

Beyond the Capture of 'Camp Zero': Terrorism and Insecurity in a Failing-Weak State

India Quarterly

I-19

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of World Affairs (ICWA)

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DOI: 10.1177/0974928419860922

journals.sagepub.com/home/iqq

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Abstract

In 2016, the spiritual base of Boko Haram, known as 'Camp Zero' was captured. With such success, most had thought that the chicken has finally come home to roost. Unfortunately, it was not to be. Because aside from Boko Haram, the country seems to experience other vagaries of insecurity. This range from kidnapping, cult and ritual groups in the south—such as female pant hunters, Badoo—oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism, cattle rustling and herdsmen–farmers crises, among others. Against this backdrop, this study is an attempt to trace the history of the terror group and examine the numerous insecurity challenges across the country despite international collaborations. The study revealed among other things that the perpetuation of terror and insecurity in the land is a reflection of the nature of the state itself—a failing, weak state. The study recommends that until there is a solution to the nature of the state itself, the insecurity will continue. Some of the solutions suggested are entrenchment of good leadership, political will, rule of law, good governance, eradication of poverty and illiteracy, and inclusive policies, among others.

Keywords

Camp Zero, terrorism, insecurity, female pants, Badoo, herdsmen–farmers, militants

Introduction

Apart from the issues of food security, sustainable development and migration, terrorism is undoubtedly one of the most pressing problems of the international

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community today. Although, it has been in existence since the classical period, it has taken another dimension in the twenty-first century for many reasons. Thus, it has become a viable strategy in asymmetrical warfare. However, terrorism is not peculiar to Nigeria and Africa. Developed countries, and even powerful countries, are also confronted with the menace.

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2011 (9/11) terror incidence in the United States of America, terrorism has not only become an agenda on every country's checklist but also a challenge that requires a concerted effort. Such is the case of the dreaded Boko Haram group. A phenomenon which began in Nigeria but has since spread to neighbouring African states such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger, with treacherous manifestation which has resulted in wanton destruction of lives, property and livelihood.

Though scholars have written extensively on the spate of terrorism on the continent and the country (Ajayi, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Murtada, 2013, p. 7; Neumann, 2008), there is still a paucity of materials on terrorism and insecurity, as related to the nature of the state. The understanding of the nature of the state itself is germane for many reasons. First, it will help stakeholders, both local and international, to understand the reasons for the continued violence and insecurity in the country, despite the efforts of the state and international community to resolve the issues. Second, it will assist to know where intervention is necessary, so that such commitments can yield needed results. Finally, it will assist to navigate how terrorism and insecurity continue to thrive in such states.

Against this backdrop, this article aims to examine the issues of terrorism, collaborative efforts by the Nigerian state and the global village to address the problems of insecurity, and terrorism, especially as it relates to the Boko Haram. More so, it will examine the reasons for the continued brittle peace and insecurity across the country, despite the capture of Camp Zero—a stronghold and spiritual headquarter of the Boko Haram. The study will be divided into four parts hereafter. The first part will examine the origins, radicalisation and internationalisation of terrorism in Nigeria; the second part will examine the international collaboration against terrorism; the third part will focus on the nature of the state, the capture of Camp Zero and what is next; and the last part will conclude the article.

Terrorism in Nigeria: Origins, Radicalisation and Internationalisation

The term terrorism originates from the Latin word *terrere* which means to frighten. Terrorism involves unlawful and typical random acts of violence or the threat of such violence employed by an individual, group or government to achieve a political goal. While war involves conventional warfare, terrorism uses sporadic and random acts of violence to cause fear (Macionis, 2002, p. 470). It is a method which can be used by any person or group and for any kind of motive. As a form of violence, it informs us of the kind of people who employs it (Macionis, 2002, p. 470).

Before embarking on a more detailed analysis and projection of trends, it is therefore worth remembering that lumping together and prescribing standardised solutions for vastly different violent conflicts based merely on tactical similarity—that is, the use of ‘terroristic’ means—do not lead to valid predictions (Neumann, 2008). It however obtained its modern form of ‘terrorism’ during the reign of terror in France in the late eighteenth century. In Maximilien Robespierre’s words,

... terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs. (Cited in Burgess, 2003)

It has become a complex, subtle and generally accepted international language (Elshtain, 2003, p. 18). Hence, it has become one of the sootiest, especially in asymmetrical warfare. There is virtually no state in the world that has not witnessed one form of terrorism; be it in a small or large scale, even the most powerful nations are not exempted. Prior to 9/11 attack on the USA, most Americans had little knowledge of it (Rourke, 2003). It had however been used even before that historic event either in or outside the continent or the country on its citizenry, allies or interests abroad (Thompson, 2014).

