

Sokoto Journal *of the* Social Sciences

(Formerly Journal of Social Science and Administration)

ISSN: 1595-2738

Vol. 4: Nos. 1, June & 2, December, 2014

Dr. Yusuf

SOKOTO JOURNAL OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME 4: NOS. 1, JUNE & 2, DECEMBER, 2014

A Bi-annual publication
of
The Faculty of Social Sciences
Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto
P.M.B. 2346
Sokoto-Nigeria

The Faculty of Social Sciences
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ISSN PRINT: 1595-2738

ISSN ONLINE: 2384-7654

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RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Africa is generally the poorest region in the World. The major concern in the literature is to provide explanation to two apparent questions: why is Africa poorer than other regions; and why are some countries in Africa doing relatively better while some fail to make progress? Rule of law is among the many factors that have been identified as responsible for success or failure of nations. This paper therefore, attempts to examine the relative importance of rule of law among five other important factors. Case study analysis was used to identify factors that are associated with economic success and failure in Africa. Pearson pair wise correlation analysis was also employed to confirm the findings of the case study analysis. The findings show that rule of law and human capital are the most important factors explaining successful economic performance in Africa and to a lesser extent democracy as well as access to the sea. Therefore, governments in Africa should invest more in education, uphold rules of law and imbibe true democratic culture.

Key words: Rule of Law, Human Capital, Case Study, Economic Performance

JEL Classification: O55, O43

INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of Africa's independence around 1960s, Africans had big dreams of better future for themselves and their nations. The economic performance in a number of African countries was better than Asian countries in the 1960s till early 1970s. However, in the late 1970s, many countries in Africa experienced growth collapse. For instance, the aggregate per capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been on the decline at almost one percent per annum since 1980 until recently. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is the home for the highest proportion of poor people in the world. Hence, the beautiful dreams that many people had turned into nightmares.

Understanding Africa poor economic performance has attracted considerable attention and the literature has grown so voluminous. A number of factors have been identified to be responsible for Africa poor performance, these include: economic factors such as investment in physical and human capital; geographical factors such as access to the sea; political factors such as quality of democracy; institutional factors such as rule of law; and cultural factors. While some of these factors are symptoms of poor performance, some are outcomes and some are mere proximate of the causes.

However, it is not clear which of these factors is responsible for economic success/failure in different countries across Africa. Thus, the focus of this paper is to cross examine the relative importance of rule of law among other key factors that are peculiar with good performance among


the few success stories and those that are peculiar with poor performance among worst cases in the continent. The paper equally seeks to examine the relationship between these factors identified and economic performance. This will assist African governments in determining what specific action(s) they could take in order to improve economic performance, standard of living and reduce poverty in their respective countries and the region as whole?

The rest parts of the paper have been arranged as follows; stylized facts on Africa's economic performance is in section two, section three is the review of literature, section four is the methodology, section five presents the results and section six concludes the paper.

STYLIZED FACTS

The common way economists compare economic performance across countries or regions is by comparing their level of income, especially per capita income. Higher per capita income reflects higher standard of living and vice versa. Therefore, per capita income of Africa is juxtaposed with other regions of the world in Figure 1 below. As evidenced in Figure 1, the average per capita income in North America and Europe are above the world average income per capita. Latin America and Caribbean had income per capita that is close to the world average. Asia and Africa had almost same level of per capita income in the 1970s up till early 1980s. While Asia continue to experience increase in income, Africa lagged behind with the lowest income per person in the world.

Figure 1: Trends in GDP Per Capita of Africa and Other Regions in the World, 1970 - 2008




Source : computed by authors from World Bank Data Bank;

Key: NAMERICA is North America, LAMERICACA is Latin America and Caribbean,

Figure 2 below shows the growth rate of per capita income of Africa and its sub-regions. Between 1961 to 1970, the average growth of sub-Sahara Africa was higher than Africa's growth, however, if South Africa is excluded, sub-Sahara Africa growth is far below. The story is different between 1971 to 1980, Africa has the highest average growth rate, followed by sub-Sahara Africa excluding South Africa. South Africa and Nigeria had almost the same growth rate between 1971 to 1980, meaning that Nigeria is one of the fastest growing countries over the period. Africa and sub-Sahara Africa with and without South Africa recorded negative growth

between 1981 to 1990, they started recovering in the period 1991 to 2000. In the decade 2001 to 2010, sub-Sahara Africa excluding South Africa recorded the highest growth rate, followed by sub-Sahara Africa excluding South Africa and Nigeria. This pattern reflect a number of stylized facts, first, the political crisis in North Africa affected Africa's growth, second, South Africa is experiencing recession perhaps result of the global economic melt down, third, Nigeria is one of the fastest growing countries in the continent and fourth, some countries in sub-Sahara Africa are growing fast in recent time.

