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
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Strengthening the Capacity of the Nigerian Military towards a Viable Internal Security and Peace Support Operations

Omede AJ¹

Abstract

The study analyses the issues that the Nigerian military has had to contend with between the period 1999 to the present. The study observed that the military's involvement in politics in Nigeria created a lot of dislocations and distortions in its structure. The advent of democracy no doubt provides the military an avenue to ensure professionalism and protect the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The study examined the challenges of the military operating within a democratic entity. This is paralleled with the task of grappling with issues such as the de-politicization and professionalization of the military, subordination of the military to civil authority (civilian oversight), provision of welfare packages, and development policies. The study argues that the Nigerian military should among others, engage in threat analyses and the perception of threats to Nigeria's national security; develop an effective military doctrine; and incorporate non-conventional, urban warfare and counter-insurgency tactics into both its internal security and peace support operations.

Key Words: Threats, Insurgency, Military Professionalism, Doctrine, Trans-border Terrorism, Territorial Integrity, Internal Security Operations (ISOs), Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

Introduction

The Nigerian military has been involved in various internal security duties and international peace support operations within the African continent and in other parts of the world since 1960. The enforcement of its internal security duties have seen the military deploying troops to flashpoints to douse conflicts in the Niger Delta areas particularly in hotspots such as Odi, Ohorho and Choba (Bayelsa State); Zaki Biam (Benue State); Bauchi (Bauchi State) Maiduguri (Borno State); and Jos (Plateau State). In terms of its peace-support operations, the Nigerian military have been deployed in countries such as Liberia,

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Sierra Leone, Darfur (Sudan), and Mali. Its internal security role has arguably been tailored towards ensuring peace and stability within the polity. Peace support operations has often been geared towards restoring democratic governance and normalcy in conflict areas by ensuring that all the warring parties adhere to internationally accepted norms and the ideals of the rule of law. Operationally, the Nigerian military has encountered so many problems in its peace support operations. This can be attributed to imperfect organisational structure, an undefined defense policy and comprehensive military doctrine; besides accused violation of human rights and suspected disregard for rule of law.

The return to democracy in May 1999 made extraordinary demands on officers and men of the Nigerian military to exhibit a high level of professional competence both in their national security and international peacekeeping responsibilities. This required sharpening its potentials, replenishing its strategy, and undertaking significant changes in its professional mandate. Consequently, the Nigerian military is expected to construct a bridge between ensuring Nigeria's survival as an indivisible entity and carrying out peace support operations around the world. In an attempt to strengthen the capacity and enhance the structure of the military towards its domestic and international duties, the challenges of conforming to the rule of law, (the social conduct guiding all democratic systems) and respect for constituted authority within the polity has become imperative in any analysis of the military's strategic posture.

Conceptualising Military Capabilities

Military capabilities encompass various components of military power that ensures that the Army is constantly in a state of combat readiness to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. A major component in this regard is the possession of well-trained men and sophisticated armaments, that is, equipment and weapons to protect the nation's territorial integrity from internal and external attacks (Johari, 2014:277). Knorr (1970:1) in his analysis emphasized that power potential of a nation is critical in determining its military capabilities. The power potential of a nation is the amount of resources (natural and financial) available for producing and maintaining the armed forces. In addition to resources, Knorr (1970:16-25), argued that the capabilities of any Army also consists of its ability to formulate particular objectives, strategies and contingency plans

including, the ability to increase its size and force structure, equipment and logistic backup in time of crises and war.

Literature on military capabilities such as Duppy (1972), Kadlor and Eide (1979), and Johari (2014), all seems to agree on certain components of military capabilities which include: the ability of the government to draw on resources and readily provide funding for military expenditure, relative state of the national economy, population, and territorial size. Other factors include the internal discipline among troops, high level of hierarchical structure, intelligence and communication and of course, periodic parades and reviews aimed to impress the world with the military strength and consequent political standing of the nation (Johari, 2014:256-277).

Certain subjective factors comprising the psychological elements of military capabilities are also important. For instance, the intentions especially the perceptions of the army, to actually use the arms at its disposal, a greater interest in surviving, the willingness of the population to defend the nation at all costs and above all, the morale of the troops. These psychological factors are, driven mostly by the morale of the troops. Morale is critical because it is the degree of determination of the troops to defend the nation and, is powered by the "impulse to service, above and beyond the call of duty that, has so often been the margin of victory" (Palmer and Perkins, 2010:76).

The Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations (ISOs)

Internal Security Operations (ISOs) involves the use of the army in supporting role to aid civilian authorities and police in quelling civil insurrection and internal violence thereby restoring and maintaining law and order. Internal disturbances involves situations where there is non-international armed conflict, but there exists an internal confrontation characterized by a certain seriousness or duration and which involves acts of violence (ICRC, 2002:4-8). In these situations, the government, often call upon the armed forces to restore internal order especially when the violence associated with the breach to peace and stability is beyond the capacity of the police. In this case, the army thus become the only guarantee of the integrity of the State (Heywood, 2007: 404).

The Nigerian military's internal security duties involves deterring threats to quell disturbances such as youth agitations and reactions to perceived marginalisation of oil producing areas by government, ethno-religious crises, the increase in small arms proliferation and bio-

terrorism, armed robbery, destruction of lives and properties, etc, which occur during crisis (Ogomudia, 2001). Over the years, successive governments in Nigeria have found expression in deploying the military for internal security duties – the promotion of a preferred internal order and stability through the Army's third function of "suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order" (Omede, 2005:178-205). Constitutionally, restoring internal order is the primary responsibility of the Nigeria Police and other Para-military forces. As experiences have shown, however, these forces found it difficult to curtail and contain civil disorders and disturbances. Consequently, the Army has often intervened through its secondary constitutional responsibility that requires it to "assist civil power in times of disturbances, insecurity, as well as conduct counter-insurgency operations as authorized by the President" (National Defence Policy, 2006:18; The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).