In 2000, there were 423 terrorist attacks worldwide, which claimed 405 lives and injured 791 people (Global Terrorist Index, 2015, p. 37). States as well as non-state actors have continued to use fear as a weapon to achieve their policies and interest. Indeed, this has made the phenomenon popular. Undoubtedly, terrorism is highly concentrated as well as a globally distributed phenomenon. Over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria (Global Terrorist Index, 2014). However, another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity (2014, p. 2). For Nigeria, this has been caused by the dreaded Boko Haram sect, regarded as the deadliest group in the world in 2014.

Deaths from terrorism from Iraq and Nigeria were 17,456 in 2014. The Global Terrorist Index (2016) further recorded 11,900 for both countries in 2015. Meanwhile, terrorism casualties for all other states was 15,309 for 2014 and 17,476 in 2015. Across the globe, terrorism accounted for 29,376 deaths and cost US\$89.6 billion in 2015 (Global Terrorist Index, 2016, p. 24). There were 25,673 deaths and the cost of terrorism was US\$84 billion as a result of terrorism in the world in 2016. Although deaths from Fulani extremists or herdsman resulted in more than 3,000 in four countries in the region, 92 per cent were from Nigeria. According to the Global Terrorism Database, Fulani extremists killed over 2,500 people in Nigeria between 2012 and 2016 (2017, p. 74). There were 18,814 deaths globally as a result of terrorism in the world, costing the world US\$52 billion; though its activities reduced in 2017 (Global Terrorist Index, 2018).

In Nigeria, terrorism was used in the establishment of the colonial states. Likewise the indigenous people that occupied the pre-colonial states also used it against the colonial hegemony who occupied their territories. Colonial reports revealed that there were some number of expeditions against these people and regions as a result of terrors. It further gave cult groups such as Ekumeku and Atinga

in Southern Nigeria and even a pirate called Bibi Kala involved in the use of terror against the establishment and traders. While the Ekumeku was used against the colonialist, the Atinga was used against witches and wizards at Otta District (National Archives Ibadan, 1900–1901, p. 28; 1903, pp. 36–37; 1906, p. 92).

Modern terrorism in Nigeria was first witnessed during the Maitatsine movement in 1980 led by Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine, who was believed to be an immigrant. From his base, he made sure that his ideology reached some of the northern states of Sokoto, Kano and Borno. It elicited the ‘justifiable’ anger of the ‘puritanic’ Maitatsine group which proceeded to spearhead religious uprisings in Kano (twice in 1980) which later spread to Yola and Maiduguri in 1982 and 1983, respectively (Ajayi, 2012, pp. 103–107; Loimeier, 2012, pp. 140–141; Murtada, 2013, p. 7). Afterwards, so many fanatical groups had emerged in both the northern and southern parts of the country such as Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation (SMYO) of 1995—which some scholars believe was the origin of the Boko Haram (Danjibo, 2009, pp. 1–21)—Egbesu Boys, Niger Delta Volunteer Force and others. While some regard themselves as freedom fighters, their strategies and motives are semblance of terror. Be that as it may, the Boko haram remains the most dreaded group in the history of Nigeria.

The group’s official name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad took the name Boko Haram—‘Western education is forbidden’. Boko Haram may have been influenced by the SMYO, but not an offshoot of the group. However, the group emerged in 2002 as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that demanded Sharia law for the Nigerian state (Ploch, 2013). It engaged in periodic skirmishes with the Nigerian police during its formative years and some of its activities resulted in the impoverishment in some predominantly Muslim North East state.

Boko Haram may not have had plans to confront the government, but subsequent harsh treatment, pervasive police brutality, infringement of fundamental human rights, social exclusion coupled with bad governance and long years of neglect may have radicalised the group—especially with the controversial murder of the sect leader, Mallam Muhamed Yusuf. After the death of Yusuf, the group reorganised. They responded by destroying government structures, aiming at the armed forces, and the Nigerian police personnel and structures. It transcended into killing innocent Nigerians as well as the internationalisation and radicalisation of its operations (Thompson & Aduradola, 2016). The then deputy, who most had believed was dead, Amir of the Jama’a, Shaykh Abu Muhammad Abubakar Ash-Shakawi (also known as, Abubakr Shekau) took over leadership (Al-Hijjah, n.d., pp. 11–14).

With Shekau in charge, the group established a link with the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2010. It was reported by Al Jazeera cable network that the head of Al-Qaeda’s North African franchise, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (also known as Abdelmalek Droukdel), offered to provide Boko Haram with weapons, training and other support in order to expand its own reach into sub-Saharan Africa, not only to gain ‘strategic depth’, but also to ‘defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders’ (Pham, 2012, p. 3).

