



Peace Research

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THE MILITARY AND INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: RETHINKING SECURITY FOR POSITIVE PEACE IN MAIDUGURI, NIGERIA

Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil Animasawun

The deployment of the military for internal security operations in (post)conflict communities comes with its own peculiar challenges which are often locale-specific, as in the case of victims of alleged military excesses in the Maiduguri metropolis in northeastern Nigeria. This article posits that, given accusations of human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings levelled against members of the military force by civilians as the military strives to enforce its mandate of the "Right to Protect" in the city, the type of peace resulting from prolonged military occupation in Maiduguri constitutes negative peace or a "victor's peace." The article argues that military deployment to (post)conflict spots should be conceived, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards an end—positive peace.

INTRODUCTION

Despite divergent views on the newness or oldness of the world's armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts today appear primarily as intra-state; there were thirty-six cases of reported intra-state armed conflicts in 2009 alone.¹ These sources of instability subvert democratization processes and result in the increased presence of the military on the streets in the affected areas. This is the case in Nigeria. Here the widening fault-lines of inter-group and state-society relations have combined to put the state in perpetual crisis. As such, argue Ebenezer Obadare and Wale Adebawu,² Nigeria is a metaphor for post-colonial African state crises; understanding

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Nigeria offers understanding of how the continent's socio-economic and political realities undermine its potentialities.

Since independence on 1 October 1960, Nigeria has had eight military regimes, five elected regimes, and one unelected civilian regime. By the time the fourth republic was inaugurated on 29 May 1999, the military had ruled the country for twenty-nine out of its thirty-nine years as a sovereign state. The current republic represents the fourth time Nigerians have seen a transition from a non-democratic to a democratic regime. The first republic lasted from 1960 to 1966. The second republic, from 1979 to 1983, was interrupted by a military putsch from 1983 to 1985. A third republic from 1985 to 1993 transformed the state from a military system to a diarchy when the Head of State transitioned into a military President atop democratically elected governors with a bicameral federal legislature and unicameral state legislatures. Rotimi Suberu and Adigun Agbaje describe Nigeria's post-colonial history as a study of military rule that can be divided into two epochs. The first epoch (1966-79) was that of "hegemonic exchange," when the country's military rulers encouraged the military governors in the states to exercise relative autonomy derived from the suspended constitution and the infusion of civilian politicians into the structure of military rule. The second epoch (1984-99) was defined by abusive personalization of power.³ Nigeria's transitions from military rule to democracy have been difficult. The country experienced a civil war from 1967 to 1970, and reached the brink of another civil war over the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election. Won by the late Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, a Yoruba from the country's southwest, many considered it the most credible election in the country. The dissatisfaction and frustration of the Yoruba people over the annulment nearly led them to secede from the Nigerian state.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, armed conflicts have arisen in the context of power struggles along identity lines, border disputes, and controversies on the role and limitations of religion in public life. The post-colonial state's failure to manage its affairs constructively and adhere to the spirit and letter of the constitution combine as cogent reasons for Africa's unending conflicts. According to Richard Joseph, these ideologically empty conflicts render post-Cold War African states as perpetually in crisis,⁴ and with Olawale Albert, raise deep questions about the mantra, "African Solutions to African Problems."⁵ As seen in places like Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire, when these contestations

degenerate into full blown civil wars, like the proverbial grass in a clash between two elephants, the hapless civilians bear the brunt of it.

In the face of such crises, the military is often pressed into what Bayo Adekanye describes as internal peace- or order-keeping.⁶ This creates a serious dilemma for civil-military relations and democracies: while the military must not be so strong as to constitute a threat to democratization in transitioning countries, it must also not be made to pose a threat to the state and citizens in nascent democracies like Nigeria. This dilemma is more compelling in the face of protracted and violent conflicts that threaten the internal security of states. Jorge Cockel notes that in many cases the military faces the following challenges: "demilitarization of militias, control and seizure of heavy and light weapons, protection of humanitarian aid zones, deterrence of anarchy and crime in cases of state collapse, prevention of violence, control of porous and/or contested borders."⁷ When the breakdown of law and order is imminent, the civilian authority is often torn between the inevitable violations of human rights that accompany military deployments and doing nothing. The near predictability of elections as precursors of protracted internal crises has called into question the relationship between democratization and peace.