Consequently, in carrying out its internal security duties, the Army has established various units like the joint task force commands in the Niger Delta and North Eastern Nigeria. The Army has had to deploy troops to flashpoints to douse conflicts in the Niger delta areas and other hotspots like Odi, Ohorho and Choba (Bayelsa State); Zaki Biam (Benue State); Bauchi, (Bauchi State) Maiduguri (Borno State) and Jos (Plateau State). The crises in these troubled areas no doubt, are manifestations of agitations and discontent exhibited by various groups (ethnic and social) due to government policies of deprivation, marginalization and social injustice (Omotosho, 2004:18).

In order to curtail the discontent and the upsurge of violence in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian Army Joint Task Force (JTF) in August 2008, launched a massive operation against the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militants operating in the Niger Delta. The military (Army and Navy) patrolled waters and hunted for militants; searched all civilian boats for weapons, and raided numerous militant hideouts (*The Punch*, August 16, 2008; *Guardian*, August 16, 2008). The operation was a counter reaction to the vandalization of oil pipelines, the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers and foreign sailors in the Delta region (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/1/hil/africa>). Notable among the internal security operations in the Niger Delta were Operation Sweep, Operation Fire-for-Fire, Operation Hakuri No 1 and No 2, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Flush 1, 2, and 3 are examples of high profile internal security operations in the Niger Delta (Joab-Peterside, 2007).

With respect to its internal security operations in North Eastern Nigeria, the Army established a Joint Task Force-Restore Order (JTF-RO) to deal with militant and insurgent activities respectively. To further curtail and contain the growing and sustained threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgents in the North Eastern parts of Nigeria (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe states), the Army also created in 2013, the 7th Infantry Division – JTF-RO, with a strength of eight thousand troops (8,000) domiciled in Maiduguri Borno State. The new division's role include building on the successes recorded by the Joint Task Force and "securing the entire North-East and sealing off the border axis between Nigeria and Niger, Chad and Cameroon, where intelligence has shown that terrorists get their training and launch bombing attacks on Nigeria" (*Vanguard*, August 18, 2013; *GlobalSecurity.org*). The conduct of ISOs by the Army in our view, had in many instances generated, heated debate, which revolves around such issues as, the lack of a unified command structure, poor equipment, the inadequacy of troops deployed, the response time to act in aid of civil authorities, low morale, human rights violations and extra judicial killings.

Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

The Army had since independence in 1960 participated under various international organizations in various peace support operations around the world. PSO's is an all, embracing concept, which involves the use of the Army in external operations. It comprises of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding post peace reconstruction and peace enforcement (Kegley and Blanton, 2011: 292). PSOs are conducted impartially and normally in support of an international organization such as the United Nations, African Union and ECOWAS. PSOs involve the use of military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are, designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified condition (NATO, 2015). Under PSOs, troops undertake a range of civilian and military tasks, including the maintenance of public order, policing, mentoring of security forces, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation (Fadina, 2014:1). Based on the foregoing, the Nigeria Army had participated in various operations, which are, the United Nations Operations in Congo (1960), United Nations Force in Lebanon (1978 and 1982), Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) Mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990-2000), United Nations Mission in Liberia (1995). Other notable operations are, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), African Mission in Somalia, Africa led International

Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the African Military Intervention Force in Guinea-Bissau (2012), (Commandant-Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre, 2013).

The analysis of the concept of military capabilities showed that the military requires combat ready men and sufficient weapons and armaments that will enable troops carry out such duties as internal security and peace support operations. The issue of morale and discipline is highly emphasized. In terms of its peace-support operations, the military experience showed a force that is versatile and attuned to the demands of international responsibility to ensure a peaceful world order. These operations are not without challenges. The issues involved in the military's ISOs include but are not limited to the use of excessive force in handling internal crises, training, lack of modern equipment, defective intelligence and communication and the lack of high morale of troops. The Nigerian military PSOs is replete with the issues such as command and control, timely deployment, adequate collaborative training with other contributing nations among others. These challenges are indicative of the need for a study such as this to strengthen the capacity of the military to achieve a state of combat readiness in carrying its assigned constitutional responsibilities.

The Army and the Imperatives of Democratic Values in Nigeria

Motivation for this study was, provided by two major events namely president Obasanjo's message to the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Army Day Celebrations (NADCEL) in 1999 and the outpouring of views expressed during the first retreat for all uniformed discipline officers in Kaduna in 2001. In his presidential address to the military in 1999, former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo re-enacted the negative implications of prolonged military rule on the Nigerian military. Obasanjo expressed the desire to transform the military from a politicized institution to professionalized one. More importantly, he emphasized on the military's commitment to its constitutional role, that is, the territorial defense and protection of the nation's sovereignty. The former president implored the Nigerian military to use the opportunity provided by democratic governance to shake off the past, and approach the future with more determination. Obasanjo called on the men of the military "to dust off their precise and standard operational procedures and zero in on true professionalism as well as be ready to subordinate their authority to civilian political control in order to defend the nation" (1999: 1-10).

Evidently, negative tendencies and anti-military activities that, characterize military rule account for this rebuke. The erosion of *esprit de corps* in the Nigerian military also led to clamor for its reorganization and transformation. As, a matter of fact, the destruction of brotherliness and camaraderie in the military was, facilitated by manipulation, intimidation and state terrorism organized at the highest levels. Officers who are, trained to speak became, united by fear and conspiracy of silence. Conferences became avenues to issue verbal orders and threats (Obasanjo, 1999). The implication of military rule on the armed forces according to (Malu, 2000:5-9) created a lot of:

dislocations and distortions in its (army,)structure. Barracks were neglected, equipment were not maintained, *esprit de corps* waned resulting in erosion of ethos, norms, ethics and tradition ... foray into politics was more damaging to the military than any other sector in the polity.

The second motivation for this study as stated earlier is the outcome of the first retreat held for senior officers of the Nigerian Armed Forces in Kaduna on June 23, 2001. At the retreat, issues of national significance relating to the supremacy of civil authorities over the military in a democratic setting; military professionalism, corruption, accountability and transparency, funding and welfare packages for members of the armed forces including the vexed issue of professionalism, military expenditure, research and development were deliberated.