By November 2013, the US State Department, formally designated Boko Haram and a splinter group Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTOs;

Ploch, 2013, p. 1). Subsequently, the group claimed to have purportedly pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2015 (BBC News, 2015). Though, Nigeria bearing majority of the group's carnage, neighbouring states and the international community have also not been left out from the spillover effect.

The World Unites Against Terror

Since the end of the cold war, the gravest threats of the USA is not military threats but transnational threats emanating from world's most poorly governed countries (Patrick, 2006, p. 2). Before 9/11, US policymakers viewed states with sovereignty deficits primarily through a humanitarian lens: They piqued our moral conscience, but possessed little strategic significance. Al Qaeda's ability to act with impunity from Afghanistan changed this calculus, convincing the Bush administration that 'the United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones' (Crocker, 2003, pp. 32–34; The White House, 2002).

Beyond expanded training of foreign security forces, Pentagon also seeks interagency buy-in for a comprehensive US strategy to address the world's 'ungoverned areas' (Garamone, 2005). The Central Intelligence Agency—which has identified 550 such zones globally—devoted new collection assets to long-neglected parts of the world (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2003). The National Intelligence Council also helped the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization identify states at risk of collapse, so that the office could launch conflict prevention and mitigation efforts (Krasner & Pascual, 2005). Not to be outdone, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) formulated its own 'fragile states strategy' to bolster countries that may otherwise breed terror, crime, instability and disease (USAID, 2005).

The Bush administration even justified trade liberalisation initiatives like the Central American Free Trade Area as a means to prevent state failure and its associated transnational threats. This was also asserted by Eizenstat et al. (2005) that terrorism, conflict and regional instability are on the rise throughout the developing world, and the repercussions will not just be felt locally in these weak and failed states as a result of the chaos they nurture which will inevitably harm US security and the global economy that provides the basis for American prosperity. They warned that the USA which is doing little to stem the tide must change her policy by doing more (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005).

With the growth and internationalisation of the terror group, the USA under former President Obama labelled it an international terror group. Hence, there was a collaboration between Nigeria and the international community spearheaded by the USA after the bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja, the state capital. This alliance, Boko Haram termed it as satanic. The publication of the sect puts it thus:

Ever since it became a world hegemony following the demise of the Soviet Union and the launching of a New World Order, several disbelieving nations of the world were

thrown into an intense competition geared towards maintaining an alliance or cordial relations with the United States (US) even if such alliance demands the massacre of innocent citizens or the maiming of the perceived niche challengers and pair competitors of the US in a bid to secure the benefits of the international System that was forcefully colonized by the US in the aftermath of the cold war. (Al-Hijjah, n.d., p. 1)

Besides the USA, others have also joined forces with Nigeria in curbing this menace. Such countries are from Asia, America, Europe and Australia. Most of these states did not assure military intervention, they supported via technical, financial and humanitarian grounds, especially rebuilding of the North East.

Countering terrorism has been on the agenda of the UN System for decades. However, the attacks against the USA on 9/11 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1373, which for the first time established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Five years later, all member states of the General Assembly for the first time agreed on a common strategic framework to fight the scourge of terrorism: the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The strategy is a unique instrument to enhance the efforts of the international community to counter terrorism along four pillars:

1. addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
2. preventing and combatting terrorism;
3. building member states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN System in this regard;
4. ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for countering terrorism (UN, n.d.).

At the time of the adoption of the strategy, the General Assembly also endorsed the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), established by the Secretary-General in 2005.

Consisting of 38 entities of the UN and affiliated organisations, CTITF works to promote coordination and coherence within the UN System on counter-terrorism and to provide assistance to member states. The UN Counter Terrorism Centre (UNCTC) provides capacity-building assistance to member states and carries out counter-terrorism projects around the world in line with the four pillars of the Global Strategy. The Security Council works to enhance the capacity of member states to prevent and respond to terrorist acts through its subsidiary bodies, which include the CTC, the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, as well as the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (UN, n.d.). The European Union (EU) has not been on the fence either. Since terrorism is a global threat, the EU has been able to harness strategies to combat the menace despite its internal challenges (Baker-Beall, 2016, pp. 172–192; Ferreira-Pereira & Martins, 2014)

The G-8¹ seems to have embraced its role in the bigger picture, delving into issues of conflict, poverty, security and development. Its members have spearheaded international responses to state failure and instability: The USA took the initiative on Afghanistan, France on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Kingdom (UK) on Sierra Leone. Under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the UK, which

will host this year's G-8 Summit, has shown interest in addressing the issues that bedevil development in Africa and the most downtrodden nations. At the summit, G-8 member states delivered on their prior commitments to market access, higher aid flows and deeper debt relief for the poorest countries (Eizenstat et al., 12).

