


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ASSESSING THE SECURITY OF LEARNING SPACES IN SELECTED PRIMARY SCHOOLS WITHIN ILORIN METROPOLIS

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Abstract

Most school environments no longer provide the security required for effective teaching and learning. Today, security issues have become major challenges in our educational institutions, such as the gunmen attack on Government Secondary School in Chibok and several kidnappings of school children in the South-east. Consequently, this study set out to explore and assess security situations of public primary schools in Ilorin metropolis. Adopting a mixed research method, data were gathered through the security vulnerability checklist and In-depth interview. The data were obtained through self-administration of the checklist in 20 randomly selected public primary schools and 10 In-depth interviews with head teachers in the three LGAs within Ilorin Metropolis. The findings of the study revealed that primary schools in Kwara State face many man-made and natural safety and security challenges such as flood, theft, burglary, vandalism and kidnapping. However, despite this life-threatening security challenges, there are no adequate security measures or devices to curb the threats. The study also reveals that there are no standard response measures for security challenges. Based on the findings, the study recommends emergency response plans for managing security threats such as holding emergency PTA meetings, taking occasional roll calls of the students, constant maintenance of school facilities, employing trained security personnel and provision of modern emergency response equipment.

Keywords : Learning Facilities, Safe School, School Security, Public Primary School, Safety Practices.

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INTERROGATING BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON NIGERIA'S POLITICAL IMAGE

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Abstract

Every nation of the world is conscious of her political image. It is the bargaining power of most nations among the comity of states. Nigeria's political image had been suffering from political leukaemia which is a combination of corruption and internal insurgency. The political image of Nigeria facing the menace of Boko Haram had become battered by the outburst of the insurgency in 2009 till 2016. Many countries have further placed Nigerians on a closely watched mirror of terrorist-attack prone state. With this advancing development, Nigeria's future relevance in political landscape of the world might be in jeopardy. This paper analyses the political implications of Boko Haram insurgence and its trend in Nigeria. The research analytical tool of process tracing is used in this study. The broken window theory is used to further justify the spread and activities of the insurgent groups. This paper concludes by submitting that insurgencies like cancerous growth and time bomb, deface the state and a virile political effort is needed to stop the future harm on the state.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Broken Window Theory, Development, Nigeria, Political Deraignment.

Introduction

Every nation of the world is conscious of their political image. It is a potent platform where other nations of the world relate. It is a formidable platform to justify a country that can be freely associated with or restrictedly associated with. Great nations of the world had used their political image to determine who their friends are and who their supposed political state foes are. The political image gives a little lee way to nations in terms of the level of international connectivity and alliance. It sets up other platforms of developments such as the economic, cultural and religious platforms. It is the bargaining power of most nations among the comity of states. Through this platform, the United Nation (UN) although multifaceted in her levels of relations among nations but primarily has a formidable political image which brings the whole nations of the world into a single political entity and alliance. Also, the United State of America (USA) had offered the hand of friendship to many regions of the world as allies due to their convergences in political terms using her strong political image. Every nation as well uses the political platform to project their national political images. To this end, any state that is not part of this union is seen as pariah nation among the comity of states and may be alienated from the numerous benefits attached to the common political pool.

Nigeria's political image is an epitome of attraction in West Africa, Africa and the world at large. In the West Africa region, the political image of Nigeria is ubiquitous to the extent that almost every action and inaction affecting the region first of all passes through the tables of the Nigerian government for possible reflection and fine tuning. In Africa, the political prowess of Nigeria cannot be over emphasized. Political decisions that affect Africa to a large extent do have a Nigerian input for smooth impartation and implementation. In the whole, the political image of Nigeria cannot be jettisoned among comity of states in the developed world but not yet as strong as that of the United State. To some extent, Nigeria's political image had been severally battered by various internal insurrections and is suffering from political leukaemia which is a combination of corruption and internal insurrection.

The political image of Nigeria facing the menace of Boko Haram is a great concern among scholars of both national and international repute. Nigeria had become battered by the outburst of large scale violence of the Boko Haram in 2009 till 2016.

The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria had grown through a dramatic scale of progression. There are about three million (3.3 million) IDPs across Nigeria with Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States having a huge proportion of 1,434,149, 136,010, 131,203 IDPs respectively (IDMC 2016). The menace has a domino effect directly on four countries bordering Nigeria at the north-eastern area which include Chad, Cameroon and Niger. The head count of the internally displaced people is increasing as the crisis lingers and its effects on the region are enormous and

cumbersome (Ibeanu, 2015).