Figure 2 Average Growth of Per Capita GDP in Africa and Africa Sub Sects, 1960 to 2010




Source: Constructed by the authors from Africa Development Indicator (ADI), 2010

The African growth performance is dismal in absolute terms, but it is worse if we take into account that, during this same period, the rest of the world has been growing at an annual rate of close to 2%. Figure 3 displays GDP per capita for the entire African continent and the sub-Saharan subset relative to the United States. The evidence of absolute

divergence is clear: Africa's Per capita income has been declining persistently relative to the that of US throughout the reviewed period. This shows the inability of Africa to catch up with the industrial world, perhaps benefiting from the fact that it started from a relatively backward position.

Figure 3: Divergence: Per Capita GDP Relative to United States



Source: Constructed by Author from World Bank Databank, 2009

LITERATURE REVIEW

In theoretical literature of growth (see Romer, 2006; chapter 1-3; for original works see Solow, 1956; Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), differences in the level of technology, accumulation of physical and human capital are responsible for the differences in economic performance across countries. It implies that North America and Europe are doing better than other regions economically because they have more physical and human capital and more advanced technology. Asia equally succeeded because they accumulated more capital and advanced their technology. We can then blame the failure of Africa to grow on its inability to accumulate capital and to improve technology. This explanation is no doubt informative but it is not satisfactory since

there are reasons why these factors are low in Africa.

If capital accumulation and technological advancement are so important (which of course they are), why did Africa fail to invest more on them? Why is the physical capital still low in Africa? Why is the existing human capital not being used more effectively? Answering these questions goes beyond the theoretical factors identified above but linked to the concerns of the rest of social sciences and other disciplines like law. It is therefore pertinent to ask questions about politics, geography, culture, policies, and institutions. Four sets of literature then emerged, the first emphasizes the importance of political system, the second emphasizes the importance of geography, the third emphasizes the importance of culture and

the last emphasizes the importance of institutions.

The literature on the relationship between political system and economic performance is sometimes situated within the new institutional economics literature. The central thesis here is that, whether a country is a democracy/autocracy; presidential or parliamentary; whether the voting system is majoritarian or proportional, all matter for economic performance. Though, there is less consensus on whether the presence or absence of democracy itself matters. Studies on the impact of politics on growth differ in their measures of political institutions. Their conclusions are also divergent, some results show positive effects, while some show negative effect, and some find no direct effects. Among those who find positive effects are Pourgerami (1988); Helliwell (1992)¹; Plumper and Martin (2002); Baum and Lake (2003)²; and more recent and prominent is Persson and Tabellini (2005, 2009). Other recent studies that find positive though weak effects are: Roll and Talbot (2003); Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005); Jones and Olkan (2005); and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005). Those that found negative effects include Landau (1986) and Bates (2006). Several studies such as Alesina et al (1992); Barro (1994); Londregan and Poole (1990); and Przeworski and Limengi (1993); did not find any or robust effects of democracy on economic growth.

The geography literature emphasizes the importance of climatic/geographical factors and demography on economic performance.

Prominent studies in this area are David, (1998); Thomas, (1998); and Gallup, Llussa and Sachs, (1998) among others. The paper by Bloom and Sachs (1998) summarized the geography-growth thesis. Bloom and Sachs (1998) argued that Africa's poor economic performance is accounted by its extraordinarily disadvantageous geography. They supported their argument with delightful mixture of historical discussion, botanical and medical argument, and statistics. First, they showed that sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most tropical region in the world and generally tropical regions lag far behind temperate regions in economic development. The tropical climate poses serious problems particularly to agriculture, such as low photosynthetic potential, high evapotranspiration, low and variable rainfall, highly weathered soils, veterinary diseases and plant and animal pests. Second, the natural environment exposes people to many endemic vector-borne infectious diseases, (see Gallup and Sachs, 1998 on the import of malaria on growth). Third, the location of the region put it on disadvantage of transport costs. This is due to the great distance from major world markets in the northern mid-latitudes. And finally, demographic factors that constraints growth in Africa include low population density, low urbanization, ethnic diversity and delayed demographic transition.

