



OSUN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

**Vol.1, No.1, April 2015
(Maiden Edition)**

**Published by the
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
OSUN STATE UNIVERSITY, OSOGBO**

OSUN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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MAIDEN EDITION

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GOVERNANCE, TERRORISM AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract

It is apparent that the campaign of terror unleashed by the members of the Boko-Haram terrorist organization has defied all solutions. Although there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies on the pervasive problem of terrorism in Nigeria, most recent studies have not specifically and adequately examined the possible connection between the components of good governance and terrorism in Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this paper examined the nexus between the elements of good governance and domestic terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria; thereby injecting new insights into the on-going academic and intellectual discourses on the terrorism in Nigeria. In achieving this, relevant literatures were reviewed and secondary data were sourced. The problem of insurgency was situated within the theoretical framework of Strategic Choice and Political Process. The paper found that the failure of Nigerian government in addressing the problems of youth unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and socio-economic inequality, particularly in the North-eastern Nigeria, provided a fertile ground for the development of religious fundamentalism, which has led to Islamic insurgency in the region. Against this backdrop this paper recommended that good governance through massive initiation and implementation of poverty alleviation programme in the region; pursuance of sound educational policy aimed at bridging the gap between North and South; and intensive campaign against political corruption that has become endemic among the Northern political

elites. Also, ideological orientation and re-orientation should be widely embarked upon in order to change the rigid and extreme religious ideology.

Keywords: Governance; Insecurity; Terrorism; Ideology

Introduction

The word terrorism was coined during the French Revolution in 1790s. The term was used to describe the terror unleashed by the revolutionaries, particularly Maxi Milieu Robespierre (1793-1795), to their opponents during the revolution. Since then, terrorism has been adapted by certain religious or political groups as a mechanism for expressing their dissatisfactions with the politico-economic and religious situations of their hitherto societies. It is fundamental to stress that during this era, terrorism was more or less a national or regional affair (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). However, this trend has been altered dramatically in recent years. According to Awake (2006:4), 'just few years ago, terrorism seemed to be restricted to a few isolated places, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque Country in Northern Spain, and some areas of the Middle East. Now, especially, since September 11, 2011, with the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, it has mushroomed into a worldwide phenomenon'. Consequently, many terrorist organizations have been identified globally, such as: Baader Mainhof gang of West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigade, the Palentinian al-Fatah, Israeli Haganah, Lebanese Hezbollah, Osama Ibn Laden's Al-Qaeda, Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, Somalia Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Livingstone, Bruce and Wanek, 1978; Ngare, 2012). In 2013, Nigerian Boko-Haram has been black-listed among the league of global terrorist organizations by the United States of America (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). According to the latest Global Terrorism

Index (GTI), Nigeria is currently ranked the 7th most terrorized country in the world (Osundefender, 2013).

The emergence of Boko-Haram in Nigeria is still shrouded in obscurity as different researchers have given divergent and seemingly contradictory accounts of the origin and formation of Boko-Haram in the country. As a matter of emphasis, the group was said to have been formed in 2002 by Yusuf Mohammed, with the sole aim of propagating Islamic law and jurisprudence in Northern Nigeria. Initially, it was based in Maiduguri, Borno State. But, later, the group was relocated to Kanamma, Yobe State, which was often touted as Afghanistan. It was from this base that the sect unleashed terror on the people and the security personnel. Since its inception, 'the sect has wrecked enormous havoc in the country especially by using explosives and firearms with gruesome, fatal consequences' (Awake, 2006:6). In effect, Nigeria is believed to have lost more than 1,500 lives to terrorist acts by 2011 (Salkida, 2012). In addition, over 300,000 people, mainly women, children and the elderly have moved within Nigeria, or sought refuge in neighbouring Niger, Cameroon or Chad (UNHCR, 2013). In May 2014, the number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) had reached almost 647, 000 (UNHCR, 2013). According to the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), there are an estimated 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the six states of the North-east, with over 90 percent are living in host community (PINE, 2014). In addition, the conflict has affected the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, with over 130,000 refugees/returnees received (Omojuwa, 2014; UNHCR, 2014). Since the beginning of 2014, over 65,000 children under five have been newly admitted for the treatment for severe acute malnutrition (UNHCR, 2014). Haruna in his piece revealed:

There were, the newspaper said, ten attacks against villages and communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa

states between January 28 against Waga Chekawa which left 30 people dead and against Jakana on March 4 in which the casualty was 11. In between were the attacks on Kauri (83 dead), Konduga (34), Izge (106), Bama (60), Buni Yadi (59 pupils of the unity school located in the town which is in Yobe State), Michika and Shuwa (28), Mainok and Maiduguri bombing (97) and Mafa (30), making a total of 538 dead within a period of less than two months...(Haruna, 2014:1).