Africa has also not been aloof to the crisis. In a related development, Nigeria and the Republic of Niger also agreed to the immediate commencement of joint border patrols along their common border to curb the activities of Boko Haram. The agreement was signed in October 2012, in Niamey, Niger. About two months after his inauguration, President Muhammadu Buhari was in Cameroon to show Nigeria's continued commitment to existing agreement to combat terrorism within its border communities. Also, President Buhari took his bilateral engagement to Chad in June 2015, where in conjunction with President Idriss Deby, pledged to pursue members of the sect 'everywhere'. More so, in this regard, the directors general of external intelligence agencies of the Republics of Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Niger, France and Nigeria signed a multilateral agreement on 5 March 2015 to ensue effective policing of common borders to avoid the infiltration of terrorists and the repatriation of suspects in conformity with existing protocols (Antigha, 2017).

Donald Trump in his inaugural speech, though projecting 'America First' supports the fight against terror across the globe as he puts it, 'We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones—and unite the civilized world against Radical Islamic Terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth' (Trump, 2016).

Recently, Emmanuel Macron in his acceptance speech also corroborated the will of France against internal and international terrorism. He averred that, 'I tell them all that France will be at the forefront of the fight against terrorism, both on its soil and in international action. However long this battle lasts, we'll fight it without growing weak' (Macron, 2017). But despite these interventions across the globe from the international community, why is the country still unable to resolve the Boko Haram menace as well as its pervasive insecurity challenges? Could this be a result of the nature of the state?

Nature of the State: A Failed, Weak, Failing or Collapsed State? The Evidences

Since 1945, interstate and intra-state conflict moved from the industrialised to the developing countries (Smith, 2009, p. 197). At the end of the cold war, developing or Third World countries have continued to be the hotbeds of conflict which characterises them as weak, if not a failed or failing state. Conflict is not peculiar to Africa or developing world alone, as it is also present in the so-called developed world. However, most of these conflict shifted to the developing or Third World since their independence. What then is a Third World country?

Smith defines Third World as a group of countries which have colonial histories and which are in the process of developing economically and socially from a status characterised by low incomes, dependence on agriculture, weakness in trading relations, social deprivation for large segments of the society and restricted

political and civil liberties (Smith, 2009, p. 1). Though, some lacuna appear in this definition as there are some states that are developed and share similar characteristics while some are Third World but do not have majority of these characteristics.²

Nigeria, a Third World country, is a democratic state. It has been consistent with this since the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Yet, its democracy has not in any way transcended to development, neither has it moved from a fragile or weak state to a strong state. Thus, Knusten argued that democracy should be promoted in Africa, as it will lead to development. But he warned that democracy does not warrant economic growth with weak state capacity (Knusten, 2013).

But since Nigeria is a democratic state, why has it remained unsecured? Is Nigeria a failing, weak state? Has this weak capacity affected Nigeria's dividend of democracy or has the symptom of a weakling affected its capacity to socially include the citizenry even after Camp Zero was captured? Does these issues of terrorism and its impact on the citizenry and vulnerable group qualifies the country as a weak state?

In an attempt to answer these salient questions, this section sets out to determine what a weak state is and if the characteristics deem it so. There are no universally accepted definition of weak states; there is general agreement that such countries lack the capacity and/or will to perform core functions of statehood effectively. Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 1) put it as:

... countries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population.

In other words, weak states are unable or unwilling to provide essential public services, which include fostering equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring physical security and delivering basic services. Yet, lacking concrete metrics to evaluate state capacity in each core area of state responsibility, policymakers and scholars resort to a host of adjectives—'weak', 'fragile', 'failing', 'failed' and even 'collapsed'—to distinguish among countries suffering from a wide variety of capacity gaps (Rice and Patrick 2008, p.4).³

There is no consensus on the precise number of weak and failing states because there is no consensus on how to define or measure state weakness (Besançon, 2003; Rotberg, 2004/2005, pp. 71–81).⁴ But not all weak states look alike, far from it. They range along a spectrum from collapsed states, such as Somalia which has gaps in all four capacities, to fragile 'good performers', like Senegal. In between, one finds a number of states that are struggling on many fronts or muddling through. Not by coincidence, weak and failing states tend to be among those states farthest from eligibility for the Millennium Challenge Account, which ranks states according to their commitment to 'ruling justly', 'investing in people' and 'promoting economic freedom'. State weakness is not just a question of capacity but also of will (Patrick, 2006, p. 8).