Social psychologists used both theoretical and historical analyses to show that societal organization matters for economic performance, (Bellah et al, 1985; Reynolds and Norman, 1988; Triandis, 1990; and Greif, 1994). One of the most important arguments in this set of literature is that most developing countries are culturally

¹ This study finds positive effect of democracy on investment and schooling.

² The paper argued that the effect of democracy on growth is indirect through health and education.

"collective", whereas the developed West is "individualistic". That, in collectivist societies the social structure is "segregated" in the sense that each individual socially and economically interacts mainly with members of a specific religious, ethnic, or familiar group in which contract enforcement is achieved through "informal" economic and social institutions, and members of collectivist societies feel involved in the lives of other members of their group. At the same time, non-cooperation characterizes the relations between members of different groups. On the other hand, in individualist societies the social structure is "integrated" in the sense that economic transaction are conducted among people from different groups and individual shift frequently from one group to another. Contract enforcement is achieved mainly through specialized organizations such as the court, and self reliance is highly valued. Thus, resulting to different form of institutional structures: weak and ineffective in the former and strong and effective in the latter.

The last set of literature is the New Institutional Economics literature, (see North, 1990, 1992; Abdiweli, 2003; Persson, 2002; Benson, 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2004; Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrick, 2000, Rodrick et al 2004; among others). The central idea here is that institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic performance across countries. According to North (1992) "institutions are the rules of the game; more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Institutions consist of formal rules (for example, constitutions, laws, property rights), informal constraints (for example, sanctions, taboos,

traditions, customs, norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both. In other words, they consist of the structure that humans impose on their dealing with each other. Institutions establish the constraints, determine the costs and benefits under which individuals take economic decisions. The extent of the institutional constraints and the choices individuals make in that institutional setting depends on the effectiveness of enforcement.

Other studies that attempt to explain Africa's poor economic performance include: the 'resource curse' hypothesis literature, which argued that countries that are well endowed with natural resources tend to grow slower than their resource poor counterparts, (Sachs and Warner, 1997, 2001; Auty 2001; Morrison, 2007; Gylfason, 2001; Hausmann and Riyabon 2002,). Though the trade led growth argument is an old one, it still surface in the debate of why some poor countries remain poor. Finally some other sets of literature blame the poor performance of Africa to corruption; colonial history; and activities of international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

METHODOLOGY

Economic performance is measured by GDP per capita (US Dollar PPP adjusted), six indicators are considered as factors that explain performance. These factors are based on the fundamental factors identified in the literature. The variables and sources of data are presented in Table 1 below. Among the variables presented in Table 1, initial GDP (or initial per capita

income), investment as share of GDP, and primary school enrollment are economic factors that explain economic performance. Investment as share of GDP proxied physical capital while primary school enrollment proxied human capital. POLITY2 represents political variable and its values range from -10 to +10. Where -10 is fully institutionalized autocracy, and +10 is fully institutionalized democracy. A “+10” democracy has institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; where choosing and replacing chief executives is done in open and competitive elections; and substantial checks

and balances are imposed on the powers of the chief executive. In a “-10” autocracy, by contrast, citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. The length of coastline is used to proxy for geography variable, and rule of law represents quality of the legal system (institutional variable) respectively.

Table 1: Variables and Sources of Data

Items	Indicators/Variables	Sources of Data
Economic Performance	GDP (PPP US Dollar adjusted) per capita	African Development Indicators, 2009
Economic Factors	i. Initial GDP at independence ii. Investment share in GDP iii. Human Capital proxied by Net Primary School Enrollment	African Development Indicators, 2009 Pen World Table 2009
Political System	Quality of Democracy proxied by POLITY 2	POLITY IV Database, 2009
Geography	Coastline	
Institutions/ Rule of Law	Index of Rule of Law	World Bank Governance Indicators, 2009

Source: compiled by authors

The study adopted two analytical techniques: a case study approach and correlation analysis. In the case study analysis, relatively better performing economies (success stories) and worst performing countries are identified using the economic performance indicator as presented in Table 1. The factors peculiar to each group are equally identified. This is to enable us appreciate a pattern of intersecting and common factors among the top ranked performing countries in the region on one hand and that of bottom ranked countries on the other hand. Correlation analysis is conducted so as to derive precise estimates of the degree or extent of pair wise linear relationship between economic performance and each of the six indicators/explanatory variables in Table 1.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

In this section results of the case study as well as the correlation analysis are presented and discussed.