Researchers, such as Agbiboa (2013d), Mustapha (2012), Kukah (2012), Cinton (2009), and Danjibo (2010), have reiterated that absence of political reforms and the failure to establish a participatory politics, weak democratic governance, lack of politics of inclusion and representation could lead to terrorism. Danjibo (2010) specifically mentioned that the Maitatsine religious crisis of 1980 could be linked to the failure of then political administration in Nigeria. According to Joseph (1987), Nigerian democratic leaders have abandoned the traditions and norms of the democracy; rather they choose to be despotic and corrupt. The Practice of the so-called democracy in the 21st century Nigeria is, intrinsically characterized by political instability, social acabre, cultural balderdash and economic quagmire, resulting in unemployment of all forms, leading to abject hunger and indescribable poverty (Majekodunmi, 2012). According to Nwalonue and Ojukwu (2012), Nigeria has witnessed dramatic increase in poverty, unemployment, social inequality, corruption, and mismanagement of resources, which are indications of bad governance (Nwalonue and Ojukwu, 2012). Emphasizing on the probable nexus between components of good governance and terrorism in Nigeria, Forest (2012) contended that the Boko-Haram is largely a consequence of expanding socio-economic and religious insecurity whose repercussions resonate among certain communities in the North.

Nchi (2013:210) aptly described bad governance could lead to the formation and the emergence of terrorism in contemporary human societies when he argued that: 'Poverty and ignorance are fertilizers for insurgency anywhere and in any age. When they combine and cloak themselves in religious ethnic or other partisan robes, they become ready incendiary for the most brutal and reckless of violence'.

The significance of this paper cannot be over-emphasized in the light of the prevalence of campaign of terror unleashed on the people by the member of the sect, which has apparently defied all solutions. Thousands of lives have been lost and there is no effective mechanism adopted by the government to address the situation. This is an indication of government failure in ensuring sustainable peace and security (Fisher et. al, 2000). The apparent failure of the Nigerian government to rescue or effect the release of the 200 abducted secondary school girls in Borno since April 15th, 2014, attest to the above claim (Daniel, et.al, 2014; Dorell, 2014; Vanguard, 2014; Yan and Duthiers, 2014). Although there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies on the pervasive problem of terrorism in Nigeria, most recent studies have not specifically and adequately examined the possible connection between the components of good governance and terrorism in Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this paper examined the nexus between the elements of good governance and domestic terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria; thereby injecting new insights into the on-going academic and intellectual discourse on the terrorism in Nigeria.

Conceptualizing Terrorism and Insecurity

There is no universally acceptable definition of terrorism. So much energy has been devoted into the definition of the concept that over 109 definitions are said to have been advanced (Isaac,

2008). For the purpose of this paper, some of these definitions would be conceptually reviewed. Goldia (2005:201) posited that 'government appeals hind to portray terrorism simply as criminal violence assaults on society that cannot be justified as serving a political cause'. This conception of terrorism is one-sided. This is because the concept of terrorism is a relative one. Heywood (2007:382) presented relatively all-inclusive definition of the concept when he argued that:

The term is highly controversial first the distinction or warfare is blurred by the fact that the later may also aim to stake fear in to wider population, secondly, as the term is highly prerogative, it stands to be used selectively (one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter), thirdly, although terrorism is usually conceived as an anti-governmental activities, government can employ terror against their own or other population, as in the case of terrorism in the state (Heywood, 2007: 382)

Table 1: Types of Terrorist Organization

Types	Examples
Rebel/Militia Groups	The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); The M23 in Congo, DRC
Islamist Insurgents	Al-Qaeda (Maghreb); Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Boko-Haram (Nigeria)
Political Movements	Taliban (Afghanistan); Hamas (Palentine)
Government Agents (Clandestine Organizations)	Janjaweed of Sudan; Violent cults and underworld organizations

Source: Okoli and Iortyer (2014)

The major terrorist organization terrorizing the North-eastern Nigeria is *Boko-Haram* religious sect. Researchers have given attempted to conceptualized the etiology and raison d'être of the sect. Andrew (2012:5) submitted that:

the name Boko-Haram is rather a distillation of the group's core beliefs, it was a name given to the group by dismissive neighbours who had not joined the sect and had no time for it. It was as if they were saying those people who go on and on about Western education being a sin. Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The group's use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits them.

He concluded in his submission that:

Boko Haram is, however, against those in northern Nigeria known as "yan boko." Yan boko is literally translated as "child of the book." It refers to the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonize Nigeria—the people who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim umma (community) (Andrew 2012:6).