MILITARY PRESENCE IN NIGERIA'S CONFLICT THEATRES SINCE 1999

Building on the work of Johan Galtung, David Barash and Charles Webel distinguish between negative and positive peace. Negative peace reflects the realist view on war and peace: "peace is found whenever war or other direct forms of organized state violence are absent."⁸ It tends to favour the status quo and, like Oliver Richmond's realist "victor's peace" that holds that peace will be sustainable if premised on military victory or the hegemony of a victor,⁹ equates the presence of peace with the absence of war. Positive peace, in contrast, is "a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated, and in which there is neither overt violence nor the subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence."¹⁰

In Nigeria, the scourge of conflicts conceptualized by Hugh Miall as deep-rooted, protracted, and intractable¹¹ has continuously compelled the deployment of the military to communities that are affected or threatened by these conflicts. As anticipated by Samuel Huntington,¹² the problem of terrorism and insurgency have become stark realities since the 1999 inception of Nigeria's fourth republic. Frequent and brutal inter- and intra-ethnic

and religious conflicts, militancy in the Niger Delta, and Islamist terrorism in the core north have been major peace- and security-related challenges that have kept the military on the streets. Fifteen years after democratization started in Nigeria, there is no geo-political zone in the country where the military has not been deployed. Such places include Idi-Araba in the southwest; Aguleri-Umeleri in the southeast Bauchi state; Borno state and Yobe state in the core north; Ataba, Tombia, Choba, and Ogoniland in Rivers state;¹³ Ilaje in Ondo state; Afesere in Delta state; Odi in Bayelsa state; and Zaki-Biam in Benue state.¹⁴ The military has emerged as a permanent feature on the streets in anticipation of—and in reaction to—public disorder or violent conflicts. This reliance on military models, methods, concepts, doctrines, procedures, and personnel gives a military character to public safety and public space issues.¹⁵ Unlike the past, when the military constituted a threat to democratization, its presence on the streets has become—paradoxically in a democratic regime—inevitable as a state response to preserve order, stability, peace, and security. Unfortunately, as seen in the invasion and destruction of communities such as Zaki-Biam and Odi, the militaristic handling of conflicts is laden with the flagrant abuse of human rights.¹⁶ While the presence of the military remains the surest way to guarantee public order and secure the state's vital interests in conflict-prone and post-conflict communities, in all of these places it has left behind many widows and orphans. Thus, although in a number of places the military has sustained public order through reliance on hard-power (negative peace), it has not produced or sustained positive peace. Given the many unintended victims of such military deployments, especially women and children, this must not escape intellectual inquiry.

BOKO HARAM

Nigeria's fourth republic is now threatened by *Jamaatu Ahlil Sunna Li-dawati wal Jihad*, otherwise known as Boko Haram, and its insistence on the Islamicization of the country. The state's anti-terrorism campaign against Boko Haram has informed the deployment of troops to northern states such as Borno, Bauchi, and Katsina. While the amnesty programme meant to initiate a process of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration in the Niger Delta was still fragile, the extra-judicial killing in Maiduguri of Boko Haram's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in July 2009, sparked even greater clashes in the north. Since then, Boko Haram has designated security personnel and

their offices as its prime targets in an ongoing wave of retaliation against the police violence that led to Yusuf's murder.

Boko Haram's terrorist activities assumed an international dimension when it bombed the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, on 26 August 2011.¹⁷ Territorially, Boko Haram's violent activities have largely been localized in the northern part of the country, where it insists that full *Shari'ah* is required. Despite views that Boko Haram is a fictitious group,¹⁸ its fierce confrontations with the military and other isolated attacks confirm that the sect constitutes a menace to public and state peace and security.¹⁹

In Galtung's comparison of Peace Studies and medical science, diagnosis is a key element in making a sick state well.²⁰ To diagnose the Boko Haram sect, we may consider two broad categories of insurgents or rebels conceptualized by Morten Boas and Kevin Dunn—roaming and stationary. While roving rebels are always on the move, relying on predation and pillaging,²¹ stationary rebels or guerrillas have physical enclaves and rudimentary structures of governance. They rely heavily on the local communities in their "liberated zones" and usually station themselves in a place in order to secure control over it.²² Boko Haram combines traits of both, while not ruling out its transnational links. This is because it has a hierarchy of control and rudimentary structures while its exact physical enclave remains unknown. It could also be described as a roving rebel movement because it robs banks for money.