Nigeria, like most of her African counterparts, despite being described one time or the other as 'failed' has never disintegrated or led to enforced jurisdictional change (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, pp. 1–2). Though the leaders pretend to be in control of situations, but often times, reverse is always the case. In Jackson and Rosberg's judgement, the capacity of Africa's government to exercise control hinges upon three factors: domestic authority, the apparatus of power and economic circumstances (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, pp. 1–2). First political authority in Africa (and in other parts of the Third World as well) tends to be personal rather than institutional. Geertz, as cited in Jackson and Rosberg (1982, p. 7), observed:

Fifteen years ago, scholarly writings on the New States ... were full of discussions of parties, parliaments, and elections. A deal seemed to turn on whether these institutions were viable in the Third World and what adjustments in them ... might prove necessary to make them so. Today, nothing in those writings seems more *passé*, relic of a different time.

Constitutional and institutional offices that are independent of the personality of the leader has not taken place in Africa and Nigeria as well. Most leaders see the office as an avenue to advance their cause and that of their cronies;⁵ besides, constitutional and institutional weaknesses are the alienation of some of the elites and other ethnic groups from government. This has in many ways led to coups; and where coups are untenable, fanning of ethnic and religious embers so as to cause havoc, chaos and conflict.⁶

Second, the apparatus of power is also believed to be underdeveloped. That is the agent and agencies that implement and enforce government laws, policies, edicts, decrees orders and the like can be considered 'underdeveloped' in regard to their stock of resources and the deployment of these resources. Jackson and Rosberg argued that in proportion to their territories and populations, they typically have a smaller stock of finances, personal and material, than Asian or Western governments and their staff are less experienced and reliable. Hence, the concept of government administration as a policy instrument bears less relation to reality. However, while Jackson and Rosberg's argument is right in some aspects, it is not in some respects. The reason is because, though, most African countries have both the human and natural resources, corruption and mismanagement have been the order of the day.⁷

Finally, most African governments are hindered by finances or poor economies. This is often as a result of many factors such as monolithic economy,⁸ low per capita income, poverty index and unemployment, among others. Jackson and Rosberg concluded that empirically, the African government with Nigeria inclusive are weak. In terms of jurisdiction, which is influenced by territory and independence, weak states usually do not have control over its territory (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p.13). This has been substantiated on several occasions by Nigeria's Ministers of Interiors and recently by the Theatre Commander of Operation Lafia Dole and Minister of Interior that the war against insurgency lingers as a result of Nigeria's porous borders.⁹

Robert I. Rotberg opines that states fail when convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver on political goods to the citizenry and that some weak states also have the trait to fail (Rotberg, 2004, ch. 1); giving instances and indicators such as insecurity, dependent on mono-economic product, infant mortality, poverty,

volatile borders, rapid fall in GDP per capita, closed economic system, partial democracy and unresponsive to popular political dissidents view, among others. He argued that the state also performs poorly as a state and provides political goods adequately at best across the vast mélange of poor and rich provinces that make up its little unified and much unglued whole decrying the susceptibility of the 2003 election as a precursor to a failed state (Rotberg, 2004, ch. 1). He again in his paper 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair' (Rotberg, 2004, pp. 1–48) argued that Nigeria was once a collapsed state,¹⁰ though recovered to become weak but headed for failure.

Akude submitted that though the Nigerian state boasts of all physiognomies of a failed state—such as lose monopoly of violence to checkmate insurgency in restive regions such as Niger Delta, corruption by the elites, poverty and economic downturn—it will not lead to a collapse state so long as the political elites are still united in the philosophy of personal enrichment and aggrandisement. In his departure, he opined that the youths who could do this are still not in unison as they do not possess the clout to destabilise the central order (Akude, 2007, pp. 1–12).¹¹

In a departure from other scholars and observers about the Nigerian state, Peter Lewis, argued that the state is a dysfunctional one. To him, Nigeria's developmental




Figure 1. Classification of States by Their Weakness and Strengths in Africa

Source: Rotberg (2010, p.47).

challenges are in the economic, political and social dimensions. Economic stagnation arises from a generalised crisis of governance, just as poor economic performance contributes to the infirmities of the state. The weakness of central political authority, and the insecurity of rulers, exacerbates social tensions and undermines capital formation. Nigeria's deep communal divisions significantly impede state formation and economic growth, and are themselves aggravated by political uncertainty and privation. In a nutshell, he puts it as stalled economy, deficit of governance and national integration and disintegration. In analysing the reason for the poor developmental performance, he further gave indicators such as communal competition or ethnic fragmentation, rentier state phenomenon and decline of institutions (Lewis, 2006, pp. 83–116).

Torsten Persson asserts that weak states cannot support basic economic functions, raise substantial revenues, deliver basic services and keep law and order, among others. They are also characterised with dependence on resource rents and aid, low threat of external conflict and non-cohesive political institutions which inadvertently lead to political violence; and instability further weakens motives to build state capacities. More so, weak states invest in violence rather than in strong state. Generally, weak states hamper development since they cannot support markets due to low legal (productive) capacity as well as pursue inefficient policies due to low fiscal (extractive) capacity. He opined that there are different types of states: common interest, redistributive and weak states. He noted that their capacity is basically on allocation of resources and ways of handling conflicts (Persson, 2010, pp. 1–49). How has Nigeria handled the post-Camp Zero success?