In the same vein, Haruna (2013) traced the etiology and emergency of the insurgency in the region. According to him:

Boko Haram predated Jonathan's presidency on his own steam in 2011 by at least nine years. During most of that period the sect was completely non-violent. It became

violent from 2009 only after its members had been systematically persecuted and killed by our security forces at the instance of the then Executive Governor of Borno State, its home base, Alhaji Modu Ali Sheriff, not because of their creed that Western education is sin, a creed widely regarded by most ordinary Muslims and their clerics alike as heretic, but because it became highly critical of what it said was the governor's venality and anti-people policies and programmes (Haruna, 2013:1).

He further revealed that:

This systematic persecution and killings of its members climaxed in the July 2009 military raid of its headquarters which in turn led to the extrajudicial killing by the police of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, his father-in-law, Baba Fugu, and Sheriff's Commissioner of Religious Affairs, Buji Foi, both of them prominent members of the sect. The military raid in July 2009, ordered by Jonathan's predecessor, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, a Northerner and a Muslim, wiped out the sect. Or so we thought, until it returned with vengeance within a year after Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who had been presumed killed in the raid, surfaced from nowhere to resume its insurgency (Haruna, 2013:1).

Therefore, in this paper the focus would be on the terrorist activities unleashed by the *Boko-Haram* religious group in the Northern Nigeria, particularly North-eastern region. Subsequently, the word insecurity does not only have only various meanings; it can be contextualized on the basis of time and space (Dambazzau, 2010). Insecurity is simply the existence of conditions within which individuals in a society cannot go about their normal daily activities without any form of threat to lives and property (Igbuzor 2004; Akin 2008). The simplicity of the definition demanded for

an encompassing definition of the concept. Oche (2001:76) provided what constitute security in a democratic state when he submitted that:

Security is the freedom from danger or threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest.... And enhance the well-being of its people. Thus, security is the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of a nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values... as well as freedom from danger to life and property.

Conceptualizing Governance

Recently the term 'governance' and 'good governance' are being increasingly used in development literature. Good governance simply means good government or good leadership. Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies. Apam (2011) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised by governments in managing a country's social and economic resources. To Akpa (2011) good governance is basically bordering on issues of integrity, efficiency, effectiveness and economy of government in the management of public affairs and meeting government's expectations of the society. Similarly, Mansaray (2004), good governance requires that governments or the leadership should be politically and financially accountable. Good governance can be a precondition for the realization of democratic rule because only by meeting the people's will in terms of their needs, can a democracy claim some degree of effectiveness (Mohideen, 1997).

Good governance, in a wider context, can be perceived from two points. Firstly, the creation of conducive environment for economic activities ensures macroeconomic stability which is imperative for national growth and development. Here, good governance links with national security. This is so because it is in the interest of national security that a nation directs effort towards providing conducive environment (peaceful, calm, nonlife threatening atmosphere) upon which good governance can thrive. Secondly, having the political will to embark on political reforms to achieve improvement in public sector management, economic and financial accountability, predictability underlined by the rule of law and transparency. This second perspective of good governance is simply a recount of the basic principles of democracy, which the stability and peace of a nation (national security) equally engenders. In this paper, good governance is perceived and conceived as the capacity of the government to address the basic and fundamental problems of a given political society, such as poverty, unemployment, expanding socio-economic and political inequalities and widening corruption in both private and public sectors.

Theoretical Framework

Strategic Choice Theory

According to the theory, acts of terrorism are often tactical parts of a carefully planned and calculated strategy to influence decision making and effect political change in a social system. The 'perpetrators of terrorist violence, rather than be seen as mad or crazed individuals; are rational actors, who have made rational choices among alternatives, as part of strategic reasoning, to achieve certain political goals' (Crenshaw, 1992: 71). They are part of calculated strategy to effect (a) socio-economic and political change(s). According to Laqueur (2006: 26), 'the act of

terrorism is mainly intended to produce repressions, draconian measures; and thus ultimately undermines the liberal façade in state authorities' in order to actualize the targeted socio-economic and political objectives. He added that what individuals who engage in terrorism actually do is to try to use violence to undermine the security of the population. And by so doing, 'put pressure on both the government and the population to provide alternative government' (Laqueur, 2006: 26). Franks (2006: 18) opined that 'much of the terrorism research is based on the assumptions that the meaning of violence is to provoke a response to further the course of something by strategic manipulation'.