Obviously, the attainment of democracy was a welcome development to both the general populace and the Nigerian military in particular. The reason for this is not far-fetched, as democracy provides the military an opportunity, to, be, adequately funded, and be reasonably equipped combat ready force capable of protecting the corporate image of the country, and preserve the morale of its personnel in the interest of military professionalism and national stability. The march, toward professionalism, constant and realistic training, establishing functional training institutions, deliberate reorientation and retraining of the Nigerian military personnel, the quest for mutual trust among the officers and men, all appear to contribute potent variable that could strengthen the capacity of the Nigerian military in a democratic setting. Other variables include the provision of operational and logistic requirements, ensuring a comfortable living and working conditions, need to ensure prudence, probity and accountability of military

resources. The enforcement of discipline within the ambits of the law as codified in the constitution of the Federal Republic and the Armed Forces Act, and the Armed Forces Decree 105 (as amended) as well, as the demand for loyalty and dedication to constitutional authority and subordination to civil authority are also factors to note.

Strengthening the Capacity and Structure of the Nigerian Military

The military has had to contend with series of threats, which endanger the national security. Notable among the threats are "menace of terrorist insurgents, religious intolerance, armed robbery, kidnappings, pipeline vandalism, piracy, corruption and other related crimes that impact negatively on Nigeria image and economy" (Dasuki, *The Punch*, June 25, 2013:19; *Vanguard*, January 30, 2011:5). Other threats are oil bunkering, ritual killings, the disillusionment of the populace with the negative dividends of democracy such as joblessness, low morale among the military due to, meager salary and low special duty allowance (*Tell*, August 20, 2012: 50-55).

In dealing with these threats, the Nigerian Army had in its possession, various modern weapons capabilities, such as Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), Gunships and Fast Assault Crafts, Guns (General Purpose and Light Machine Guns,), Reconnaissance, Infantry and Utility Vehicles, Gunships, Surface-to Air-Missiles and Multiple Rocket Launchers, Helicopters (M1-24, M1-34, Utility), AMX, T-55 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons. (Wikipedia, 2015; glogalsecurity.org, 2014 and Eminue, 2006:331).

In spite of its impressive capabilities, it has, observed that the expensive equipment in most of the military installations across the country are in parlous state of affairs. The equipment, were allowed to rot away, in bad state of disrepair and lacked proper maintenance (Eminue, 2006:331; *The Guardian*, August 31, 2005). Based on the foregoing, one can argue that the military has been unable, to effectively carry out its ISO's because of such factors as the lack of transparency in defence expenditure, corruptive practices associated with the activities of defence contractors, bureaucratic delays and lack of maintenance culture (www.dailyindependent.com-new slider, 2014). Other debilitating factors are the undue emphasis placed on military incursion in politics, the politicization of the military at the expense of professionalism and in particular, the declining morale and psychological motivation associated with the non-provision of adequate welfare facilities for the officers and men of the Nigerian military.

With respect, to its peace support operations, the military is also grappling with the swift deployment of its troops to meet its international assignments. A case of note was the military's inability to fully, comply with the Presidential directive that one thousand, two hundred (1,200) troops be deployed to participate in the French-led military operation in Mali (*The Punch*, February 7, 2013:16). Following the directive, only one hundred and sixty two (162) troops (originally part of the Mali-bound ECOWAS force) were, deployed for the mission. The remaining one thousand and thirty-eight (1038) "were hurriedly sent to training camps in Sokoto to undergo a mandatory training program for participation in international peacekeeping mission" (*The Punch*, February 7, 2013:16).

Structurally, most of the Army barracks (with a few exceptions in Abuja, the Kalapazin-Artillery Barrack in Kaduna,) in the country are in a state of disrepair and neglect. Apart from this, majority of the barracks lacked complete perimeter fencing. This state of negligence has made it easier for the structures in the barracks as well as the officers and men to become easier targets for militants who find it easier to loot the armoury and carry out incessant attacks on the military facilities (*The Punch*, March 22, 2014:7). Some of the cases of attacks which the study compiled from various sources include the following (*The Punch*, March 22, 2014:7) (*The News*, February 10, 2014:38) (*The Guardian*, December 31, 2010:1 and 2) (Also monitored on YouTube and Twitter, CNN, BBC News and Al-Jazeera):

The attack on Mongunu and Bama barracks in Borno State. The insurgents decimated the armoury, took some military vehicles and killed many soldiers

The penetration of the 21 Artillery Brigade of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri in a bid to set free their detained colleagues

The bombing of the Dalet barrack in Kaduna in 2012 and that of the St Andrews Military Protestant church inside the Jaji military cantonment in Kaduna state, in December 2013

The destruction by the Boko Haram sect of about twenty(20) buildings, thirty(30) vehicles in the 333 Army Artillery Regiment and, the burning of an aircraft parked in the 72 Composite Group of the Nigerian Air Force.

The highlighted cases of attacks poses great challenges for Army in carrying out their internal security and international peace support operations. The government's inability to equip the military, pay adequate salary and provide life insurance and befitting accommodation for its troops add up to these challenges. The whole essence of this study is well, captured by Falana (2013) summed up the challenges before the military in the following words:

It is inexcusable to deploy ill-trained, ill-motivated soldiers and police officers to war-zones, armed with only AK-47 rifles without bulletproofs, serviceable vehicles, communication gadgets to fight suicide bombers with more sophisticated weapons... The Federal Government should take urgent steps to train and equip security personnel deployed to the battlefield, purchase helicopters for aerial survey (surveillance) of the northeast zone, upgrade medical facilities... and fortify police stations, barracks as well as prisons and other detention facilities (See *The Punch*, May 13, 2013:13).

To redress this situation, the government has stepped up efforts, to provide the necessary equipment for the military. A major step taken was the provision of adequate funding. President Goodluck Jonathan as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, requested the National Assembly, in 2014, to, approve the sum of one billion dollar (\$1bn.) external loan (this, is in addition, to an earlier budget of ₦968.127bn.). The President explained that the loan is required to "upgrade the equipment, training and logistics of the armed forces and the security services, in order to enable them more forcefully, confront, the serious threats facing the nation as typified by the *Boko-Haram* threats" (*The Punch*, July 17, 2014). This request has, since been granted.