Case Study Analysis

Using both the economic performance indicator and the six explanatory variables all the countries in Africa (where data on these variables are available) are ranked in descending order. Top ten countries and bottom ten countries in each of the performance indicators/ variables are selected for the analysis. Table 2 presents the first ten countries at the Top of the ranking in each indicator, while Table 3 presents the bottom ten.

Table 2: Top 10 Countries on the Selected Indicators

GDP per Capita	Rule of Law	POLITY2	Coastline	Initial Income	Net Primary School Enrollment
E. Guinea	Mauritius	Mauritius	Madagascar	Libya	Seychelles
Seychelles	Botswana	S. Africa	Somalia	S. Africa	Tanzania
Libya	Cape Verde	Comoros	S. Africa	Ethiopia	Sao Tome & Principe
Gabon	Namibia	Lesotho	Mozambique	Angola	Tunisia
Botswana	Seychelles	Ghana	Egypt	Guinea	Madagascar
Mauritius	Tunisia	Botswana	Eritrea	Zimbabwe	Algeria
S. Africa	S. Africa	Zambia	Morocco	Tanzania	Mauritius
Algeria	Egypt	Sierra Leone	Libya	Nigeria	Uganda
Tunisia	Ghana	Senegal	Angola	Egypt	Egypt
Namibia	Malawi	Mali	Namibia	Mozambique	Zambia

Source: Compiled by authors using data in Table A at the appendix

Table 3: Bottom 10 countries on the selected indicators

GDP Per Capita	Rule of Law	POLITY2	Net Primary School Enrolment.	Initial Income
Zimbabwe	Somalia	Eritrea	Congo	Gambia
Congo	Zimbabwe	Libya	Djibouti	Seychelles
Burundi	Congo, Dem, Republic	Morocco	Liberia	Botswana
Liberia	Chad	E. Guinea	Sudan	Lesotho
Guinea Bissau	Guinea	Gambia	Sierra Leone	E. Guinea
Eritrea	Cote d'Ivoire	Mauritania	Niger	Swaziland
Niger	Sudan	Cameroon	Guinea Bissau	Mauritania
Central African Republic	Central African Republic	Congo, Dem. Republic	Central African Republic	Guinea Bissau
Sierra Leone	Guinea Bissau	Gabon	Eritrea	Central African Republic
Togo	Angola	Sudan	Burkina Faso	Togo

Source: Compiled by authors using data in Table A at the appendix

After identifying the top and bottom countries, the second stage of the analysis is scores matching. This is done by matching economic performance rank with rank in each of the explanatory variables. That is, there is a match if a country listed as ten top/bottom is also listed as ten top/bottom in the factor indicator, otherwise there is no match. Table 4 presents score matching of top ten countries in economic performance and Table 5 presents score matching of bottom ten countries.

A closer examination of Tables 4 and 5 immediately reveals that no single factor can explain the growth or lack of it in Africa. However, from Table 4, it is evidenced that rule of law is the most influential factor in explaining income level, at least among other factors considered in this study. Six countries

among the ten top countries in economic performance are also ranked among the top ten in index of rule of law. While four countries at top of economic performance (Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Gabon and Algeria) do not match with rule of law ranking. On the other hand Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana and Malawi are among top ten in rule of law ranking but not among top ten in economic performance. Meanwhile, it is important to note here that, Cape Verde has the highest per capita income in West Africa, Egypt is ranked twelve in the term of per capita income in Africa and Ghana is equally doing well in the West Africa sub-region.