Those who engage in terrorist violence do so because they believe that their actions or inactions will force a reaction or overreaction on an established power center or the population in general; in such a way that they will want to negotiate or give to the demands of the instigators of the terrorism. According to the leaders of the *Boko-Haram*, the imported system of government based on Western values has resulted in ostensible corruption, poverty, unemployment and the widening gap of socio-economic and political inequalities in Northern part of the country (Danjibo, 2009); and unless violence is used to undermine the security of the population in order to put pressure on the government, these manifested failures of Western democracy would continue unabatedly. This could inform the use of force or violence by the *Boko-Haram* sect predominantly in the Northern-eastern Nigeria.

Political Process Theory

The concept of political process was originally coined by American Sociologist, Peter Eisinger, in 2008. The theory seeks to place acts of terrorism in the wider socio-political environments in which they operate. The existence of resources is the main factor, which drives mobilization. This Mobilization does not take place

as isolated units. Instead, it emerges within specific political structures, which both facilitate and shape the dynamics within them (McAdam, 1982, Tarrow, 1994). The resources at the disposals of the *Boko-Haram* could be illiterate and jobless youths in the region, couple with large pool of *Almajiri*, who can be easily available or readily accessible tools for inciting and fuelling the insurgency. According to Danjibo (2009), majority of the members of *Boko-Haram* religious sect were largely jobless and illiterate youths who engaged in petty trading or had dropped out of school.

Another source of resources for this group is through clandestine relations with some Northern Politicians. Some scholars were of the opinion that the political marginalization of the Northern political leaders made some of them to be identified with the sect. Several reports have identified some Northern leaders like Ali Ndume and a serving Nigerian Senator representing Bauchi South; Alhaji Shettima Pindar, Nigerian pioneer and Ambassador to Sao-Tome and Principe, from Borno State (Ukpong, 2011); Ali Modu Sherif, the former Governor of Borno state (Tsa, 2011); Arewa Consultative Forum, a formidable Northern Political pressure group that is made up of prominent politician from the Northern Nigeria; and Buji Foi, a former Bauch State Commissioner for religious affairs (Walker, 2012). More specifically, Williams and Guttsihuss (2012: 37) quoted President Goodluck Jonathan amidst repeated bombings in the country and the failure of the security agencies to curtail it:

Boko-Haram members have infiltrated my administration. Some of them are in the executive arm of government; some of them are in the legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies

History and Origin of Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

The history of terrorism in Nigeria can be traced to pre-colonial era; specifically, the Holy *Jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804. According to Hodgkin (1975: 247), 'the fundamental principle which guided *Jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio, was to make upon the heathen king who make no profession of Islam, is obligatory by assent'. Therefore, the goal of Islamizing Nigeria under the Sharia Law dates back to *Jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804. The *Jihad* declared war against those who he considered as hopelessly corrupt and apostate Hausa ruling elite of the time (Agbibo, 2013). As part of the strategy for the execution of this movement, Dan Fodio led his followers into exile in order to form a truce Islamic state. According to David (1978), Dan Fodio's legacy of both withdrawal and *Jihad* is seen as normative by many Northern Nigerian Muslims, including *Boko-Haram* religious sect. This confirms the historical linkage between *Jihad* of 1804 and recent *Boko-Haram* uprising.

During the colonial period, the British were simply perceived to be infidels, agents of the devil, which had to be resisted with all the violent means. If not, they would create *Kufur* state, where immorality and godlessness would thrive. This statement inspired a revolutionary *Mahdism* which received little elite, particularly the marginalized political elites in the Northern region of the present day Nigeria, support but attracted radical clerics, disgruntled peasants and fugitive slaves. This social movement sought unsuccessfully to overthrow the British colonial regime which controlled the Sokoto Caliphate founded after the *Jihad* of Usman Dan Fodio. Following the failure of the movement, Northern Muslim elites made a formal agreement with the British colonialists that they would rule indirectly in return for British education not being imposed on the protectorate (Dearn, 2011).

In the post-independence era, the *Maitatsine* movement came to the fore. The movement was led by a Cameroonian Preacher known as Marwa, who arrived in the Northern Nigerian City of Kano around 1970 and took up many of Dan Fodio's teachings. He believed that Islam had come under the influence of the formation of the modern state (Agbiboa, 2013d). He was catalyzed by massive socio-economic inequality, pervasive corruption, increasingly youth unemployment, expanding level of poverty and constitutional debates which polarized the country at the time. Marwa attracted the urban poor that denounced the affluent elites as infidels. Among the groups attracted by Marwa were the *Almajiris*-that is, a group of young itinerant students of the Quran who had a very simple lifestyle and earned their daily bread begging on the streets. After he successfully mobilized the poor in the region, he waged holy war against the secular government. Thus, Northern cities of Kano, Kaduna and Maiduguri were engulfed by religious conflicts between 1980 and 1982. In Kano alone 4, 177 people were killed. Falola (1998: 46) described Marwa thus:

He was a Quranic teacher and preacher. Forceful, Persuasive and Charismatic, he rebelled against many popular opinions among Kano Islamic circles, denouncing certain parts of the Holy Qur'an and even criticizing Prophet Mohammed. He was opposed to most aspects of modernization and to all Western influence. He decried such technological commonplace as radios, wrist watches, automobiles, motorcycles and even bicycles. Those who use these were viewed as hell-bound pagan

Marwa preached against Nigeria's secular government, political corruption and the moderate religious establishment. *Maitatsine*

teachings are said to be the source of ideological inspiration for *Boko-Haram*. The group has been in existence since 1995. *Boko Haram* is a dreaded Islamic sect known as *Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda' Wat, Wal Jihad* meaning a group committed to the propagation of Prophet Muhammed's teachings and *Jihad* (Meehan and Spaier, 2011). Others trace the sect founder to Shehu Sanni, a civil right activity in Northern Nigeria. Apart from the above, numerous expositions on the origin and founder of *Boko Haram* abound (Danjjibo 2009, Bumah and Abimbola 2009, Langmang 2011, Adike 2012, Uzodike and Maingwa 2012). It was under the leadership of the slain Mallam Muhammed Yusuf that *Boko Haram* became radicalized and enjoyed foreign collaboration especially with the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (Abimbola and Adosote 2012). Since 2009, *Boko Haram* has constituted a serious security threat in the Northern part of Nigeria. According to Danjibo (2009), *Boko-Haram* could be compared in terms of philosophy or ideology and objectives to the *Maitatsine* and *modus operadi* is Taliban.

According to Abimbola and Adesote (2002), and Sunday Tribune (2012), *Boko-Haram* members see western education and democracy as corruptive and immoral. James (2011: 49) put that 'there are a high number of home grown terrorists driven to violence by poverty, illiteracy and hopeless situations in their localities. Many of the members attracted by *Boko-Haram* are motivated by deep-seated socio-economic and political grievances such as corruption and poor governance (Kukah, 2012). It has support among the impoverished and alienated Northern population (Campbell, 2011). Without mincing words, this is a potent signal that the dividends of democracy are not forthcoming. Consequently, most of the children from impoverished families fall into hands of radical clerics who entice them with the creation of an Islamic state that will address all the social and economic woes

facing them directly or indirectly. In August 2009, Sanni Umaru, the man who proclaimed himself leader of *Boko-Haram* after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, explained that:

Boko-Haram does not in any way mean Western education is a sin as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko-Haram actually means Western Civilization is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader it includes education but is not determined by Western education.

Also, reports and research findings have shown that the *Boko-Haram* religious sect has won the sympathy and support of some political elites in Northern Nigeria. Adeniyi (2014), in his article, *Boko Haram and a Nation at War*, asserted that *Boko-Haram* as Governor Shettima said:

the enemies that our soldiers confront are not only motivated, given that they fight for an ideology for which they are prepared to die, they are also heavily funded otherwise how did they acquire anti aircraft guns? The possibility of local collaborators among the political elite is also not ruled out given some security reports about the nature of funding of the Boko Haram activities, all of which put the lives of our military men at risk (Adeniyi, 2014:1).

Governance and Terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria: The Nexus

Some scholars argued that religious extremism is the main driver of domestic terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria. However, Christopher (2011), Faruk (2012), and Campbell (2011) refuted and argued that domestic terrorists in the region attack both

Muslims and Christians. According to Iman (2004), at no time did the Muslim jurists approve of terrorism, nor indeed is there any evidence of the use of terrorism in Islamic traditions. Seoul (1999: 58) put it straight when he reiterated that 'religion is not the cause of religious conflict; rather for many, it frequently supplies the fault lines along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs'. Kwaja (2011: 1) argued that religious dimensions of the conflict has been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. Herskovit (2010) submitted that domestic terrorism in the North-eastern Nigeria is not a mono-causal phenomenon; rather it is a multi-causal one. There are sufficient empirical data which suggest that domestic terrorism in the region is driven by a combination of factors such as poverty, unemployment, politics of North-South divide, and political rivalry among politicians in the Northern states. It should be mentioned that these are direct manifestations of the failure of government in the region to provide dividends of democracy and governance. In the submission of Mayor (2011), *Boko Haram* is a product of bad government and corruption and therefore fuelled by politics.