Boko Haram's violent conflict with the Nigerian state emerged in a milieu of anti-Americanism in northern Nigeria and radical Islamism.²³ Anti-Americanism in Nigeria has a wide social and global source. Unaware of the growing American Muslim community, most in northern Nigeria believe that anything from the West is American and Christian. Also, many Muslims have the impression that most Christian evangelists receive financial and logistical support from the United States just as the Christians believe that Muslims get huge financial support from Saudi Arabia. This was reflected in the Pew Global Attitudes Project of 2007 which revealed that 89 percent of Nigerians who were Christians viewed the United States favourably while only 11 percent of respondents who were Muslims viewed the country favourably.²⁴ Radical Islamism has accompanied revivals of Islam and Christianity throughout the country, but in most parts of northern Nigeria, political, physical, and spiritual power is constructed and legitimized

by Islam that dates back to the Jihad of Othman Dan Fodio of 1804, which was a radical movement to purify Islam of the desecrations existing during that time and to create an Islamic state. This quest has continued in post-colonial Nigeria because of the determination to give Nigeria's northern region an Islamic identity. The revival of *Shari'ah* in 2000 fits into this struggle.²⁵ The conflict involving Boko Haram has produced Nigeria's version type of what Scott Appleby calls "ethno-religious nationalists" who are striving to make their religion the centre of the society,²⁶ and it has become a major threat to peace and security in Nigeria.

The federal government's military responses to combat Boko Haram have heightened insecurity in the affected states. According to Alice Hills, (post)conflict communities face many challenges that prevent the military from achieving peace, order, and security in conflict-ridden cities. These include inadequate knowledge of the environment by the deployed force; difficulty distinguishing combatants from non-combatants or terrorists from bystanders; and difficulty in gaining intelligence from the citizens, many of whom are suspicious of state representatives. A consequence of this is the erosion of trust between the military and the residents of the city.²⁷ This is the case in Northern Nigeria.

For example, to stop the menace of Boko Haram in Maiduguri, in June 2011 the federal government established a military Joint-Task-Force (JTF) comprised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State Security, and Nigeria Police.²⁸ Contrary to the deployment's official objective, citizens allege that when the men of the JTF engage in house-to-house hunts for Boko Haram members, all residents stand the risk of being abused, maimed, or killed by either the military or the rebels. Innocent citizens are killed, and the numbers of widows and orphans increase. With this have come two instances of the imposition of State of Emergency, first only in fifteen local government areas and then in Nigeria's three northwestern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.²⁹

Despite the insightful findings of Chris Alden, Monica Thakur, and Mathew Arnold³⁰ on activities of militias, Nigeria's security establishment seems unable to control Boko Haram's use of both guns and Improvised Explosive Devices. In a recent study carried out by Gbemisola Animasawun in areas affected by Boko Haram activities in Bauchi State, indoctrination, bitterness over the extra-judicial murder of its leader, and poverty were found to be constant narratives of grievances used by the sect to recruit and

toughen members.³¹ These challenges, present also in Nigeria's many post-conflict communities, raise the question, is there any alternative to military deployment?

MILITARY RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM IN BORNO STATE

Since 2009, when open confrontations between Boko Haram and military forces started, there has been consistent documentation of unlawful killings by men of the JTF in Borno state. Recent events lend credence to the 2011 Amnesty International report that the JTF threatened to kill residents if they failed to report future Boko Haram attacks.³² Also, in a report by Reuters International on 3 August 2012, Boko Haram denied JTF claims to have killed twenty Boko Haram members; spokesperson Abu Qaqa told reporters, "They only succeeded in killing civilians. Twenty of us cannot risk sitting in a volatile place to hold a meeting."³³ Adam Nossiter of *The New York Times* provides a vivid account of survivors of an April 2013 military invasion in the town of Baga following the killing of a soldier. According to survivors, senior relief workers, civilian officials, and human rights organizations, over 200 civilians were killed. The governor of Borno state, Kassim Shettima, stated,

This Baga is just on a bigger scale, but they have been doing this for ages. They've not adhered to the rules of engagement. When you burn down shops and massacre civilians, you are pushing them to join the camp of Boko Haram. We are in a Catch-22 situation. Boko Haram is a deadly insurgent force that needs to be confronted but not by a military that terrorizes its own people. We need them to carry out their duties in a civilized manner.³⁴