In West Africa, the foremost regional organization, Economic Commission of West Africa States (ECOWAS) had made financial, technical and political advice in attempts to succour the effect from escalating to more turbulent guerrilla warfare in the region. The Africa Union which houses the political integration of the continent has shown some concern such as technical assistance and political backing for the Nigeria government in solving the menace which had transcended the shores of Nigeria to other neighbouring countries. Several developed countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and China had shown concern in assisting Nigeria government in ameliorating the pain or eventual quenching of the insurrection by rendering intelligence, financial and military supports. The concern of the United Nation (UN), the world political body by offering special intelligence supports to the countries involved through specialised agencies is also a reflection of the worry of the whole world to the prevailing life threatening incidence the people of Nigeria and indeed West Africa are facing.

A few countries have placed Nigerians on a closely watched mirror as a terrorist attack prone state (Rogers 2012; Olojo 2013). This has ranked Nigeria with some notorious zones of the world where terrorist attack and insurrection are bred and transferred to other nations. Therefore, several Nigerians had been subjected to special check up before visas and entry permit are issued. In reality, no state will like to inflict her citizens with terrorism by permitting a casual check and not thorough enough scrutiny of classified citizens of some terrorism ridden states. With this

advancing development, Nigeria's future relevance in the political landscape of the world might be in jeopardy.

This paper analyses the political implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. How it was allowed and how and why it should be disallowed. This will be discussed with a model showing the cycle of terrorism in a polity. The cycle explains what constitute the onset of terrorism in a polity, what allows it and what action(s) can curtail (disallow) its effects, its possible termination and potential resurgence. This paper also compiled a chronological data of attacks made by the Boko Haram. Descriptive statistical data analysis using percentage and graphical representations were employed to further explain the political implications of the insurgency on Nigeria's polity.

The process tracing methodology is used in this work. It makes use of the sequence and structure of events as evidence that a given stimulus caused a certain response in a case. Process tracing aims to ascertain the causal process linking an independent variable(s) — Nigeria to the outcome of a dependent variable in this case Boko Haram particularly in small-n studies. This method is particularly useful for looking at deviant cases as the objective and research question of this study is concerned. Also it determines the specific factors that lead them to diverge from expected trends. While process tracing may not be able to exclude all but one theory in a given case, it can narrow the range of possible explanations and can disprove claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient to produce an outcome (George and Bennett 2005; Collier 2011).

The broken window theory is entrenched in this paper to show the extent of neglect by the political authorities of Nigeria which allows the insurgent group to ravage the political terrain of the state. The paper also enriches the theory by including the window-guard strategies for preventing the breakages in the window. This will create a lee way to curtail the spread and other activities of insurgent groups and other societal anomalies.

This paper concludes by submitting that insurgencies like cancerous growth spreads to the whole body of the country rapidly without being noticed but suddenly, it will break down the entire system and render it a potential failed state. Also like a time

bomb it suddenly explodes, catches the state officials unawares and defaces the state. A virile and concerted political effort is needed to stop the future harm on the state once it starts. Suggestions are made to the citizens at the local levels where the hidden planning of the insurgent activities are been conceived or implemented and to the state political authority at large on the importance of rapid response to intelligent information, drastic efforts made and reducing politicking of the security of the state to a minimal level.

Conceptual Clarification

Terrorism

Terrorism is a complex issue that has been studied and debated for several decades. Terrorist attacks do not occur in a vacuum, but they are instead products of complex interactions between individuals, organizations, and environments (Forest, 2010). Terrorism transcends local targets to international attacks so as to instil fear on the respondents. Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of the polity to create fear due to the fear of a political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or—equally important—the threat of violence. These violent acts are committed by nongovernmental groups or individuals aggrieved within the government sponsoring the separatist groups. Terrorism is by nature political because it involves the acquisition and use of power for the purpose of forcing others to submit, or agree, to terrorist demands (Hoffman 2009).