Scholars such as Huma (2007), Clinton (2009) and Agbiboa (2013) have linked elements of good governance to dramatic rise in the acts of terrorism in the region. Clinton (2009: 1) argued that 'lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise and reject the authorities of the state'. Also, the Nigerian justice system is marred by corruption, judicial malpractice, and a culture of disrespect for laws. This is what *Boko-Haram* leaders see as limitation of secular laws and called for the establishment of Islamic law (Mamman, 2007). With entrenched poverty, illiteracy and unemployment, we cannot eliminate the menace of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria (The Nation April 5, 2012). Huma (2007)

mentioned socio-economic factors as a potential driver of extremist activity. According to him, socio-economic factors, such as limited employment opportunities and little access to education and social services could contribute to extremism. Clark (1999: 45) observed that:

Current Islamic trends in Nigeria appear to be moving in the direction of heightened fundamentalism. Poverty, political marginalization and unemployment have created an environment ripe for anti-system religious tendencies.


Similarly, Haider (2004: 2-3) opined that:

It is certain that significant socio-economic inequalities could generate conflict especially when the economic prospects are negative. When these inequalities get reinforced by political grievances such as ethnic discrimination, it becomes Boko-Haram.

Isaac (2008) built a macro-analytic model that captures the relationships between governance and insecurity in Nigeria. The model emphasizes the importance of good governance in achieving sustainable peace in the North-eastern Nigeria. The model has eight variables that are akin to the components of good governance. These: (i) Improved border security and improved welfare and training for security forces; (ii) Sharing of information intelligence internationally and regionally, provision of modern surveillance technology at air and sea ports; (iii) Build a sustainable infrastructure base, diversify the economy and open up other productive sectors; (iv) Job creation and Poverty alleviation, liberalization of economy, developing of the productive sector etc.; (v) Political reforms especially in the area of political succession, civil society participation in decision making and respect for human right; (vi) Participation, transparency

accountability, rule of law responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity-strategic vision; (vii) Independence of the judiciary legislative independence, sound electoral system that guarantees stable political succession and political pluralism; and (viii) Respect for the rule of law and human rights This model is presented below:

FIGURE 2: STRATEGIC HIERARCHY FOR THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA



However, this paper focused on three fundamental components of good governance in Nigeria. These are: (i) Poverty and unemployment; (ii) illiteracy; and (iii) perceived political inequalities between Southern political elite and the Northern political elite. This pattern is adapted from the work of Dudley Seer (1971) when he argued that three questions must be asked before we can say that a country is developing or under-developing. These questions are: (i) What has been happening to poverty; (ii) What has been happening to unemployment?; and (iii) What has been happening to inequality? If these three questions are answered satisfactorily, we can say that the people are enjoying the dividends of good governance; if otherwise, we say that the people are not enjoying the dividends of good governance. As a matter of emphasis, each component of good governance is discussed in relations to their contributions to religious extremism in the North-eastern Nigeria. They are as follows:

Poverty and Unemployment: The extent of poverty and inequality in the Northern Nigeria has led several researchers to posit that the main factor behind *Boko-Haram's* campaign of violence in Northern Nigeria (Agbibo, 2013d, 2013b; Mustapha, 2012; Kukah, 2012, Agbibo, 2013b, HRW, 2012; and ICG, 2010). With 53% of the population and 65% of the land mass, advantage in food and cash crops, and a wide range of mineral deposits, Northern Nigeria should not be least developed region of the country. According to Bartolta (2011), 72% of the populations in the Northern region live below the poverty line compared to only 22% in the Southern part. Similarly, Ogege (2013) put that the poverty rate in Northern Nigeria is 70.1% compared to the 34.9% in the Southern Nigeria. Lukeman (2012) added that ten states in Nigeria with highest incidence of poverty are all in the Northern region, while ten states with lowest incidence of poverty are in the Southern region. This could be seen palpable manifestations of the

failure of the government to utilize the abundant resources of the region to improve the condition of the people and implement poverty alleviation programmes in the region. Omemma (2012: 75) corroborated further when he argued that:

Poverty has become so endemic in the land that the latest NBS put the national poverty rate at 67.1%. Poverty has been on a steady increase in the nation. The endemic poverty level in the North is so enormous that the latest report from the official statistics showed that poverty in North-West is 77.7%, North-East is 76.3% which is much higher than that of national poverty rate of 67.1%.

Boko-Haram religious sect, at the outset, seemed to have had its operational bases located in the poorest part of Northern Nigeria, such as Borno and Yobe state in the North-eastern region. It is in such place where people have been denied the opportunity to go to school as well as have meaningful economic source of livelihood that recruitment is the easiest for *Boko-Haram* leaders. This pattern is in tandem with the political economy model for mobilization as the poor view their situation to be a result of mismanagement and corruption by the elites, and thus the poor express their real world grievances by joining the sect or supporting it against the secular democratic state (Carrie, 2002).