In the words of a resident, Mohammed Muhammad, who survived the invasion, "Many people died running into flames; I saw that. If they didn't run into the flames the army will shoot them. As flames enveloped the houses they used petroleum." Another survivor, Isa Kukulala, said, "They poured petrol on the properties. At the same time they are shooting sporadically into the fire. They took a small child from his mother and threw it inside the fire. This is what I have witnessed."³⁵

Military and civilian claims on the number of casualties differ widely. The military spokesperson, Brigadier General Austin Edokpaye, absolved the JTF of any wrongdoing. He claimed that "one soldier was killed while

30 Boko Haram terrorists lost their lives and unfortunately six civilians were killed and ten other civilians were injured in the cross-fire.”³⁶ Similarly, the federal government claimed that only 36 lives were lost. It also released a signed statement by the president’s spokesperson that “houses/properties destroyed were far less than 1,000.”³⁷ This, however, may be less than accurate as it is a standard practice in official circles to understate mortality statistics. According to John Campbell’s incisive analysis, official statistics should be multiplied by five to approximate the actual number of victims.³⁸ If this is true, unofficial figures corroborate Campbell’s observation. Against the military’s spokesman’s claim, Nwakpa O. Nwakpa of the Nigerian Red Cross stated,

Another 77 people are receiving medical care there in the ruins of a town where some 300 homes burned down Local residents blamed angry soldiers for burning down neighborhoods where they knew civilians were hiding. Our volunteers are on standby We are yet to be provided clearance. . . . By the time Borno state officials could reach the city . . . a local government official said at least 185 people were killed, something not disputed by a brigadier general who attended the visit.³⁹

After a two-day on-the-spot assessment, the Senator representing the area recounted that he saw 228 bodies distributed along these lines: “Makabartar Waya graveyard 130, Makabartar Arewa 60 and Budumari 30, 6 other bodies buried in town and over 4000 thatched houses torched.”⁴⁰ Analysis of satellite imagery of Baga by United States-based Human Rights Watch revealed that a total of 2,275 houses, mostly residential, were destroyed while 125 houses were damaged.⁴¹ Even UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon expressed “his firm conviction that no objective sought can justify this resort to violence,” and demanded that all involved fully respect human rights and ensure the safety of civilians.⁴²

These deaths of unintended victims come from both the military and Boko Haram. The International Society for Civil Liberties and the Rule of Law⁴³ presents a detailed diary of over 300 deaths from January to April 2013 occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram insurgents and the military. The citizens are caught in the middle.

BOKO HARAM, JTF, CIVILIAN VICTIMS, AND NEGATIVE PEACE IN MAIDUGURI

In Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, Boko Haram carried out a series of attacks following the murder of its leader and many of its members by men of the Nigerian police. Out of forty-four recorded attacks carried out by Boko Haram from 27 July 2011 to 26 January 2012, fifteen took place in Maiduguri.⁴⁴ These attacks raised calls to deploy the military or establish a force comprising both the military and the police in order to preserve public peace and security. While the military has had some success in staving off the attacks, it has also sparked a row between it and sections of the community over alleged abuses of human rights and wrongful killings of innocent residents.

In an apparent retaliation for the bombing of the Kaleri Ngomari Custain area on 9 July 2011 (when Boko Haram members allegedly targeted JTF operatives and injured some soldiers),⁴⁵ the JTF cordoned off the area and went from house to house using what Hills describes as vicious and illegal tactics against the residents.⁴⁶ Prior to that, there had also been allegations of extortion, unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, arbitrary and unlawful detentions, and intimidation.⁴⁷ In the retaliatory attack, the JTF allegedly killed at least twenty-five people, with many more men and boys reported missing.⁴⁸ According to eyewitnesses, the JTF burnt down many houses, forcing their occupants to flee, and badly beat many people including women and children.⁴⁹ Although the JTF claimed that only eleven people were killed and all were Boko Haram members, a group known as the Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought (BELT) claim that over forty innocent people were killed.⁵⁰ According to Tajudeen Suleiman,

Residents have complained that the soldiers break into their homes and kill innocent young men in the name of looking for Boko Haram sect members. The soldiers have also been accused of indiscriminate burning of houses and cars in areas where bombs were dropped by members of the sect. The morgue of the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital is filled with corpses of young men killed in military operations.⁵¹

A widow named Saudi reported, “After he was dragged out, I started crying and asked them to kill me too since they have killed my husband.”⁵² Here is another widow’s experience:

Talatu, another widow who is also an orphan, claimed the soldiers

broke into their home and shot her husband, Audu Fulani in her presence and those of their five children. Her husband was 38 years old. She alleged the soldiers also made away with the sum of N250,000.00 from their bedroom. They say my husband is Boko Haram, but he was not a Boko Haram.⁵³

Six other women—Hauwa Adamu, Saudatu Mamman Kurshe, Jamila Kiri Kanumbu, Binta Usman, Mairo Dahiru, and sixty-four-year-old Hajja Maira—likewise became widows when JTF personnel killed their husbands. Eighteen-year-old Hajara Mohammed lamented, “We have all lost our husbands recently as a result of the crisis in Maiduguri; all of us have children and have dependents. Most of us are fulltime housewives. So, do you foresee any happiness coming to us?”⁵⁴ Another widow gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the killing of her husband by men of the JTF:

On that day (Saturday), he was in his car, on his way back home from his place of work. What delayed him reaching home was that he branched at the place of a mechanic to pick our generator because we have serious problem of electricity here. He had picked the generator and before he arrived, a bomb exploded and the soldiers had cordoned our houses, looking for the Boko Haram members. I told them my husband was not one of them and even showed them some of his papers but they did not listen. They chased us away and set the house ablaze.⁵⁵

Another woman, Jamila Kiri Kanimbu, said she lost her husband and that she is now battling to care for eight children. “Our only solace,” she said, “is that our house was not burnt but despite pleas, the soldiers killed my husband.” For Binta Usman, it was a terrible Saturday. Shortly after the bomb blast,” she reported, “some soldiers came to our house and asked the whereabouts of my husband and when my husband, who was in the bedroom, heard strange voices, he came out.” She said he was interrogated for a while and then was shot in the hand: “He did not die but I saw him bleeding. . . . They took him away and up till today, we have not seen him. We have gone to all the hospitals but we didn’t see even his corpse.” Her husband left behind six children. “Our predicament,” she said, “is how to survive but we believe God has reasons for everything.” Mairo Dahiru said her husband was also killed by the military operatives even though he was not a member of the Boko Haram: “My husband was a driver. I have two

other co-wives and he left behind eleven children.” All of them, including the children, she said, were present and their breadwinner was forced out of his room and shot dead.

Another widow who recounted her ordeal was sixteen-year-old Hajara Mohammed. She said she got married at the age of fourteen and became a mother at fifteen. Her husband was also killed at home. “He tried to explain to them but they did not listen. My husband left me behind with another pregnancy,” she said. Fatima Baba, eighteen years old, said her husband was also felled on that fateful Saturday. In tears she said, “It is sad that he is gone. We got married two years ago and I have only one son.” Most of the women said their houses were burnt and therefore called on the federal and state governments to help them.⁵⁶

The JTF spokesman in Maiduguri justified the house-to-house searches because some of the population were shielding Boko Haram members, and because the sect was using teenagers to place bombs around its targets. Boko Haram insisted that those killed in such processes were innocent members of the public while the military maintained that they were members of the sect. The alleged wrongful killings led the Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought to call on the federal government to withdraw its troops from Maiduguri. In response, the government demanded that the elders suggest tangible and sustainable security alternatives.

As much as military deployment to Maiduguri illustrates a fulfillment of the Nigerian state’s responsibility to protect its citizens, it has produced two types of victims: the intended victims—members of Boko Haram—and unintended civilian victims. Thus an enemy image for the army is constructed in the minds of these widows and orphans.

Hills points out the complexity and difficulty of ensuring security in troubled cities like Maiduguri that represent both religious identity and ethnic nationalities, and sanctuaries and battle spaces for terrorists and insurgents. This combination makes cities in conflict-prone and post-conflict communities insecure. Although forces deployed for internal security operations are to be neutral, cities such as Maiduguri are not neutral spaces because they harbour factors that can worsen tense situations, such as proximate ethnic neighbourhoods, territoriality, economic interdependence, symbolism, and centrality.⁵⁷