In terms of structure, the Army established in 2013 a new division, known as the 7th Infantry Division in Maiduguri Borno State, which is the stronghold of the *Boko Haram* Islamic insurgents. To be more effective, the 7th Division is comprised of existing units as, 23rd Brigade, Yola in Adamawa State; 21 Brigade, Maiduguri – Borno State; and the 22 Brigade Ilorin–Kwara State (*The Vanguard*, August 18, 2013). The purpose of the new division is to "secure the entire North-East, and seal off the border axis between Nigeria and Niger, Chad and Cameroon, where intelligence has shown that terrorists get their training and launch bombing attacks on Nigeria" (*The Vanguard*, August 18, 2013). The creation of the new division brought the Sixth Army

Divisions in the country. The Nigerian Army had in existence, the 1st Division with headquarter in Kaduna, 2nd Division in Ibadan, Oyo State, 3rd Armoured Division in Jos, 81 Division in Lagos and 82 Division in Enugu.

The Army has stepped up its efforts in countering insurgencies and terrorism in Nigeria. The Army has embarked on training that enable "the soldiers to acquire relevant skills that would enhance their performance in assigned tasks, commensurate with, their new status as members of the new Quick response Group (QRG) (*The Nigerian Tribune*, August 8, 2012:3). In spite of these trainings, the Army still, finds it difficult to stem the tide of the incessant destructive activities of the *Boko Haram* insurgents in Borno, Yobe and some parts of North Eastern Nigeria. In redressing this, tide however, the Army created in June 2014, a Special Operations Command (NASOC) to deal with counterinsurgency operations and civil-military relations. Other units being strengthened include, the anti-terrorism unit in Jaji (Command and Staff College), the special warfare, mountain warfare units and the composite counterterrorist unit of the 82 Division, Enugu (www.naijapals.com, 2014).

In sum, the military has had to contend with series of threats, which endanger the national security. A major internal security operation embarked upon in recent times and which, highlighted the capabilities of the military is the operation against the *Boko Haram* insurgents in North Eastern Nigeria. In, dealing with these threats, it was observed that the military lacked the capacity (force structure, modern weapons, and training) and the psychological motivation in defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Nigeria. Cases of the military's inability to quickly curtail insurgents attack on military and civilian installations have also been rife. The negligible state of military barracks, inadequate training of the troops and the little attention paid to the welfare and psychological motivation of troops are also factored as causal variables. In terms of its external role, the 2013 Mali peace-support operation was a classic example that showed the deficiency of the Nigerian military in troop deployment.

Constitutional Role of the Military and Subordination to Civil Authority

The hallmark of the military in a democratic set-up is the respect for the supremacy of the constitution, subordination to civil authority and the inculcation of democratic values. The constitutional framework

of the roles and responsibility of the military is enshrined in Sections 217 and 220 of the 1999 Constitution. Specifically, Section 217 (1) provides, that there shall be armed forces for the Federation, which shall consist of an Army, a Navy, an Air Force, and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be, established by an Act of the National Assembly. Sub Section (2) of Section 217 of the same 1999 constitution explicitly states that the Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly, equip and maintain the Armed Forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purposes of:

- (a) Defending Nigeria from external aggression
- (b) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air
- (c) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly
- (d) Performing such other functions as may be, prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly

In carrying out its assigned roles, therefore, the Nigerian military has been, implored to be subordinated to the provisions of the Constitution and its men and officers submit themselves to civilian oversight that is, democratic leadership of the President and the National Assembly. In reinforcing the superiority of civil authority over the military, Section 218 Sub-Section (1) of the Constitution empowers the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation, to determine, the operational use of the armed forces. The President, shall also appoint the Chief of defense, Army, Naval and Air staffs and any other branch of the armed forces, as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly and delegate any member of the armed forces of the federation, his powers relating, to the operational use of the armed forces.

With regard to the subordination of the military to the civil authorities, obviously, the President and the National Assembly intended to insulate the military from unauthorized involvement in civil matters even where these might appear serious in nature. In particular, the powers given to the National Assembly serve as a check on the executive to safeguard both the military and civil society. Accordingly, Section 218 Sub Section 4 of the same 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the regulation of:

- (a) The powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation; and
- (b) The appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of the armed forces of the Federation

In furtherance of these objectives, the Obasanjo administration also came up with a policy thrust that strengthens civilian oversight of the military. Highlights of the policy are as follows (*The Punch*, January 12, 2001; *The Guardian*, February 2: 2001)

- 1. National Service chiefs are to have access to the President only through the Security Council of which they are members
- 2. The Chief of Defence Staff being the President's principal military adviser has a direct contact with the president on the behalf of the service chiefs.
- 3. The service chiefs except on operational issues will not have any direct contact with the Minister of Defence. The job of the Minister will be mostly supervisory - ensuring the day-to-day running of the military conforms to agreed policies.

To, further transform the military, the Government of Nigeria also appointed four ministers to oversee the large Ministry of Defence. It has also instituted different bodies for policy formulation and implementation of Nigeria's defence needs. In sensitizing the military to and in order to effectively implement the policy of civilian oversight over the Nigerian military, Siyanbade (2001), called on the officers and men to:

- (i) Support Nigeria's democracy whole-heartedly by standing in the vanguard of its protection.
- (ii) Be loyal to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
- (iii) Be steadfast and unflinching in their loyalty to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The importance of civilian oversight of the military cannot be over-emphasized. This principle implies that the military must be obedient and loyal to the State at all times, irrespective of the type, of the government or leadership of the day. Officers and men of the military must at all times be professionally oriented, politically neutral/non-

partisan and be respectful of the political order established by the Sovereign will of the people (Eminue, 2006:371).

Attaining Military Professionalism in a Democratic Dispensation

Different meanings and interpretations have been, ascribed to the concept of professionalism. There is a consensus among scholars however, that professionalism is, equated with a high level of skill, competence or the correct demeanour of those who are highly trained and disciplined. Other features of the concept include expertise, responsibility, corporateness and a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge. In our view, this knowledge is an embodiment of intellectual advancement and formalized training aimed at achieving organizational goals (Huntington, 1962; Eminue, 2006:321).

