnected world (courtesy of globalization), conflict, tension or instability in neighboring African states represent threats to Nigeria. Whatever happens in any African state has adverse effects on Nigeria because of its "big brother" position and role. Hence, the interests of these conflict-ridden countries must be put into consideration, thus posing a great challenge facing the transformation process.

The limited financial resource is more or less the greatest challenge facing the AFN in the process. This is owed to the continuous drop and fluctuations in the price of crude oil, which constitutes about 95% of Nigeria's export earnings and over 80% of federal government revenue (US Bureau of African Affairs, 2012). The consequence of this is the reduction in the overall defense budgets, which fall short of the globally recommended 30% of a nation's budget (Cabrera, 2006:4). While some argued for the increment of the defense budget, others opined that it will promote corruption amongst the already corrupted military chiefs. The controversy over the Nigerian defense expenditure has become much more intense because defense allocation (like that of other African countries) is seen as a reflection of the interplay of many variables, which are perceived by different people in different ways (Omede, 2012). In view of this, the inevitable need to increase the defense budget is unrealistic, thereby serving as threat to the successful implementation of the transformation policy.

The national policy and decision making trend is also a key determinant of the success or otherwise of the process, as is usually the case in most of the armed forces of the middle powers. The understanding of security subscribed to by Nigerian political elites is greatly influencing and undermining the process. In the long run, some benefit-seeking military officers hobnobbing with the political class might succeed in politicizing the process given the nature of politicking in Nigeria (i.e. the politics of tribalism, favouritism and religious sentiment, etc).

It is generally subscribed to that corruption in running in the vein of an average African leader, which has now become a way of life. In view of this, the process may not be immune from the challenge of corruption in the form of the embezzling and

misappropriation of the already meager financial resources. This may eventually lead to purchasing substandard equipment and a reduction in the training courses, thereby defeating the objective of the entire process. Another great challenge facing the process is the issue of out-facing old techniques, which are now part and parcel of our old generals. This is not only peculiar to Nigeria alone, as it also affects other countries. This is evident in the writing of Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (1998)- a retired US army-when he argued that:

The army's top leaders are like men who have raised a wonderful daughter, but who cannot accept the fact that she is no longer daddy's little girl. They do not want to let her change. These generals cling to outmoded organization they grew to love and promote subordinates who share their prejudices. We have a great army that is eroding to a good but increasingly troubled one: our personnel policies are anachronistic, our organization is inefficient, our procurement policies are eye-tollers, our quality of thought has decayed and our image is rotten. Our army is inherently conservative. Occasionally, this serves our nation well. In times of crisis, it does not.

All the afore-discussed factors are militating against the transformation and modernization process, which, if not checked and corrected is more than enough to pervert the whole process and render it useless and its effort futile.

Conclusion and Recommendations

One thing is to identify a problem and then fashion a way out to solve it. However, it is an entirely different scenario, whether there is the political will to implement the raised solution or the tenacity to endure the pains while solving the problem. It is often said that 'no good thing comes without sacrifice' or put simply 'no pain, no gain'. In essence, the Nigerian nation must rise up to the challenges (as identified in the preceding section) in order join the list of transformed countries. It is praiseworthy to note that some of the recommendations made at the December 2008 3-day retreat are being implemented. Chiefly is the establishment of the Department of Nigerian Army Transformation (DOAT) headed by a military director, as recommended. The department is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that the Nigerian

Army actualizes its Vision 2015, which is to manage the transformation in order to develop the operational effectiveness of the Nigerian army. It is also expected to develop strategies that will ensure that the Nigeria army responds adequately to the ever dynamic operational and technological environment. However, it might be too early to evaluate the entire process, as we are still in the implementation stage. The entire process, which started in 1998, is expected to run through and end by 2015. This paper only explores the process and analyzes the on-the-process evaluation to see the pace of the implementation of the process and set the record straight to avoid trivial issues from setting in to pervert the process. Efforts will be made in the year 2015 after the whole process should have been completed, to critically carry out in-depth evaluation of the transformation process. As earlier noted, military transformation is a global phenomenon with a time frame of the year 2020 as the deadline. The Nigerian government set 2015 as the target year of full transformation. However, certain steps must be put into consideration in order to prevent the process from being an effort in futility.

First, the country should keep her transformation efforts intellectually honest, taking a holistic approach and at the same time looking beyond a gadget-oriented approach to change. This implies that we must not only transform by acquiring new equipment, but also by re-orientating our military on civil-military relations. As I earlier proposed, the concept of attitudinal change in military behavior is a key issue in the effort to attain the highest state of professionalism. This is because war fighting is no longer the mere purpose of the military in the changing world, but also how the military can partner with other governmental and non-governmental agencies for peace and stability at home and abroad.

Second, all the rank and file of the armed forces should be carried along in the transformation process. It should not be a matter of the military chiefs alone. Also, the generals must be willing to adapt to change in order not to sabotage the process. This will solve the challenges of the conservatism of the old generals who are more often than not reluctant to adapt to new methods of doing things.

Third, it is strongly recommended that education and vocational skills must also be given priority in the military. This will allow them to practice other professions (such as engineering, law, teaching, craftsmanship, etc.) in the absence of war or any peacekeeping operation. This will shift our military

orientation away from war fighting towards a world characterized by freedom, liberty and self-determination. Consequently, our nascent democracy will be shielded from possible termination by military rule.

Fourth, since one of the major challenges facing the process is lack of adequate means of funding, focus should be shifted to finding alternatives, such as "pooling support services", as used by Netherlands and Germany in the case of the joint aircraft sharing agreement whereby Netherlands is responsible for maintenance and Germany for training (Cabrera, 2006). In addition, the Nigerian government must maintain and sustain (and also step up) its commitment to the cause by doing the right thing at the right time, especially on adequate funding and the prompt release of fund.

Finally, the Nigerian military should be depoliticized in all its ramifications. The present nature of what is obtainable is that those in authority are fond of protecting the interests of their allies when it comes to promotion and deployment. Also, entry into the military (both force and military schools) is majorly based on military linkage. In essence, the column for 'father/relative status', which specifies whether the applicant has any relative in the military, should be removed to allow equal access or opportunities for all and sundry.

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Durkheim, Weber and Geertz on Religion: Implications for Theorizing in Africa

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Abstract

The thrust of this article is to briefly contrast the approaches of Durkheim and Weber on "religion" and how it relates to society. Geertz's approach is equally employed in contrast to these scholars' showing how he built on them. Durkheim provided a definition of religion, while Weber did not but Geertz complemented Weber's work by providing one from interpretive sociology. Theoretically, Durkheim believed studying sociology needs first identifying a social phenomenon and tracing it to its origins to see how it came about. In contrast, Weber tries to understand variations in the influence of ideas on action, explaining why some kinds of cultural systems have much more influence on economic and political action than others. Geertz believed that people act according to the system of meanings that they have, and interpreting the meanings and describing them are the tasks of a researcher. Methodologically, Weber considered the subjects' "motives" or interpretation of actors' actions, which is a credit when compared to Durkheim's that downplays the individual. The essay then critiques these postulates, arguing that in Africa, there is no clear line of separation between the sacred and the profane. But the western approach to religion separates them, subject from object and beliefs from practices, which does not help us in understanding religion in Africa. Thus, due to differences conceptually, theoretically and methodologically, the western approaches to religion are incompatible to Africa, there by necessitating the need for a theory that allows for the understanding and theorizing the dynamics of the situation.

Keywords: religion, society, method, approach, theorizing.