Terrorism involves the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, not just within the direct victims but among a wide audience. Terrorism proper is thus the systematic use of violence to generate fear, and thereby to achieve political goals, when direct military victory is not possible. In order to attract and maintain the publicity necessary to generate widespread fear, terrorists must engage in increasingly dramatic, violent, and high-profile attacks. These have included hijackings, hostage takings, kidnappings, car bombings, and, frequently, suicide bombings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI 2012) describes terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

Further, there are many different kinds of terrorism, defined primarily by ideological

orientations like ethno-nationalism, left-wing, religious, and professions. And just like there are many different kinds of terrorism, there are many typologies of contexts in which terrorism occurs. One popular typology identifies three broad classes of terrorism: revolutionary, sub revolutionary, and establishment terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism is arguably the most common form. Practitioners of this type of terrorism seek the complete abolition of a political system and its replacement with new structures. Sub revolutionary terrorism is rather less common. It is used not to overthrow an existing regime but to modify the existing socio-political structure. Establishment terrorism, often called state or state-sponsored terrorism, is employed by governments—or more often by factions within governments—against that government's citizens, against factions within the government, or against foreign governments or groups (Jenkins 2012).

Terrorism is most often fuelled by individuals and groups who are very dissatisfied with the economic, religious and or political status quo, and have come to believe in the need to use violence because they see no other way to facilitate change. Terrorism is also seen as a violent product of an unequal distribution of power on local, national, or global levels. It is usually bred by secluded group of people aggrieved by the states action(s) which may include failed state promises among other claims of infringements on their right and fundamental privileges.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is an Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist group which is meant to wipe out modernism in its form and shape so as to establish Sharia-Islamic form of governance. The group was formed in 2002 by Mohammad Yusuf (1970-2009). He was a radical Islamist cleric, in Maiduguri, Borno state, in North Eastern Nigeria. Following his expulsion from two mosques in Maiduguri by Muslim clerics for propagating his radical views, he set up a religious complex, called Markaz. The complex included a mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families in Nigeria, and neighbouring countries like Niger, Cameroon and Chad sent their children to the school to get Islamic education. The centre had ulterior political goals to create an Islamic state and impose Sharia Laws, and it soon became a recruiting ground for future jihadist to fight the state (Chothia 2012; Shuaibu and Salleh 2015).

Shuaibu, Salleh, and Shehu (2015), remarked that the Boko Haram which emerged around 2002 was a peaceful local Salafist Islamic movement whose original aim was preaching and assisting the needy. The group was initially operating under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization under the leadership of Mallam Lawal. When Lawal travelled for his educational pursuit in Madina, Saudi Arabia, Yusuf became the leader of the movement. In addition, Yusuf's leadership opened the group to popularity and political influence (Chothia 2012).

Boko Haram is a Hausa term for "Western education is forbidden". The official name for Boko Haram is "Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad" which means "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad." As its name suggests, the group is adamantly opposed to what it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities in northern Nigeria (Forest 2012).

The Boko Haram group's intention is to carry out holy war (Jihad) to Islamize Nigeria, West Africa and probably Africa as a whole. Given the global jihadist movement, there is the likelihood that the group may be receiving ideological, motivational, and material support from other jihadist movements in Africa and elsewhere such as Al-Shabab, Al-kyada and other splinter groups. The recent Boko Haram crises that began in 2009 were considered an off-shot of the Maitasine initially, but the ideological differences between the two groups set them apart even though both have adopted terrorism as a weapon. The Maitatsine violence ended when the security forces killed the sect's leader, but that of the Boko Haram only escalated when the group's leader was killed (Umar 2013).

Theoretical Framework

The broken window theory is entrenched in this paper to analyse the neglect by the socio-political and economic structure of Nigeria. It expresses the uncaring attitude, to some extent, for the emergence of the insurgent group ravaging the political terrain of the state. The paper also enriches the theory by including the window-guard strategies for preventing the breakages in the window. This will create a lee way to curtail the spread and other activities of insurgent groups and other general societal anomalies.

The broken window theory was first coined in the Atlantic publications by Wilson and Kelling (1982). The theory is basically meant to explore the reason for the occurrence and reoccurrence of crime and violence in an organized community. The theory assumed that disorder, mayhem, turmoil, social disorder and crime in general are mostly linked in a kind of developmental sequence. There is a linkage and sequential growth of crime and criminalities from a neglect of delinquent behaviour state to a more advanced vandalism and damage to life and property stage. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired; all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is due to the mind set of uncaring attitude for community dignity and collective security principles.