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, successive administration has continued to emphasize the importance of retraining of the Nigerian Army both locally and internationally. Some of the steps taken in this direction and aimed at achieving military professionalism according to our research include:

- (i) Replacement of sheer number with firepower and technology. It is expected that the envisaged force will enable military commander's plan and equip the armed forces with available resources
- (ii) The desire for a compact force, which is, organized, around existing structure, but with emphasis on high mobility
- (iii) Refurbishment and modernization of existing equipment
- (iv) Reduction in size and demobilization of the services in order to achieve desired strength. Toward this end, those who have reached the maximum 35 years of service or have attained the mandatory retirement age, as well as those with poor disciplinary records are currently being discharged from active duty
- (v) Retiring personnel are being given attractive packages to enable them integrate properly into civil life
- (vi) Placing priority on realistic and consistent combat training.
- (vii) Placing emphasis on discipline of officers and men, both, within and outside of the barracks. This is necessary because discipline is the bedrock of military tradition and the only way the Army could command the respect of the Nigerian public.

- (viii) Inculcate the zeal for physical training and fitness in Nigerian Army personnel.

Other concrete attempts embarked upon by the government (as further revealed by our research survey) to make the military more viable also include (*The Guardian*, September 13, 2000; Malu, 2000; *The Guardian*, July 5, 2000):

- (a) Acquisition of military hardware and equipment such as the helicopter gun-ships and the MI B 35, to curtail the incessant violations of Nigeria's territorial integrity particularly those of the Chadian rebels in the northeastern part of the country
- (b) Deployment of the military for peacetime statutory roles like the evacuation of victims from conflict and disaster zones
- (c) Ensuring internal peace, which will provide, an enabling environment, for the other sectors, of the polity. In realizing this particular objective, the Nigerian Army has been involved in resolving internal conflicts in several parts of the country. It also contained the threats of marauding Chadian and Nigerien soldiers who operated as bandits in the Northeast and Northwestern parts of the country
- (d) The compulsory retirement of some officers who had held political appointments. This was necessary in raising a sound, professional and a loyal army. Accordingly, it was argued that the continuous service of the politically active soldiers was capable of sowing the seed of discord between the military and the political class
- (e) Subjecting the account of the Ministry of Defence to external and internal auditing, as well as, probing past personnel of the Directorate of military pensions over alleged anomalies in the disbursement of pension funds
- (f) Rehabilitating Nigerian Army personnel toward the acquisition of necessary skills needed for contemporary peace support operations. An example in this regard is the setting of a five-year target to make 40 per cent of officers and soldiers literate in French. According to an Army source, learning French is necessary in order to justify the Army's involvement in international peacekeeping operations, which are in reality geared toward the democratic consolidation.

To be able to achieve the above objectives, significant efforts were, made in the area of training. Some of the initiatives so adopted include:

- (i) The series of cooperation and bilateral agreements between the USA and Nigeria in the area of military training and procurement of equipment for the Nigerian Army
- (ii) Military cooperation between the USA and Nigeria; this agreement focuses on steps to help the Nigerian Army adapt to civilian control and embrace democracy
- (iii) The participation of Nigeria in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) initiated by the USA; this effort aims to help African nations enhance their peacekeeping capabilities

In addition to the foregoing, other concrete efforts made to enhance the performance of the Nigerian military also entails the proposed partnership and the eventual buyout of the Defence Industry Corporation (DICON) by the South African arms manufacturing giant Denel Pty Ltd. The proposal of the takeover of DICON by Denel Pty Ltd was due on one hand, the non-performance and zero production of most of the factories and facilities of DICON; and on the other, the non-patronage by the government.

The facilitation and provision of human and material resources for the effective management of Nigerian Army Welfare Insurance Scheme (NAWIS) established in 1988 and the armed forces benevolent fund (1991) is a step in building up the morale and psyche of the military. NAWIS for instance aims to provide life insurance for officers who ordinarily would not seek conventional insurance policies. The benevolent fund on its part is, aimed at providing immediate succour to the families of deceased Nigerian Army personnel (*The Soja*, 1999: 21).

One would agree that the various efforts enumerated and analysed in the preceding paragraphs has contribute immensely to the improved performance of the military in the present democratic dispensation. A cursory look at the activities of military worldwide however would also reveal that there are areas, which the military are still deficient. Thus, in order to strike a balance between national and international realities, the following paragraphs is hereby set to deal with those challenges before the Nigerian military in an era of national consolidation and international peacekeeping.

Challenges Confronting the Nigerian: Some Policy Options

In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the Nigerian military must endeavour to incorporate some policy recommendations examined in this section when planning policies that would enhance the performance of its constitutional roles. The first point of departure is for the military to engage in a continuous analysis of threats to the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Threat analysis and the perception of threats to Nigeria's national security constitute an important aspect in the nation's military preparedness. It particularly acts as a major factor in the build-up of the military capabilities of the Nigerian military. In view of the various threats to Nigeria's security, (insurgencies and extreme militancy, cross border conflicts, terrorism, externally instigated insurgencies, economic threats, etc.), the Nigerian military should seek political, social and economic interactions with her neighbouring countries. More importantly, the military must develop its capability to include such offensive and defensive capabilities that would back up the nation foreign and defence policy objectives.

In addition, threat analysis and threat perception by security and defence planners should seek to include:

- (i) An analysis of the challenge posed by the military build-up in contiguous states (like Cameroun, Chad and Republic of Benin) and other African countries, with particular reference to the Republic of South-Africa, Libya, Egypt, and all other Franco-phone countries within the West Africa sub-region.
- (ii) An examination of the various forms of instability in the sub region especially, in Mali, Guinea, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, with special attention to neighbouring countries such as, Chad, Niger and Cameroun. The department of Defence/Army policy and plans should take cognizance of the possibilities of the role of external powers inexploiting internal differences to create conflict and antagonisms within the West-African sub region.
- (iii) An analysis of the potential disruption of Nigeria's economy occasioned by incessant bombings by the *Boko Haram* Islamic sect, kidnappings, vandalisation of oil pipelines and its crippling effect on the de- stabilization and disruption of Nigeria's economic wellbeing and that of other ECOWAS member states.