Table 2: Unemployment Rates in North-East States between 2008 and 2010

State	2008	2009	2010
Bauchi	37.2	37.2	39.2
Borno	27.7	27.7	29.1
Gombe	32.1	32.1	34.1
Taraba	26.8	26.8	26.8
Adamawa	29.4	29.4	31.4

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2011)

Table 3: Unemployment Rates in Southern States between 2008 and 2010

State	2008	2009	2010
Abia	14.5	14.5	15.5
Anambra	16.8	16.8	17.8
Cross River	14.3	14.3	15.3
Enugu	14.9	14.9	15.9
Ekiti	20.6	20.6	22.6
Lagos	19.5	19.5	20.5
Ogun	8.5	8.5	9.5
Ondo	14.9	14.9	16.9
Osun	12.6	12.6	13.6
Oyo	14.9	14.9	15.9

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2011)

From the tables 2 and 3, it is clear that there is stark inequality or economic disparity between the Northern and the Southern regions of the country. The rate of unemployment is considerably and significant higher in the North-eastern region when compared with the rate in the Southern region. There is no gain-saying the fact that the bulk of unemployed youths in the region could provide much more needed pool of resources which the religious fundamentalists could mobilize to challenge secular democratic authorities. According to Robert (1999:24):

Any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of any acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment, has a false sense of security

Illiteracy: According to World Bank Report (2012), Northern Nigeria had the largest number of children in the world that did not

go to school. Official statistics have shown that the level of illiteracy is tremendous in the Northern region. According to National Population Commission (2008), that literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, and that 72% of children between the ages of 6 and 16 never attended schools in Borno state. The reports also show that Northern zones contribute less than 30% of the young people going to the University. Without any formal educational system, most of the children fall back on the traditional Islamic school system. It should be noted that these schools lack formal structures and curriculum, which make them highly vulnerable to learn extreme religious belief. In these informal Islamic schools, the students (known as *almajiris*) left in the care of radical Islamic clerics; and most of them fend for themselves through begging on the streets (Abubakar, 2013; Muhammed, 2010). Consequently, the vulnerable *almajiri* are more likely to fall into the waiting hands of the sect, lured by handouts and housing. The sect attracted more and more people by offering welfare handouts, food and shelter, refugees from the wars across the border in Chad as well as jobless Nigerian youths (Abdulkhakim, 2006; Mohammed, 2012).

Perceived Political Marginalization of the Northern Political Elite: The inception of democratic rule in 1999 ushered in an informal political agreement, often referred to as "zoning", which was intended to ensure the rotation of the presidency between North and South. From 1999 to 2007, the Christian Southerner, Olusegun Obasanjo, was president. It was supposed to be the North's turn at presidency from 2007 to 2015, but following the death of Northern President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in the office, his Southern Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, became the President. This did not go down well with the North political elites who viewed that they had been betrayed by the current political arrangement. Northern politicians were of the opinion that

Jonathan should have been step-down. Emphatically, *Boko-Haram* capitalized on the feeling of injustice and discontent with Jonathan's presidency. They conceived him as infidel, liar and corrupt individual. This is in tandem with the argument of Ousman (2004). Ousman (2004) traced the problem of Islamic movement to the opening of democratic pluralism in 1999, which shifted the balance of power from Muslim military rulers of the North to Christian civilian rule in the South.


Table 4: People Killed in *Boko-Haram* Attacks, between 2010 and 2012

Year and Quarter	No of Attacks	People Killed	Average Death toll	Median
2010: Q1	0			
Q2	0		1,8	2
Q3	5	9	9	1
Q4	12	108	6,9	1
Year total	17	117		
2011: Q1	7	8	1,3	1
Q2	17	99	5,8	4
Q3	6	46	7,7	4
Q4	27	160	6,6	2
Year total	57	313	5,5	2
2012: Q1	24	286	13	4,5
Q2	23	175	7,6	4
Q3	39	185	5	2
Q4	30	140	4,7	3,5
Year total	116	786	7	3

Source: Emilie (2013)

From the above table, people killed in the attacks increased from 100 in 2010 to almost 800 in 2012. Median number of people killed from one death per attack in 2010 to three in 2012. On a yearly basis, the coverage number of people killed per attack

decreased from 2010 to 2011, but increased again from 2011 to 2012. It could be inferred from this that *Boko-Haram*'s attacks increased dramatically after the 2011 general elections, showing a strong connection between political marginalization of the Northern political elites and domestic terrorism in the North-eastern Nigeria.