After the Capture of Camp Zero, What Next?

By the time we were ready to make an inroad into the Camp, they had already destroyed the camp and fled. We found a wounded terrorist, who strap himself with an IED. He was heaping abuses on us, we kept a distance from him knowing he could be dangerous and after abusing us and knowing he had no chances of escape, denoted the IED to end his life. (Maina, 2016)

When President Muhammadu Buhari came on board, he stated some of the strategies to contain, defeat and end any threat from the insurgency. Words followed with action when the command was moved from Abuja to the Borno State. Eventually, this began to yield results, as 'Camp Zero', which was the supposedly strong hold and spiritual headquarters of the dreaded group, was captured on 24 December 2016. After its capture, the whole world rejoiced with Nigeria and the Chief of Army Staff, Lt General Tukur Yusuf Buratai, became a model to Africa's military and Third World nations.¹² One then thinks that with the capture of Camp Zero, the lost Chibok girls would be found and attacks would then cease.

Rather than cease, soft and hard targets are being attacked, especially military bases. Other forms of insecurity are palpable across the country. Kidnapping, piracy, robbery, Fulani herdsman killings, military–civilian confrontations with the Shia–military dilemma as example, among others, are still the characteristics

of the polity. These show that terrorism rather than being defeated have taken another hydra head.

Besides the threat of Boko Haram, what about the Niger Delta question, the secession of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB; Thompson, Ojukwu, & Nwaorgu, 2016, pp. 255–256), the incessant protest and requests of the Shia group and many conflicts across the country such as cattle rustling, herdsmen–farmer clashes as well as the rampaging killing of herdsmen, political witch-hunting and assassinations, religious to ethnic jingoism and fanaticism, among others? There is no doubt that these challenges are multifaceted, which range from social, economic to political and cultural.

President Buhari, in his inaugural speech, acknowledged the vagaries of the problems affecting the polity besides the Boko Haram menace. He puts it thus:

Boko Haram is not only the security issue bedeviling our country. The spate of kidnappings, armed robberies, herdsmen/farmers clashes, cattle rustlings all help to add to the general air of insecurity in our land. We are going to erect and maintain an efficient, disciplined people—friendly and well-compensated security forces within an over-all security architecture. (Thompson et al., 2016, p. 257)

There is no doubt that the capture of the dreaded Sambisa or Camp Zero rather than thaw the menace has only exacerbated the insecurity in a weak state.

A minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Mallam Naisr el-Rufai had on his twitter page warned that whoever killed a Fulani man owed death a date, be it a military man or civilian (El Rufai, 2012). In 2015, he was elected as the governor of the state and the crises in southern Kaduna gradually began leaving many dead, property lost and citizens displaced. In fact, he also acknowledged that he paid some herdsmen to stop the killing and maiming (*Vanguard*, 2016).¹³ Despite the acknowledged payment, the killing has not stopped, instead rustling and killings have increased than ever. This is also coupled with arrests on trumped-up charges of the critics of the government.

Across the country, there is the prevalence of rampaging Fulani herdsmen who in the quest to graze their cattle have embarked on the destruction of crops and farmlands, thereby causing food insecurity, hunger and starvation among the populace as well as loss of livelihood. There are also reports that some of these herdsmen are responsible for the killing of innocent people and attack on villages across the state—from the north central of Taraba, Benue, Kogi and recently trampling on research crops at the University of Ilorin, University of Uyo to the western part of Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti and Osun to the eastern part of Enugu, Imo, Anambra to the oil rich south–south region of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa. These allegations are what some people term as the ‘Islamisation process’ (*The Punch*, 2017).¹⁴

Whereas the government has not prosecuted some of these rampaging herdsmen and their sponsors. In fact, more than 1,000 people have died as a result of the herdsmen–farmers clashes and more people continue to die in the Middle Belt than in the North East (Lunn & Harari, 2018, p. 9). For most herdsmen who migrate to the southern part for grazing their herds, their problems are also compounded by the desertification of the Sahara and the growing ecological crisis of the Lake Chad basin (Zenn, 2018, p. 9). Be that as it may, their conflict with

indigenous farmers have led to deaths and displacement of millions of people. Added to these menace are the activities of cattle rustling in the northern part.

Economically, the increase in cost of living, inability of some states to pay salaries, states' over dependence on Federal Allocations, financial crimes and corruption, foreign exchange racketeering, recession and other indicators does not augur well for Nigeria's status. Even at the federal level, accumulated pensions and gratuities are still owed over elderly citizens who have worked and toiled for the development of the state in various capacities; meanwhile their political counterparts who served for years still get uninterrupted life pensions and salaries.¹⁵ And in 2016, the country also found itself in recession (Okonjo-Iweala, 2018).