Considering the quality of democracy proxied by POLITY 2 value, only three countries among the ten top countries with better democratic values are among

the top ten in economic performance. This means, it is possible for a country to have a high income and yet not to have high democratic values. Similarly, only three countries with largest coastline are among highest income and even landlocked countries are among the top income group. It was argued in the literature that African countries are not doing well relatively because they started with lower income level. However, the case study presented here show that most of the countries that started with high level of income at independence are not among the countries with high income in 2008. In fact, countries like Botswana and Seychelles that are among top ten today were among the lowest ten at independence. Human capital proxied by net Primary school enrollment also seems to matter in explaining economic performance in Africa because four of the countries with highest net primary school enrollment are among top ten in economic performance. Only one of the countries with

highest investment as share of GDP is among the top ten income group. Similar pattern was also evident among the Bottom ten in Table 5 above. Six out of the ten countries at the bottom based on economic performance are also among the bottom ten in primary school enrolments. While three and four of them were also among the bottom ten in terms of initial income at independence and rule of law respectively. The inference from this analysis is that, better rule of law, high net primary school enrollment, access to the sea measured by coastline, high quality of democratic values, and high level of initial income are common features among the success stories in Africa. These factors in that order are relatively the most important factors explaining economic performance among African countries.

On the other hand, low levels of net primary school enrollment, lack of access to the sea, low levels of initial income and poor adherence to rule of law are common features of bottom ten countries.

Table 4: Score Matching of Top Ten Countries

GDP per Capita	Rule of Law	POLITY2	Coastline	Initial Income	Net Primary School Enrollment	Investment as Share of GDP
E. Guinea					✓	
Seychelles	✓					
Libya			✓	✓		
Gabon						
Botswana	✓	✓			✓	
Mauritius	✓	✓				
S. Africa	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Algeria					✓	✓
Tunisia	✓				✓	
Namibia	✓		✓			

Compiled by the Authors using Table 2

Table 5: Score Matching of Bottom Ten Countries

GDP per Capita	Rule of Law	POLITY2	Coastline	Initial Income	Net Primary School Enrollment	Investment as Share of GDP
Zimbabwe	✓					
Congo					✓	
Burundi						
Liberia					✓	
Guinea	✓			✓		
Bissau						
Eritrea		✓			✓	
Niger			✓	✓	✓	
Central African Republic	✓			✓	✓	✓
Sierra Leon					✓	
Togo			✓	✓		

Compiled by the authors using Table 3

Correlation Analysis

In this sub-section we computed the Pearson Pair-wise correlation coefficient between economic performance and each of selected variables for all African Countries. The results are shown in the Table 6 below.

Table 6: Pair-Wise Correlation Result

Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita

Independent Variables	Correlation Coefficient
Initial GDP at Independence	0.19
Share of Investment in GDP	0.19
Net Primary School Enrolment	0.28
POLITY 2	-0.21
Rule of Law	0.24
Coastline	0.09

Computed by the Authors Using data in Table A.3

The Pearson correlation results still buttressed the findings in the case study analysis that presence or absence of a single factor cannot explain economic progress or stagnation of African Countries. However, the human capital development and rule of law indicators had the highest pair wise correlation coefficients of 0.28 and 0.24 respectively, followed by initial income at independence and investment as share of GDP. The relatively higher correlation coefficients for human capital and rule of law implies that these factors are relatively the most important factors influencing the economic performance among and across African countries. Contrary, to our expectation POLITY 2 variables representing political systems had a negative correlation coefficient. This again shows that rule of law and not democracy matters for growth, which was also evident in Table 4 and 5 as only three (Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa) out of the Top Ten economies were also among the top ten in terms of democratic nature of their political systems. And for the Bottom Ten only Eritrea fall among the Bottom ten in terms of POLITY 2.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of lessons can be deduced from the case study analysis presented in this paper. First, there is no single factor that can completely explain growth or lack of it in Africa. Second, economic performance and important factors influencing it varies from country to country. Third, no single country that ranked low in index of rule of law is among the high income countries. Fourth, four of the countries with better democratic quality are also among the top

ten with high rank of index of rule of law. This implies that there could be some correlation between rule of law and democratic quality. Fifth, a country can be disadvantaged geographically such as being a landlocked country and yet perform better than geographically advantaged countries. Thus, geography may be a disadvantage but it is never a predicament. Sixth, countries such as Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt did badly in the POLITY2 value (quality of democracy) and yet they are among countries with highest income in Africa. Yes, democracy is good, however, a country can grow without being democratic. Seventh, human capital proxied with net primary school enrollment seems to matter too because most countries that have low primary school enrollment are poor, while most rich countries have high enrollment rate. Initial income level does not seem to matter since countries that started with low income at independence are now doing far better than those countries that started with relatively high income. Finally, colonial origin does not seem to matter in explaining economic performance in Africa.