Source: Authors

From the above model, the symptoms of bad governance in the North-eastern Nigeria are pervasive poverty and rising level of illiteracy in the region. These two critical symptoms provided a fertile ground for the formation of Boko-Haram religious sect. This is because majority of the members were illiterates and the unemployed youths in the region. In other words, the poor and the impoverished people found the group more appealing because of the apparent failure of the government in addressing these two critical symptoms of bad governance. Later, the group became more offensive following the extra-judicial killing of the founder of the sect, Yusuf Mohammed, and other important members of the group. According to Ousman (2004) and Abdulmajeed (2013), the killing of Yusuf and efforts by security forces to wipe out the group revolutionized the Islamic sect into one of the Africa's most ferocious and deadly terrorist groups. Also, the perceived marginalization of the Northern political elite radicalized the Islamic sect. Consequently, the group increased its determination to establish a government based on Islamic political ideology and jurisprudence in order to panaceas to the corrosive symptoms of bad governance that has enveloped North-eastern Nigeria. The belief of the group is that the goal of attaining good governance in the region lies in Islamic political ideology and jurisprudence. After the establishment of this system of governance, poverty, unemployment and socio-political and economic inequalities would things of the past.

Islamic Political Ideology and Terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria

As a result of the flagrant failure of Western democratic system to address the problems of pervasive youth unemployment, poverty and perceived socio-economic and political inequalities, the members of the *Boko-Haram*, religious sect have forcefully

demanding for the establishment and propagation of Islamic political ideology in the Northern Nigeria. The Islamic political ideology, which Boko-Haram claimed to be pursuing, is based on the critique of the country's democratic system and some of the politicians within the Northern Region. The leaders of the movement conceived Western education as ungodly, sinful and sacrilegious (Danjibo, 2009) and Adesoji (2010). James (2011:49; emphasis added) quoted Yusuf in his sermon:

Hadn't Western influences given them Ali Modu Sherif (the then state governor of Borno State between 1999 and 2007), who was generally perceived to be excessively corrupt and loyal to Obasanjo who spent little on his people, but built himself a palace of marble pillars and golden gates in Maiduguri? As long as the country continues with this Western system, it will only succeed in Promoting a Kufur system that is run by these kinds of hypocrites and non-believers like Ali Modu Shérif; and this has the inherent capacity of widening youth unemployment and poverty.

Similarly, Yusuf also consistently refers to the region's economic situation, which in comparison to other regions was deplorable. To him, the adoption of Islamic political ideology could address socio-economic and political woes of the region. Walker (2012:15) 'as a solution, Yusuf presents Al-Shari'a system. This system would restore the country to the right religious, social and moral path, and change the region's political and economic quagmire'. More precisely, only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy-Qur'an (Suleiman 2011). James (2011: 49) opined that:

In Yusuf's opinion, instead of the so-called dividends of democracy, the generality of the citizens within the

region have continuously remained impoverished than other parts of the country. All these, Yusuf often concludes, are direct consequences of the country's adoption of Western education and its value system. And unless the situation is changed, the situation would only become worst.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the foregoing, it can be argued increasing youth unemployment and rising level of illiteracy are the root causes of the current spate of terrorism in the North-eastern Nigeria. The crisis was ignited by the extra-judicial killing of the founder of the Boko-Haram religious sect, Yusuf Mohammed, and other prominent members of the group. The consequence of these events is the increasing agitation for the establishment of government based on Islamic political ideology and jurisprudence in Northern Nigeria. This was perceived by the group as the only solution to the aforementioned failure of governance in secular democratic Nigeria. Based on this conclusion, the following recommendations were suggested:

- (i) Government at all levels in the country should provide good and effective leadership as the failure in this respect has been the main driver of the insurgency in the North-eastern Nigeria. There is also the need for the implementation of people-oriented programmes such as the poverty alleviation; free and functional education and the provision of infrastructural facilities. The palpable failure of the government in the region has made Islamic fundamentalists demanding for an alternative, which they found in Islamic religious and political ideology.
- (ii) There is the need for widespread sensitization aimed at changing extreme ideological indoctrination. This is

because ideology remains the core strength of the *Boko Haram* sect. According to Patrick (1999) ideological battles are more important than the physical battles and that once the ideology is defeated, the terrorist movement withers. Specifically, moderate Islamic organizations such as NASFAT, QUAREEB family, Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and others should be encouraged by the government to spread moderate ideology and to dissuade and pacify those with extreme ideology.

- (iii) The almajiris school programme should be speedily implemented in every part of the North especially where extreme Islamic sects are known to be active. This will go a long way in reducing the number of unsupervised informal schools run by radical Islamic scholars. There is no gain-saying the fact that if this educational programme is not genuinely pursued the region will continue to experience an increase in the number of informal Islamic schools which are based on rigid and extreme Islamic ideology.

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