Socially, the threat of the *Almajiri* system in the north, the Skolombo on streets of Calabar, cult-related clashes across the southern states, kidnapping for ransom, unemployment and underemployment increase, threat of meningitis, malaria and the warning of a reoccurrence of the Ebola virus, among others, pose serious threat to the already weak state; these coupled with the high level of social vices among youths such as rape and ritual, cannibalism, child marriage or forced inter-religious marriage, increase in suicide cases, among others.¹⁶

Lately, there is this ritual pattern, where female pants are forcefully removed from them in their homes, or on the streets or stolen on lines, where they are meant to dry for ritual purposes (Onyegbula, 2019). Although, this act is recent—no doubt it is a belief system, where the ritualists believe that such act could fetch quick money—little attention has been paid to its spread. More so, it has also instilled fears in most ladies because the belief is that whosoever's pant is used will die mysteriously.

In a nutshell, the report of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) report for January 2017 sums up the state of weakness of the Nigerian state even after the capture of the famous Camp Zero and the handing over of Shekau's flag to the federal government. In the NSRP report, the issues were divided into political, social and economic. These are the indices of status of a state: weak, failing, failed, strong or collapsed. If the reports is to be followed, then the state can then be regarded as a failed state.¹⁷ Furthermore, at a time when pundits were breathing relative peace in the North East, there was the kidnapping of more than a 100 secondary school girl from Dapchi, Yobe state. Although most of the girls were released in less than three weeks after their kidnapping—except the five who died in custody of the terror group and a Christian girl, Leah Sharibu, who refused to denounce her faith—the way and manner it was quickly done raised a political question (Maclean & Abrak, 2018). While the ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the federal government claimed it did not pay ransom or release any prisoner in exchange for the girls, the opposition and critic felt otherwise. It was not until an international observer revealed that the government paid ransom and also exchanged some prisoners in the exchange for the school girls (Omonobi, Akinrefon, & Erunke, 2018).

Though, Amao and Maiangwa in their assessment of the Nigeria's military intervention in Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and the Boko Haram (2009–2015) contend that while the Nigerian army performed magnificently in Liberia, they have not lived up to expectations during the Jonathan administration, as a result of

poor military morale and corruption in arms procurement, among others (Amao & Maiangwa, 2017). It is instructive to note that even during and after the capture of Camp Zero, the problems have remained unabated. To be sure, some soldiers were caught on video complaining about the poor welfare and weaponry deployed by the army in its fight against insurgency. Worrisomely, this complaint came after the release of US\$1 billion and another US\$462 million, from the Excess Crude Account (ECA), by the Buhari administration, to procure arms for the military in April 2018. In the video, the army was heard saying,

See the weapons they bring here. These are not working These are outdated vehicles, they are not working. They just keep them here for formality Imagine, they are killing us every day. The situation is getting worse. (Carsten, 2018; Omilana, 2018)

Although the military continues to deny these allegations as mere propaganda and fake news, the reality on ground says otherwise. In fact, a delegation of the Borno State governor, traditional rulers, elders, national and state assembly members on their visit to President Buhari made some undisclosed demands, of which insecurity of the region is widely believed to be at the crux.

At another meeting by President Buhari with the Shehu of Borno, Alhaji Abubakar Umar Ibn Garbal Elkanemi, in November 2018, the Shehu dismissed the claims going round that the state was no longer under terrorist control. He succinctly puts it thus:

Nobody can dare move out of Maiduguri by 10 kilometres without being confronted/ attacked by Boko Haram. Quite a number of farmers are being killed and kidnapped on a daily basis around Molai general Area, which is just 10 kilometres away from the metropolis, along Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu road We plead that the federal government and the security agencies review the strategies in nipping this lingering crisis in the bud. (Ahiumayoung & Marama, 2018)

Quite aside, there is a general insecurity in the country, even as the 2019 election is fast approaching. Some elder statesmen—such as Olusegun Obasanjo, Rt Gen Theophilus Danjuma and Abdusalam Abubakar, amongst others—have raised such concerns. For instance, Obasanjo (2019) in an open letter to President Buhari states:

Before I conclude, let me assert that the security situation has deteriorated with kidnapping everywhere and Boko Haram more in action and nobody should deceive Nigerians about this. With the teaming up of Boko Haram and Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram is stronger today militarily than they have ever been. Boko Haram has also been empowered by the Nigerian government through payment of ransom of millions of dollars which each administration disingenuously always denies.