Conclusively, evidences have shown that Africa is not only the slowest growing region of the world but it has the lowest income per capita, implying that Africa has the lowest standard of living. Northern African countries are doing a little better than the rest in the continent. Several factors have been identified in the literature to account for Africa's poor performance. However, no single factor could completely explain growth or lack of it in Africa. Geographical endowment could be disadvantageous to growth, but it is never a predicament. In other words country can still

grow despite geographical disadvantages. Democracy is good for growth but not necessary and sufficient condition for growth. Evidence have shown that some non democratic countries are performing better economically than countries with better democratic qualities. Human capital accumulation is important for growth and the most important is the rule of law (legal

system, i.e. good institutions). Finally experiences of economic performance differ from country to country in Africa irrespective of colonial origin.

Therefore, it is recommended that governments in Africa should uphold the rule of law and principles of democracy as well as invest more on human capital (education).

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APPENDIX

S/No	Country	Year of Independence	Colonizer	GDP US\$ (2008)	GDP Per Capita	GDP Growth	Initial GDP US\$ at Independence	Investment as Share of GDP	Net Primary School Enrollment	POLITY2 (2005)	Rule of Law	Corruption (CPI)
1	Algeria	1960	France	173881.3	8032.66	3	2723.64	36.74	95.18	2	27.75	998
2	Angola	1975	Portugal	83383.4	5898.54	14.8	6804.28	15.95	52.76	-2	0.22	1600
3	Benin	1960	France	66080.07	1467.87	5.1	226.2	12.21	80.17	7	34.45	121
4	Botswana	1966	Britain	12969.2	13391.77	-3.1	51.66	17.18	81.99	8	60.38	0
5	Burkina Faso	1960	Ivory Coast	7948.24	11613.4	-4.87	11320.44	10.89	46.94	10	42.58	0
6	Burundi	1962	Belgium	1163	382.76	4.5	212.5	9.97	74.6	6	13.88	0
7	Cameroon	1960	France	23396.08	2215.06	3.9	618.74	14.78	69.17	-1	14.83	402
8	Cape Verde	1975	Portugal	1729.6	3504.27	5.95	213.56	25.85	87.8	9	64.59	985
9	Central African Republic	1960	France	1970.15	735.67	2.8	112.16	7.17	45.61	-1	5.26	0
10	Chad	1960	France	8360.69	1455.27	-0.4	313.64	15.66	60.22	-2	2.87	0
11	Comoros	1975	France	530.11	1169.01	0.97	123.5	3.03	55.06	9	14.35	340
12	Congo, Dem. Rep.	1960	Belgium	11588.21	321.44	6.2	3427.33	6.46	33.18	5	10.53	37
13	Congo, Rep.	1960	France	10699.02	3945.88	5.57	131.76	9.39	54.71	-4	1.91	160
14	Cote d'Ivoire	1960	France	23413.95	1651.23	2.21	546.2	6.39	54.93	0	3.83	515
15	Dominican Rep.	1977	France	874.69	2140.23	3.86	340.99	11.4	37.75	2	32.54	316
16	Egypt, Arab Rep.	1922	Britain	162818.8	5416.41	7.06	4144.24	13.47	93.88	-3	33.59	2450
17	Equatorial Guinea	1968	Spain	18425.1	33872.93	11.29	67.51	20.55	67.08	-5	8.13	296
18	Ethiopia	1993	Italy	1653.92	632.12	2	467.88	20.46	46.54	-7	10.05	2234
19	Ghana	1960	France	26487.29	868.11	11.32	7369.14	5.19	65.22	1	30.14	0
20	Gambia, The	1965	Britain	1434.96	14526.53	2.06	141.47	10.21	87.99	-1	36.36	885
21	Gambia, The	1965	Britain	781.52	1362.77	5.89	44.3	14.98	72.28	-5	45.03	80
22	Ghana	1957	Britain	16123.41	1452.07	6.2	1117.15	9.77	63.61	8	31.13	339
23	Guinea	1958	France	4266.12	1203.97	8.4	6684.48	1.81	71.57	-1	3.35	320
24	Guinea-Bissau	1974	Portugal	429.61	537.8	2.7	98.78	14.55	45.15	6	5.74	350
25	Kenya	1963	Britain	34507.02	1589.95	3.6	926.59	15.59	75.48	7	17.7	536
26	Lesotho	1966	Britain	1622.06	1587.84	3.95	56.72	21.4	72.56	8	47.37	0
27	Liberia	1945	Italy	870.1	387.76	7.1	190.5	13.13	39.47	6	9.57	579
28	Libya	1951	Italy	99926.47	15402.42	7	2890.49	14.13	95.91	-7	31.40	1770
29	Madagascar	1960	France	8969.83	1048.92	6.88	673.07	8.07	91.12	7	34.76	4528
30	Malawi	1964	Britain	4269	836.79	9.7	194.74	6.84	91.12	6	50.24	0
31	Mali	1960	France	8740.31	1127.56	5	274.54	9.02	60.51	7	41.15	0