A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, and a window is smashed, the ground is in this sense gradually being prepared for crime and criminalities. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children get emboldened and become more rowdy (Aluko, Mu'awiyya and Balogun, 2015). This is creating room for gangsterism and hoodlums capable of growing into super crime master in the community if the case is not nipped in the bud. Families move out, unattached adults move in, an intruder may influence the community with unruly behaviours capable of infecting the community. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move, they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, a slum community is created. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers. These definitely will lead to pandemonium in the urban areas.

This indicates as observed by Wilmot (1994) that the easy hands strengthened by unemployment and other social vices coupled with disobedience to the law and constituted authorities will be cultivated and life will be made unbearable for the rest of the community. These scenarios painted above exemplified the Boko Haram syndicate neglect in Nigeria. Nigeria's socio-political atmosphere is an atmosphere which allows all and sundry to grow at his own pace. The strong and rich dominates the weak and poor, subjecting them to a perpetual neglect of basic necessity of life to attain a good living. These include good food, potable water, comfortable housing, good road, affordable health facility and a stable income. The winner takes all while the loser losses all in the Nigeria's zero sum game. The rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer.

The poor and the middle class who are considered weak in the polity therefore create a niche for themselves so as to be able to survive in the imbalanced socio-political and economic relationship in the society. The Boko Haram as a point of theoretical analysis and centre piece in this paper is a creation of neglect in the society. They were neglected and overlooked in the society until they rot out into calamitous anti-state entity. Political neglect in term of slakes in taking proper and prompt actions against separatist ideology in the polity. It causes havoc to lives and properties to a large extent, inflicting and jeopardising the good living of the rich and creating pandemonium for the society at large.

The window-guard strategy is a mechanism which is applicable to prevent windows to be broken. It prevents socio-political and economic neglect in the polity. It safe guards the societies window from been broken down by any criminal syndicate. The window-guard strategy is a dual monitoring mechanism which employs both the general community members on the one hand as the chief agent of safe guarding the polity for proper accountability, checks and balances. The government official security personnel of the state is the counterpart of the mechanism which depends on the general community members for proper studying, scrutiny and securing of the community against some perceived criminal syndicate member of the community.

The window-guard strategy functions to deter potential criminals and hoodlums in the society. The dual nature of the strategy safe guards the polity from unnecessary damages and destruction of lives and properties. The official security personnel depend slightly on the information from the community and largely on their personal informatics so far they are part of the community. The general community members in the same vein largely depend on the official security personnel for prevention and deterrent of any insurgent or terrorist groups. Prompt response is crucial to the success of the window-guard strategy if a harmonious and hegemony of the state is to be preserved.

Boko Haram's Expedition in Nigeria

There is always trigger stimuli that do stimulate the onset of an event. The onset of such event might have a spill over or domino effect on some other issues. The onset therefore might become the beginning of doom and the end of happiness or the end of doom and the beginning of happiness for such country or state (Aremu and Aluko,

2015). The onset of Boko Haram crisis was in 2009. From an overview perspective, it is a form of doom for Nigeria, West Africa, Africa and the world at large.

The stimuli that stimulate the Boko Haram attacks were the new government legislation of wearing helmet for motorcycle riders. The government of Borno state gave the police order to enforce the use of helmet as part of the 'operation flush out'. The members of the sect went out on motorcycles for funeral without wearing helmets and the police stopped them. This resulted in a clash between the police and the sect members, which led to the death of four members of the sect while about eighteen of the members were injured. Yusuf became angered and wrote his famous tirade entitled 'An open Letter to the Federal Government' in which he threatened the government and urged them to respond within forty days (Murtada, 2013).

Members of Boko Haram are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe. This makes up approximately four (4) percent of the population who are concentrated in the north-eastern states of Nigeria like Bauchi and Borno. The population of the Hausa and Fulani is about twenty seven (27) percent of the population which spread across most of the northern states. Since 2009 till 2016, the group has attacked police stations and patrols, politicians, village chiefs, religious leaders of both Christian and Muslim faith, and perceived anti-Islamic individuals whom they deem to be engaged in offensive activities to Islam, like drinking alcohol and rearing swine.