The development of an effective military doctrine is another aspect that could enhance the Nigerian Army performance. Military

doctrine enables military leaders to plan effectively and take rapid decisions in times of emerging international crisis. To be able to achieve this feat, defence planners must take note of three basic factors namely: The historical background of Nigeria; the various threats to Nigeria's national security and the military power and capabilities of countries that Nigeria has a conflictual relationship with in the pursuit of her national interests.

It is also necessary that the Nigerian military acquire offensive capabilities to complement its defensive ones. This combination of offensive and defensive military capabilities in our view should form the basis of the military's deterrence policy. It should aim at protecting the nation's territorial frontiers, as well as, at undermining the enemy's ability to threaten the existence and survival of Nigerians and their culture. Realistically, for the Nigerian Army to be able to build up and utilize its capabilities to the fullest, the authorities in the view of this study, should incorporate the following four (4) characteristics into its ORBAT:

- (i) Have forces in sufficient numbers and quality that can survive a well-executed surprise attack; react with a timing needed to assure the necessary deliberation and control; penetrate enemy defences and destroy enemies designated targets.
- (ii) Build diversity into its organizational and force structure, and thus insure against the failure of its component units
- (iii) Be capable of avoiding being, withheld from a substantial list of hard and soft targets
- (iv) Possess a survivable command, control and communication network; weapons with, a high- degree of, accuracy and a measure of civil defence evacuation capability in times of crisis and war.

In enhancing its structure and capabilities, one is also of the view that the Nigerian military just like its United States counterpart, must embark on a new strategy that involves the containment of adventurous expansionism of aggressive foreign nations within the West-African sub region. This, the Nigerian Army must achieve through the adoption of newer strategies to be based on time-honoured deterrence and collective security concepts. Essentially, the strategy should consist of:

- (i) Forward Presence which involves protecting important national interests as well as the forward deployment of land and air-

forces, periodic joint and combined exercises, security assistance operations and a carefully coordinated nation-to-nation relationship to achieve advance mutual objectives.

- (ii) Power projection that revolves around "the concentration of forces and projection of power swiftly and massively to advance and protect Nigeria's vital interests whenever and wherever they are challenged; and
- (iii) Force reconstitution which involves the Nigerian Army's ability to expand its force structure should the need arise. An example in this regard is the ease of establishing a new Divisional headquarters in the North-Eastern Nigeria (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states), because of the destructive activities of the *Boko Haram* insurgencies.

In addition to the foregoing, it would be logical to suggest here that the Nigerian military should endeavour to adopt a "siege-mentality" type of defence policy to complement the already existing "Responsive-Offensive" doctrine. The siege mentality involves the perception by the Nigerian Army that Nigeria is constantly being harassed and violated by her predominantly Franco-phone neighbours especially Cameroon. The responsive offensive doctrine on the other hand, involves a sort of tactical doctrine that provides the framework for a swift and hard-hitting operation that aim to contain and eliminate enemy forces within forty-eight (48) hours (at most) from Nigeria's territory.

To complement the siege-mentality and responsive offensive doctrines, particularly with tackling the activities of insurgents that operate across the Nigerian borders, the military should also adopt the policy of hot-pursuit (encirclement) whereby the troops will chase the insurgents into their hideouts, flush them out while diplomacy continues at the state level (*The Punch*, March 1, 2014:8).

However, for siege-mentality doctrine to be truly effective, the military should endeavour to build the under listed characteristics into its force structure:

- (i) Have the ability to react quickly and sharply to impending crisis.
- (ii) Possess the ability to quickly, deploy logistic and material to and from crises areas; as well, as to other strategic areas far beyond the hot spots

- (iii) Possess and be able to maintain an overwhelming state-of-the-art, tremendous firepower and a combined mechanized, motorized artillery and armoured force structure (combined arms doctrine) that is highly adaptable, flexible, mobile and superbly professional.
- (iv) Develop its military capabilities and training exercises to the level of a "credible war fighting capability" that is based on massed, armoured warfare called the doctrine of operations in depth. This strategy takes cognizance of the Nigerian Army commitment to seizing the initiative at the onset of hostilities and conducting bold offensive operations at a high tempo to annihilate completely enemy forces.

The success of the hot-pursuit strategy especially with regard to trans-border criminals will on its part, depend on the cooperation between and among leaders whose countries are contiguous with Nigeria. Perhaps, President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria had this thought on his mind when he called on African leaders to adopt a collective approach and work closely together to confront trans-border insurgencies. In an address to fellow African leaders during an International Conference on Human Security, President Jonathan (2014) enthused:

Our architecture must recognize the fact, that trans-border criminals don't respect boundaries while law enforcement agencies are compelled to respect our international boundaries ... there must be compromise if we must wipe out criminality and trans-border crimes ... it's now time we must agree, as African leaders that an act, of terror against one nation is an act of terror against all nations ... we must not allow our countries, to become safe havens for terrorists; we must cooperate ... and adopt protocols that allow other countries, to pursue terrorists to their safe havens in other countries ... we can redefine our collective approach, in fighting trans-boundary insurgencies.

Lastly, the Nigerian military should incorporate the tactics and strategies of non-conventional warfare, urban warfare and counter-guerrilla/counterinsurgency warfare into its internal security and peace support operations. This suggestion is very relevant because of the frustrating and annoying dilemma often times encountered by highly organized Armed Forces in their efforts to counter insurgencies that

adopt the unconventional (guerrilla) tactics. An example is the situation whereby the Army is battling to contain and curtail the activities of the *Boko Haram* Islamic sect in Nigeria. The victory recorded by the Vietcong over the Americans during the Vietnamese war and the constant, unchecked assaults of the Khmer-Rouge in Cambodia, the Tamil Tigers in Sri-Lanka and the Charles Taylor led NPFL forces against the ECOMOG troops in Liberia, are all cases of note.