In most parts of the country, especially northern Nigeria, insecurity is traceable to fear and want because of the high level of poverty, government

corruption, and risk to cherished values and lives. When we examine these contextual factors that precipitated the rise of Boko Haram, it is evident that reliance on the military alone will not bring about positive peace in the affected areas, including Maiduguri. The extent of corruption and exploitation in the relationship between the governors and the governed is glaring. Despite the military's presence, the citizens do not feel protected from rape, robbery, kidnapping, mutilation, torture, or death. Although in a number of places military deployments have sustained public order through reliance on hard-power, they have often been counter-productive to the restoration of peace and security, and have not yielded the desired dividends of positive peace. The accompanying enemy image of the state can make community residents empathize with terrorist organisations and it provides an avenue for people to be recruited into their ranks.⁵⁸ This is confirmed by David Wilson and Gareth Conway, who demonstrate that military operations alone are insufficient to effectively respond to domestic or international terrorism,⁵⁹ and by Jonathan Stevenson, who, with Iraq as a reference point, insists that a sole reliance on force in counter-terrorism or counter-Islamism has little potential for success.⁶⁰

The varied allegations and exchanges involving the residents, the military, the Borno elders, and the Borno state government point to deeper and clashing perspectives on the notion of peace and security and how to pursue it. In Bayo Adekanye's analysis, the attendant violence and the experience of the unintended civilian victims in the ongoing conflict call for fresh thinking. The pursuit of security and peace must protect the vulnerable and deliver help without hurting the inhabitants or creating an enemy image of the state in their minds. In the face of insecurity in a setting whose conception of physical, political, and spiritual power run contrary to that of the state, continued reliance on a militaristic approach in combating terrorism has little potential to make citizens safe. Therefore, the pursuit, design, and content of security promotion in Maiduguri must be premised on positive peace and a mind-set of constructive peace research.⁶¹ With this understanding, we may see order, security, and peace in a progression or continuum. On this continuum, the security provided must ensure that citizens not only feel safe but actually are safe.

HELP WITHOUT HURT: TOWARD A POSITIVE PEACE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA AND MAIDUGURI

At the end of the Cold War the United Nations Development Programme articulated an alternative to the realist, state-centred conception of security, namely, "human security." Human security has a universal concern, (particularly for individuals); it encompasses safety from chronic threats including include hunger, disease, and repression, and protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.⁶² According to Matt McDonald, the concept's workability, which centres on the security of individuals, is the strongest counter-argument against the realist school of security. Discussion on human security has raised three main issues. First, operationalising the concept requires human security proponents to move from a descriptive to a prescriptive use of the system.⁶³ Second, some scholars caution against universalizing the concept because it may abstract the individual, and the concept rests on the principles of Western democracy and the free market.⁶⁴ Third, states may benefit from the concept by "talking the talk" and not "walking the walk," as when Iraq used the exigencies of human security due to the drying up Euphrates River to solicit international assistance despite continued oppression of the people by the regime.⁶⁵

Given the complex and inchoate nature of many post-colonial African states, neither "orthodox" nor "new" conceptions of security precisely capture their nuanced security challenges. There is need to contextualize security and insecurity in the light of local and external vulnerabilities that threaten to bring down or weaken state structures.⁶⁶ These vulnerabilities include (1) the threats states pose to each other, (2) the threats institutions of organized violence (formal and informal) pose to each other, (3) the threats institutions of organized violence (formal and informal) pose to states and regimes, and (4) the threats those who control the means of violence pose to citizens and society. All four areas of concern must be addressed to ensure that the activities of the JTF in Maiduguri result in positive peace. For this paper, the major focus is on the fourth vulnerability. Clearly, the JTF as an agency that controls the means of violence poses a significant threat to the citizenry, especially women and children. Therefore, any conception of security must take into account the need for measures to restore the citizens' confidence in the JTF as a state security apparatus. The premise of this should be the need to deliver help without hurting the recipients of that help.

Even if military operations are considered inevitable and justifiable,

given the negative images of the military formed in the minds of many in these places, the military must ensure that the pursuit of security not alienate Maiduguri's citizens from their government. The pursuit of security must be not only for the State but also for the citizens, and the two can cooperate to achieve this security and pursue positive peace. To deliver help without hurting the recipients of that help, first, the pursuit of positive peace must prioritize the prevention of human rights abuses. Further, the military must establish an interface with the community to maximize the potential of civil-military cooperation, especially in the area of intelligence gathering.