32	Mali	1960	France	2858.12			1.9	90.62	13.24	79.5	-5	13.4	754
33	Mauritius	1968	Britain	8651.06	12079.33		5.34	1153.47	10.03	95.03	10	82.3	177
34	Morocco	1956	France	86329.26	4388.5		5.8	2027.15	22.81	88.11	-6	49.28	1835
35	Mozambique	1975	Portugal	9735.33	855.15		6.46	3526.29	4.34	76.05	5	33.06	2470
36	Namibia	1990	S. Africa	8563.88	6342.7		2.67	2350.31	19.7	83.84	6	61.24	1572

Appendix
Table A: Selected Economic, Political and Geographical Statistics of African Countries

S/No	Country	Year of Independence	Colonizer	GDP US\$M (2008)	GDP Per Capita	GDP Growth	Initial GDP US\$M at Independence	Investment as Share of GDP	Net Primary School Enrolment	POLITY2 (2008)	Rule of Law	Coastline (KM)
37	Niger	1960	France	5354.26	684	9.5	449.61	12.16	43.42	6	23.44	0
38	Nigeria	1960	Britain	212079.7	2081.89	5.29	4196.17	8.97	63.81	4	11.48	853
39	Rwanda	1962	Belgium	4456.86	1021.93	11.23	125	6.71	91.47	-3	38.28	0
40	San Tome and Principe	1975	Portugal	174.61	1738.48			37.76	96.2		37.32	209
41	Senegal	1960	France	13208.53	1771.96	2.5	792.99	10.39	70.72	7	46.89	531
42	Seychelles	1976	Britain	833.02	21529.57	2.81	49.28	19.94	99.4		59.33	491
43	Sierra Leone	1961	Britain	1953.1	766.27	5.06	327.83	11.2	43.08	7	15.79	402
44	Sierra Leone	1960	Britain	917.04			180.46	21.96		0	0	3025
45	South Africa	1910	Britain	276764.4	10108.56	3.06	7342.23	12.64	85.32	9	55.02	2798
46	Sudan	1956	Britain	58443.4	2153.28	8.34	1126.15	44.41	41.15	-4	4.31	853
47	Switzerland	1968	Britain	2618.18	4928.21	2.5	79.8	17.99	84.17		31.1	0
48	Tanzania	1961	Britain	20490.44	1262.94	7.46	5100.41	11.43	97.85	-1	44.98	1424
49	Togo	1960	France	2823.25	829.48	1.1	121.15	12.44	80.13	-4	22.49	56
50	Tunisia	1956	France	40180.18	7996.08	5.1	866.16	13.67	96.1	-4	58.85	1148
51	Uganda	1962	Britain	14528.89	1164.7	9.53	449.16	7.23	94.61	-1	40.67	0
52	Zambia	1964	Britain	14313.9	1355.77	6	822.64	32.38	91.99	7	39.71	0
53	Zimbabwe	1980	Britain	3418.09	273.99	-5.3	6678.87	15.71	87.8	-4	1.44	0

Source: Computed by authors from African Development Indicators, World Bank Governance Indicators