Boko Haram has also carried out several mass casualty attacks and is the first militant group in Nigeria to embrace the use of suicide bombings. Boko Haram expanded its terrorist attacks in Nigeria to include international targets, such as the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja in August 2011. Forest (2012) reiterated that the group also made significant leaps in its operational capability, and there are indications that members of the group have received weapons and training in bomb-making and other terrorist tactics from al-Qaeda affiliates in the north and/or east of the continent.

The activities and attacks from the group has escalated in 2013, as a result, the Federal Government declared state of emergency in three most affected states of the region in May 2013, extending the existing ones that have been declared in some parts of Borno and Yobe in late 2011. These attacks have increased in frequency

between 2012 and 2015 whereby the sect, in April 2014 adopted new tactics of kidnapping female students and women in the north-eastern part of the country. On April 14th 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped nearly 300 students from Government Girls Secondary School Chibok, as a result of which the United Nation Security Council committee blacklisted the group on 22nd May 2014.

Between 2013 and 2015, about 8000 people were killed in Boko Haram violence and over 30,000 injured. United Nation and Nigerian officials reported that more than six million (6,000,000) Nigerians have been affected, and more three hundred thousand (300,000) have been internally displaced. And at least two thousand (2,000) were killed in the first half of 2014 (Blanchard 2014). Therefore, the threats posed by the group of recent, places the existence of Nigeria as a single indivisible entity in jeopardy. On August 24th 2014, Shekau, the sect leader declared areas under his sect's control as New Caliphate which would be governed according to Islamic Sharia and jihadist orientation.

The group also carried out what the Amnesty International described as a deadly attack, the worst so far in the history of the group, by attacking the Kano Central Mosque in November 2014 (Mark 2015). The members of the group set off three suicide bombs and fired at the worshippers, killing more than 100 people and injuries more than 200 (Nicholas 2014). Also in a related issue, Boko Haram carried out the deadliest massacre in the town of Baga in Borno state in which more than 2000 people were killed.

Some noteworthy attacks carried out by Boko Haram include:

- a) September 7, 2010: Raid on a prison in Bauchi, Nigeria, freeing over 700 inmates.
- b) June 2011: Boko Haram's first suicide bombing takes place at a police station in Abuja.
- c) Christmas Eve 2010: Bombings of churches during Christmas services kill 32. (Jos and Maidiguri)
- d) August 26, 2011: Suicide bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja kills


23 people in one of the deadliest attacks in the U.N.'s history.

- e) December 25, 2011: Attacks on five churches in response to Christmas celebrations kill about 40 people. Attacks struck Madalla, Jos, Gadaka and Damaturu.
- f) January 2012: Attacks across Kano kill about 185 people.
- g) April 2012: Car bomb near a church in Kaduna holding an Easter service kills about 40.
- h) July 2012: Suicide bombing of a mosque in Maiduguri that fails to kill the most senior imam in Borno but kills five Muslims.
- i) February, 2013: Kidnapping of seven French citizens in Cameroon. They are released two months later.
- j) August 11, 2013: Massacre of 44 Muslims during prayers at mosques in Konduga.
- k) September 29, 2013: Massacre of 44 teachers and male students at a college in Gujba.
- l) November 2013: Kidnapping of a French priest in Cameroon. He is released six weeks later.
- m) February 15, 2014: Storming of Christian village in Izghe, killing 106.
- n) February 26, 2014: Attack on a college in Buni Yadi kills 29 students.
- o) April 14, 2014: Kidnapping of about 276 schoolgirls in Chibok. The vast majority are Christians.
- p) May 2014: Massacre of about 300 people in Gamboru Ngala.

The strength exercised by the group is in a decreasing momentum. There are no current and credible public estimates of Boko Haram's current membership. Shekau leads the group with an iron fist, killing rivals and not permitting other commanders to get publicity by appearing in his videos. In terms of organization, it operates as an insurgency/guerilla force, with units having between 300 and 500 fighters each. Boko Haram carries out acts of terrorism, but also tries to control territory and

establish authority. (cnn.com/2014 boko-haram-leader) The group has little support in Nigeria. A 2013 Pew poll found that Boko Haram's support among Muslims in Nigeria has decreased to 24% from 2010 to today, with only two percent expressing a favourable opinion of it. About 83% expressed an unfavourable opinion. The remaining 15% did not have an opinion on the group (clarionproject.org/analysis). The descriptive statistical data analysis below shows the bar chart frequency distribution of death per year in Nigeria's Boko Haram terrorism expedition. The graphical representations further explain the extent of damage caused by the Boko Haram insurgent group and its extrapolation implications on the political implications of the insurgency on Nigeria's polity. It is evident that insurgence groups hit a high record of death per month in the country in the early 2013 and this record rises gradually to an unbearable level of state of emergency. The state of economy has a blunt stain on the political image of Nigeria. The ripple effect has a spiral effect on the number of external states that prefer to partner in economic, social or politically with Nigeria.