Promoting such a cooperative relationship must account for the complexity of the terrain. As John Paul Lederach notes, complexity entails multiplicity, interdependency, and simultaneity.⁶⁷ Simultaneity is required both to combat Boko Haram and to establish positive peace in the community. Interdependency is equally needed between the military and residents, and this can only come when the military shows itself to respect the residents' right to life and when they are not (un)wittingly punished for acts committed by Boko Haram. This can be achieved by deterrence, education, and interaction. If military men found culpable of human rights infractions are properly disciplined, others are deterred and/or restrained from repeating such acts. Also, education on weapons handling and human rights for the men to be deployed can promote restraint in the use of firearms. In addition, as illustrated by Lederach's leadership pyramid,⁶⁸ a multi-level engagement of the grassroots, middle-level, and top leadership of the community can go far to restore the confidence of residents in the military. Frequent interaction with different levels of community actors can help clarify and correct perceptions and help construct a shared meaning of peace and security. Eventually the residents will begin to see Boko Haram as an existential threat to their collective security.

In *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Galtung elaborates an eightfold path to peace equally divided between positive and negative peace. To consolidate his argument that peace is not utopian, he identifies political, economic, cultural, and military routes to peace that can serve curative and preventive purposes.⁶⁹ These are determined by macro and micro-determinants that must be factored into the long-term pursuit of positive peace. In this context, the macro-determinants speak broadly to Nigeria's national integration, good governance, and security, while the micro-determinants concern Borno state and Maiduguri in particular.

At the micro level, Obafemi Awolowo rightly describes northern Nigeria as a universe "housing a large peasant mass enslaved by ignorance, poverty, superstition, antediluvian methods of cultivating the land, and with a hopelessly unorganized system of marketing their products."⁷⁰ In his view, "an educated citizenry is indispensable to the satisfactory and successful practice and working of democracy."⁷¹ While these challenges are not unique to the region, its residents are indisputably the worst affected compared with other parts of the country. Addressing these challenges requires both political and economic interventions rooted in good governance, which is largely absent in Nigeria. Many international financial institutions (IFI) identify this absence as a prime cause of conflict and insecurity.⁷² Accordingly, says Robert Rotberg, good governance must be "the effective provision of political (socio-economic) goods to citizens."⁷³

Further, the activities of the military in northern Nigeria must become part of the solution (positive peace) and not part of the problem. As Ekaterina Stepanova notes, "Despite the state's continuing conventional superiority—in terms of power and status—over non-state actors, the critical combination of extremist ideologies and dispersed organizational structures gives terrorists many comparative advantages in their confrontation with the state."⁷⁴ This implies that, where the military is deployed, winning the battle in the long run must be based on the support of the local population. Soldiers must see themselves as deployed and obliged to restore the liberty and sense of security of the populace which Boko Haram has taken away. This recalls words of George Washington, which, though spoken in a different context, can be instructive for the military's pursuit of internal security:

When we assumed the soldier we did not lay aside the citizen and we shall most sincerely rejoice with you in that happy Hour, when the Establishment of American Liberty on the most firm and solid Foundations, shall enable us return to our private Stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful and happy Country.⁷⁵

In words that echo Galtung's four paths to positive peace (political, economic, cultural, and military), Alex Bellamy argues that peace or security operations must not only create spaces and atmospheres for negotiated conflict resolution but must also actively contribute to the construction of politics and economies that are life enhancing.⁷⁶ This point was eloquently made by Obafemi Awolowo during Nigeria's 1967-70 civil war:

It is important and crucial to win the war. But it is equally

important and crucial, if not more so, to win the peace. For if we lost the peace, we would have fought the war in vain, and our sacrifices would have been colossal and criminal waste One of the potent means of winning the peace was to correct the economic and social ills—that is, abject poverty, preventable diseases, squalor, and ignorance—which had in the past, plagued, and, for the present, continue to torment this country, without immediate respite.⁷⁷

Nigeria's war against terrorism requires more than reliance on force. It requires the cooperation of both citizens and the state in order to consolidate the legitimacy of the Nigerian state and ensure that the Nigerian army's mandate of the "Right to Protect" is strengthened and legitimized in Maiduguri. Mindful of the fact that the *raison d'être* of the modern state is security, security will be secure if there exists a shared conception of security between the state and citizens who receive the service provided. In order to achieve this, security must be both *subject*-specific (citizens) and *situation*-specific (social environment), and about *feeling* (impression) and *being* (reality). This premises the legitimacy of the state on the safety of the people. An aggregate of all these can constitute the foundation for the achievement of positive peace.

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