Conclusion

The study attempted to trace the history of the terror group Boko Haram, examine the numerous insecurity across the country—despite international collaborations

and commitments—as well as the capture of Camp Zero, which was believed to be the spiritual home of the group. This study is necessary in relation to the nature of the state. Put differently, can the war against terrorism and insecurity succeed despite the nature of the Nigerian state—a state generally believed as a weak state?

The study revealed, among other things, that although terrorism has become one of the most potent form of warfare in asymmetrical battles in recent times, the collaborative efforts with the international partners helped to stem the tides. However, the election of President Muhammadu Buhari changed the way the terrorists were confronted. He got support from international partners and also changed the strategy by not only relying on international partners but also boosting the morale of the troops. This led to the final capture of Camp Zero, a territory regarded as the spiritual and strategic base of the group. Be that as it may, while the Nigeria military was quick to rejoice and celebrate the success, the spate of insecurity and the revival of the Boko Haram has significantly increased.

The study argued that this is so as a result of the nature of the state. Although it has every characteristics of a weak state, the reality on ground—such as the increase in rituals, conflicts and economic downturn, which led the country not just into recession but also become the poverty hub of the continent, among other political and socioeconomic factors—has no doubt put the country in a failing state phase. With the symptom of a failing state, we argued that no matter what the collaboration is or investments in the country is made, the wave of insecurity and terrorism will increase.

Hence, the study recommends that to end the terror and insecurity in the country, the root causes and characteristics of the failing state must be addressed. This is divided into political, and socio-economic and even international interventions. Politically, good governance, good leadership, political will and rule of law should be toed. Socio-economically, there should be an inclusive policy, where education is received and illiteracy is eradicated. For the ritual killing, stakeholders, including African traditional religion worshippers and herbalists should be sensitised and community policing should be introduced. For the farmers—herdsmen clashes, efforts should be made to recharge the Lake Chad Basin and adhere religiously to climate change. More so, human capital investment should be upped. Internationally, the fight against terror has never been won alone. Hence, Nigeria must be altruistic in its collaboration by toeing the path of respecter of human rights in its fight against terror, as well as investing in intelligence to eradicate all fifth columnists or saboteurs in its ranks and files. More so, sponsors of the groups must be prosecuted.

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. It means the largest industrialised democracies. The G-8 were formerly G-6—France, the USA, Britain, Japan, Italy and Germany. G-8 consists of Canada, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the USA. In 2014, as a result of Russia's intrusion in Ukraine, it reverted back to the G-7 with the exclusion of Russia.
2. Russia, North Korea and China have issues with human rights or political liberties, but they are among the developed, while some underdeveloped countries have human rights records and do not depend on agriculture. Agriculture would have been put as raw materials.
3. Nigeria ranked 28 of 141 states. Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo and Iran are the first four.
4. More than 40 systems for ranking governance have been created.
5. State machinery is often used to advance personal interest. A leader does not want his or her cronies persecuted. Today people wonder why few members of the ruling party have been prosecuted.
6. Examples are the moment Buhari said that his appointment will be from the 97 per cent, which voted for him during the 2015 general elections. Consequent upon the pronouncement, bombings began on pipelines because some elites felt they were not being carried along in the scheme of things, especially from the Niger-Delta region which produces the country's foreign currency earnings.
7. A good example is the recent monies recovered from unimaginable places, such as septic tanks, abandoned buildings, lands, ghettos, vacant apartments, etc. Let alone those hidden in the UK, the USA Dubai and the Panama Paper which revealed safe havens for stolen funds.
8. Also known as the Dutch disease of syndrome.
9. Abba Moro in May 2013 said that Nigeria needed \$244 million to solve this; Lt Gen Azubuike Ihejirika in his 2014 valedictory speech also blamed the border porosity for continued terror, Maj Gen Irabor and Lt Danbazzau are of the same opinion.
10. He referred to the 1990s under late Sani Abacha.
11. He is right on this. Even after the 'Not too young to run' Bill was signed into law, most of the youth still remain divided. More so, when some of them are given appointments by the old guards.
12. He was honoured and called to deliver lectures across and was even invested with a title in Brazil.

13. One may ask why this is so in a state which ought to protect lives, provide security and bring criminals to book. The payment made to alleged criminals to stop their crimes on the excuse of what happened several years (post-election violence of 2011) should not be tolerated in a civilised clime.
14. Some Southerners, especially the Igbos, see the Fulani encroachment as the beginning of the Islamic agenda, especially when the Federal Government has not taken a stand against it. See *Unilorin Bulletin* for Professor Ambali's warning.
15. Most states now pass laws allowing political office-holders to enjoy life pensions.
16. The spate of killing on cult- and ritual-related issues such as Badoo, One Million Boys, female panties, bread and human faeces used by ritualists, etc. are common occurrence in the country.
17. For example, the missing Chibok girls, kidnapping of school pupils in Lagos and other unreported.

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