With the adoption of the unconventional guerrilla tactics, the Nigerian Army will be, exposed to both the offensive and defensive strategies of limited and urban warfare. Soldiers will be versatile in the tactics of guerrilla operations of such as hit and run, surprise attack, speed and mobility and above all, rapid military decision-making. In addition, the guerrilla dictum of "enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halt, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue" should be adopted by the Nigerian Army (Spanier, 1972:172-175). Finally, sending officers and men of the Nigerian Army to such countries as China, North Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc., would be a source of gaining valuable experience in non-conventional warfare.

Training and manpower development are also essential determinants of the capacity of men to fight well. Training is not just a matter of technical skill. It also involves the initiative of developing the capacity of men to make correct decisions under better conditions. The essence of training according to this study and in line with Coplin's analysis (1974:115), is first, to develop the skills and proficiency of an individual. The second is to, ensure the utilization of these skills within the collective body; and finally, achieve a positive result that is, maintain the unity and preserve the nation's territorial integrity (Imobighe, 1987:62).

It is therefore necessary to state that the Nigerian Army properly needs to train its men in the task of accomplishing its defence functions. Nigeria military planners must design a "train- ability and sensitivity training" into the military's procurement policy alongside with weapons operational features. With this type of training focus, the concept of "continuity in training" will be entrenched in the minds of the officers and men. This will no doubt minimize the problems associated with passive training. Consequently, continuity in training can be, achieved through regular joint military (that is, the Army, Navy and Air Force) exercises at both the operational and tactical levels. It is hoped that the joint exercises would create a sort of standardization, uniformity and a high level of coordination that would contribute to the effective

performance of the military's national and external peacekeeping operations.

The study, however, recognizes the efforts of the military in the continuous train-ability of its troops. For instance, we commend the training of soldiers in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (CTCON) at the Armed forces Command and Staff College (AFSC), Jaji (*Tribune*, August 8, 2012) and the training of the 143rd Infantry Battalion in a full spectrum of special operations (2014), in conjunction with the special forces from the California (USA) Army National Guard (*The African Sun Times*, June 26, 2014). The training of crack Army Commandos in the United States in 2014 (www.naijapals.com, 2014) is also worthy of note.

Developing effective external defence and peacekeeping strategies is another important area to be explored. Current events in the international system have witnessed the participation of the Nigerian Armed Forces in both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations outside and within the African continent. However, focus of this study is on the following under listed recommendations:

- (a) Military planners must give priority to contingency planning and preparation, which must involve the procedures of specifying purposes, appraising opposition, formulating strategy, allocating resources and reconciling ends with means.
- (b) The decision to send troops outside Nigeria must be, followed by the full preparation of all the various units of the Armed Forces. In addition, all essential human and material resources needed to survive during the operation must be, made available.
- (c) In terms of logistics, the operations to be undertaken must be planned up to the minor detail. Logistic is the back-end of military planning and thus determines the level of competence and military autarky of emerging regional powers. Based on this fact, the military policy and plans authorities must understand that the success of any logistic planning depend on the availability and continuous flow of resources, supplies, finance and the close liaison and coordinating of all the efforts involved in the peace-keeping operations.
- (d) Provision must be made for a centrally integrated logistic cell comprising the full complement of liaison staff from participating countries that should be involved in the planning of the operation right from the onset.

- (e) There must be a constant and realistic joint military training and exercises of the three arms of the military and other sister African nations. These exercises must be, conducted during peacetime, as this will save loss of lives resulting from uncoordinated actions during peace enforcement/ intervention operation.
- (f) In future peacekeeping operations, the Nigeria military should endeavour to set up a twenty-four (24) hour information unit that will gather and disseminate information about the operations of the troops on the field to the administrators outside the field of operations. In our view, this kind of an information unit will reduce the complexities of field operations, while at the same time create some form of a semblance of order out of the murderous chaos normally associated with field operations.
- (g) The military should introduce some form of flexibility in their various military operations. This implies that the military should be able to adopt both the conventional and the non-conventional (guerrilla) warfare.
- (h) Military planners working in collaboration with civilian policy makers should ensure that they prepare the political ground by seeking or negotiating with the various warring factions ever before the peacekeeping force is, launched into operations.
- (i) The Nigerian defence headquarters should make sure that the chain of command and control between the Nigerian contingent and other contingents are clearly defined and explicitly specified. This will go a long way in minimizing any clash of interest that might likely arise between participating countries.
- (j) The Nigerian Army should set up a "quick-reaction force" that would serve as a "buffer" before the actual launching of other units into operation. What is been said here is that the Nigerian Armed Forces should establish a reserve-unit/force which would be in a constant state of combat readiness; and which can be deployed at a moment's notice to hold the ground in any operation.
- (k) Finally, the welfare of the troops should be, given top priority. Troops must be fully kitted. They must be, provided with good medical facilities, transportation, accommodation and food like the composite ration. In addition, the Nigerian Army should formulate an effective burial policy and funeral arrangements for troops who dies while on a peacekeeping or any external

military assignment. Provision of these essential facilities would contribute immensely, to, the morale, high sense of duty and the total commitment required of a dedicated personnel.

Nigeria, like most other African countries, appears to lack viable cost effective and efficient procurement policy. Most of the weapons imported from Western countries are ever hardly tested for their suitability to the Nigerian environment. Hence, it has been observed that the weapons so imported into the country are too sophisticated and thus, inappropriate. However, in order to correct this anomaly, the study is of the view that the Nigerian military adopt the two basic types of procurement policies.

The first type of policy is the one that encompasses the whole process of planning, acquisition, deployment and the declaratory policies. It emphasizes the importance of studying what a country intends to buy, how it organises its men and material in anticipation of the envisaged procurement, what it declared to do with the weapons and why. The second type is, referred to as the life-cycle management policy. The life cycle begins with drawing up of specification by the Nigerian military choosing the right source for providing the equipment and weapons at a minimal cost; training of military personnel in the skills of weapons to be procured; and the maintenance and repairs of such equipment. Lastly, the life cycle further involves the modification, adaptation and indigenous manufacturing of the procured weapons in order to suit the Nigerian environment.