Reported civilian deaths by Boko Haram, Sept 2010-Jan 2015



Note: Fatalities up to 10 Jan, includes provisional 150 deaths for attack on Baga
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof Clionadh Raleigh, Uni of Sussex

Implications on Nigeria's Political Image

thrown their weight behind Nigeria in terms of political mobilization of anti terrorism policies (Osezua and Aluko, 2016). Others have practically sent in intelligent reports, military hardware, financial resources allocation for the payment of combatant armies and other logistics supports. Prominent among these states are the United State of America, Britain, France, among others. Other African states such as Niger and Cameroon had sent in troops to jointly support the combat process. The reactions of all other United Nations to the prominent political image of Nigeria are germane reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency to be disallowed in all its forms and shapes in Africa and other parts of the world.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper analysed the political implications of Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. How it was allowed and how and why it should be disallowed. Nigeria had become battered by the outburst of large scale violence of the Boko Haram in 2009 till 2016. More than fifteen thousand (15,000) lives had been lost and more than fifty thousand (50,000) people were displaced internally in Nigeria. The menace has a domino effect directly on four countries bordering Nigeria at the north-eastern area which include Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. This brings the number of the internally displaced people to more than one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) people.

In West Africa, the Economic Commission of West Africa States (ECOWAS) had made financial, technical and political advice in attempts to succour the effects. The Africa Union which houses the political integration of the continent renders some political backing for the Nigeria government in solving the menace and the affected neighbouring countries. Several developed countries such as the United State, Britain, Germany, France and China among others had assisted Nigeria government in terms of intelligence, financial and military supports. The United Nation (UN) in particular offers special intelligence supports to the countries involved in the menace.

This paper analyses the political implications of Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria using a process tracing analytical tool. It reveals how the terrorist group were allowed and how and why it should be disallowed. This paper also compiled a chronological data of attacks made by the Boko Haram. The research method of

process tracing tool is employed to achieve the objective of the study which is to assess the political trends and implication of Boko Haram on Nigeria.

The broken window theory explains the extent of neglect by the political authorities of Nigeria which allowed the insurgent group to ravage the political terrain of the state. The paper also enriches the theory by including the window-guard strategies for preventing the breakages in the window. This will create a lee way to curtail the spread and other activities of insurgent groups and other societal anomalies.

The paper also notes that to a large extent the citizenry are not satisfied with the response of the government to these incidents which is dwindling and not at par with the tactics of the terrorist group. The reactions of all other African States to the high and creamier political image of Nigeria are prominent reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency to be disallowed effectively within Nigeria and other spheres of their operations. The reactions of all other part of the world to the political image of Nigeria—seen as gate way to Africa are prominent reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency to be disallowed promptly. The reactions of the United Nations to the prominent political image of Nigeria as a major player in global stability and politics are germane reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency to be disallowed in all its forms and shapes in Africa and other parts of the world.

This paper concludes by submitting that insurgency, like cancerous growth, spreads to the whole body of the country rapidly without being noticed but suddenly, it breaks down the entire system and renders it a potential failed state. Also insurgency is like a time bomb that suddenly explodes, catches the state officials unawares and defaces the state. Therefore, a virile and concerted political effort is needed to stop the future harm on the state.

It is recommended that the government at the federal level should make the citizens at the local levels where the hidden planning of the insurgent activities are been conceived or implemented agents coded as informants for classified information dissemination. The government at all levels should take as priority the importance of rapid response to intelligent information, drastic efforts made and reducing politicking of the security of the state to a minimal level. The security agents should consider the state as an entity to be secured and not money making venture to be cartelized. Therefore, rapid response is essential to the sanitization of the community of any build up to neo terrorist groups and the curbing of any growing trend of terrorism.

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