In terms of military expenditure, there has always been a continuous and constant increase in the nation's defence budget. This upward trend has been justified because of the growing demands and responsibilities of the Nigerian Armed Forces both within and outside the country. In order to meet up with these responsibilities, especially with the least impact and draw back on the Nigerian economy, the study is reiterating that the Nigerian military maintain its current size, while it attempts to modernize its weapons system through the procurement of equipment and ammunitions that would be used, in the long-run, to develop a viable defence industry.

Military Research and Development (MR&D) is an important component of a nation's military power and military strength. It is the effort to extend knowledge, technical expertise and military applications-existing or potential-to create more effective weapon systems and in further creating way and means of using these weapons. The Nigerian military has not imbibed such a philosophy of MR&D.

The study's recommendation in this area is that Nigeria should engage in more MR&D that are productive by adopting imported weapons and ultimately manufacturing her own indigenous weapon's system, to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign suppliers. However, the study is aware that there is a Defence Industry Corporation (DICON) of Nigeria; yet, one is of the opinion that the activities of the DICON show that the organisation is very defective in initiating actions that are, geared towards the local manufacturing of defence weapons. However, for the military to have a potent and highly viable MR&D industry, the following three factors must be, seriously considered:

- (i) Develop the urge to create and apply new knowledge, through research activities, which will expose scientists to the unsettling consequences of innovations.
- (ii) Understand that the adaptation, manufacturing and application of new technology require a great deal of investment.
- (iii) Realize that the benefits of MR&D are manifested in economics of scale, which favours countries that are large as well as highly productive.

For the Nigerian Army to be able to accomplish the tasks listed above, all the MR&D efforts of the Armed Forces must be directed at discovering and utilizing new ideas instead of relying and depending solely on constant procurement of new weapons. This paper is therefore recommending that the Nigerian Army adopt an integrated package approach to MR&D. The integrated package approach simply means reducing the importance attached to arms procurement, while more emphases are devoted to the development and adaptation of indigenous military technology. Furthermore, it entails that the Federal government should devote a very significant proportion of its military expenditure to basic research explorations and advance developments.

Other policy recommendations are that the military should focus on:

- The analyses and perception of threats to Nigeria's national security. This is an important aspect in a nation's military preparedness.
- The development of an effective military doctrine is another aspect that could enhance the Nigerian military performance.

Military doctrine enables military leaders to plan effectively and take rapid decisions in times of emerging international crisis.

- It is also necessary that the Nigerian military acquire offensive capabilities to complement its defensive ones. The Nigerian Army must achieve through the adoption of newer strategies, to be based on time-honoured deterrence and collective security concepts.
- The Nigerian military should incorporate the tactics and strategies of non-conventional warfare, urban warfare and counter-guerrilla/counterinsurgency warfare into its internal security and peace support operations.
- There must be a constant and realistic joint military training and exercises of the three arms of the military and other sister African nations. The military should introduce some form of flexibility in their various military operations. These should include non-conventional strategies of urban guerrilla warfare, sensitivity to public (domestic and international) opinion and human rights issues such as the handling of civilians in line with international humanitarian laws (IHL)
- The Nigerian military should set up a "quick-reaction force" that would serve as a "buffer" before the actual launching of other units into operation. This could be attained through the establishment of a composite force including all the three arms to complement the Army efforts in its ISOs. Other members to be co-opted into the composite group are, the State Security Services, Civil Defence and the police force, Civil and Youth Groups such as the existing Borno Vigilante Youth Groups, government agencies such as the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). This group is to be headed by an Army Commander and members should be given special training in guerilla and urban warfare. At the end of the training members should be given special ranks and pay package. The group will form the nucleus in the war against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The study focused on enhancing the capacity and structure of the military in carrying out its internal security duties as well as engages in international peace support operations. In doing this, various military, political and other such tactical measures that would enable the armed forces, confront the challenges of performing its constitutional roles of protecting the territorial integrity, and sovereign existence of the entire Nigerian polity.

The study dwelt extensively on the roles of the military in Nigeria's nascent democracy. Democracy provides opportunity for the military to ensure the protection of the corporate image of the country and preserve the morale of its personnel in the interest of military professionalism and national stability. The purpose of the Nigerian military internal security role was to ensure peace and stability within the polity. Consequently, since 1999, the Nigerian military has been involved in various internal security duties as well as, international peace support operations both within the African continent and in other parts of the world. In addition, the military has had to contend with series of threats, which endanger the national security. In dealing with these threats, it was observed that the military lacked the capacity (force structure, modern weapons and training) and the psychological motivation in defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation.

In carrying out the study, various issues such as, the subordination of the military to civil authority (civilian oversight); the quest to attain military professionalism; constant and realistic training; establishing functional training institutions; deliberate reorientation and retraining of the Nigerian military personnel; the quest for mutual trust among the officers and men; provision of welfare packages; as well as, the development of an effective indigenous military research and development were critically examined.

Our emphasis in this study however, is on the state of combat readiness of the Nigerian military. This emphasis is particularly of relevance because readiness of military forces is not a static condition but a dynamic and continuous one. A condition, which determines the degree of training of forces and the execution of any mission that, maybe assigned to them. In addition, combat readiness of the military expresses constant internal, moral, political and psychological preparedness of the armed forces, their ability to retain self-control in most critical situations, to display staunchness, courage, and heroism and combat skills.

Consequently, the study recommends that the Nigerian military must be a force of today and tomorrow that is highly disciplined, professional with an adequate amount of firepower, flexibility and mobility. In addition, the Nigerian military is implored to adopt a workable logistic plan; encourage research and development in the future development of the Nigerian Defence Industry; conduct regular joint Armed Forces training exercises for better future coordination and cooperation. The study also examines the various ways that the Nigerian military can adopt to implement a dynamic military strategy and doctrine that will protect the national interests, security and territorial integrity of the country. Above all, our position is that the onus is on the Nigerian Army to divorce itself from political governance and ethnic politics. Preoccupations with internal politics are sources of neglect of military responsibilities, which will in the end, inhibit the attainment, of professionalism and credibility.

Above all, the study concluded that for the military to successfully protect Nigeria's territorial integrity especially with regard to containing irregular activities from contiguous states, the Federal Government of Nigeria should not only intensify Nigeria's bilateral and multilateral cooperation, but must also be committed to implementing such agreements.

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